Opinion
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News Analysis
Anglo-Americans deliver Musharraf
By C. Raja Mohan
NEW DELHI, JAN. 13. The Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf's decisions to declare a war against the `jehadis' in his country and suggest a readiness to discard the instrument of cross-border terrorism against India constitute a major diplomatic triumph for the United States and Great Britain.
The swift routing of the Taliban after September 11 and the management of the Indo-Pak. military confrontation since December 13 have made the Americans and their Anglo-Saxon cousins the most influential external players in the subcontinent.
The Taliban ran for cover so fast in the wake of the American bombing of Afghanistan, that other powers who might have hoped to see the Americans get bogged down - just a little bit - in the quagmire of Afghanistan have had little room to play. Within just eight weeks - from October 7 to December 9 - of American military operations, the Taliban became a footnote in history.
Similarly, within a month of the attack on Parliament on December 13, Gen. Musharraf was compelled by the relentless pressure from the Anglo-Americans to recant on cross-border terrorism and drop the much-loved distinction in Pakistan between its endorsement of the war against international terrorism and support to the ``freedom struggle'' in Jammu and Kashmir.
Of course, skeptics would argue that too much credit is being given to Britain. But the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was quick in his assessment of what September 11 meant and smart enough to come out unambiguously in support of the American war in Afghanistan.
While the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, burnt the telephone lines calling the External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, and Gen. Musharraf almost every day to cool Indo- Pak. tensions, it was Mr. Blair who delivered the blunt words directly to the General last week. It was his tough message that Pakistan will no longer be allowed to fudge the question of terrorism in Kashmir that apparently converted Gen. Musharraf to the ``reformist'' path.
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The return of the Anglo-Saxons to the subcontinent does not bring much cheer to the Europeans, Russians and the Chinese who have had to settle for a secondary role in defeating the Taliban and defusing the Indo-Pak. tensions. As the Bush administration took charge after September 11, the other powers either had to extend support or keep their reservations to themselves.
The Europeans (with the exception of the French) have been too domesticated by the welfare state to retain any sense of geopolitics. Having long ago handed over the messy business of security to Washington, Europe has little courage of conviction to take sides in difficult moments. At best of times, Europeans can only offer a liberal critique of the U.S. policies.
Within the subcontinent, the Russians and the Chinese are constrained by the lack of political credit with both the rivals. Beijing has little leverage in New Delhi and Moscow even less in Islamabad. That has left the field open to Washington, which has expanded its ties to New Delhi in recent years and retained its influence in Islamabad, to defuse the latest Indo- Pak. crisis. Britain naturally gets the award for the best supporting role.
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The Europeans will certainly learn to live with the rising profile of the U.S. in the subcontinent. But what about Russia and China who see America mucking around, rather successfully, in regions adjoining them? The prospect of long- term American military presence and political influence in Central Asia and the subcontinent is certainly not appealing to Moscow and Beijing.
There is speculation here that the Chinese Premier, Zhu Rongji, who will have political consultations here this week, will try and revive the Indian interest in the idea of a ``strategic triangle'' among Beijing, Moscow and New Delhi. With America setting up military bases in Pakistan, and India drawing closer to Washington, Beijing might want to take some political insurance in New Delhi.
India will surely hear out Mr. Zhu. But having invested heavily in the relationship with the Anglo-Saxons and discovered that they could indeed deliver at critical moments, India is unlikely to be easily tempted by the Chinese tease on the ``strategic triangle.''
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India's own diplomatic energies in the coming months should be focussed on one single issue - mobilising the Anglo- Saxon power to get a reasonable settlement of the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. The very mention of this idea makes the talking heads all over the country jump in anxiety about internationalising the dispute and allowing third party mediation.
The Government has already dismissed the appeal of Gen. Musharraf to the U.S. to get involved in resolving the Kashmir dispute and insisted that ``there is no scope for any third party involvement.'' Rhetoric apart, there is nothing that stops India from encouraging the U.S. to deliver Gen. Musharraf- again - for a mutually-agreeable partition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, a partition of Kashmir might undo the enduring negative effects of the Partition in 1947 by facilitating a normalisation of Indo-Pak. relations. On Kashmir, Indian diplomacy from now on must focus on ``outcomes'' rather than ``modalities.''
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