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The case for de-escalation
THE DEFENCE MINISTER, George Fernandes, is absolutely correct when he says that other nations do not have the right to demand that India pull back its troops from the western border. But there is a fundamental question which goes well beyond such strident, even aggressive, assertions of sovereign privilege — should we de-escalate the situation on the border? The cool-headed and rational answer, which is often lost in the noisy chorus of war rhetoric, is yes. A good way to begin addressing the question is by analysing New Delhi's pre-conditions for de-escalation, which would mean scaling down the massive deployment of Indian forces (now locked eyeball to eyeball with their Pakistani counterparts) and taking other appropriate steps to signal that the threat of war has receded. Mr. Fernandes and other senior functionaries in the NDA Government have linked de- escalation to the fulfillment of two demands — the handing over of the terrorists on India's wish-list by Pakistan and its putting a clear and unmistakable end to infiltration and cross-border terrorism. With New Delhi signalling that President Musharraf will be given some time to meet the latter demand, the focus has shifted almost wholly to New Delhi's list of 20 terrorists.
To link de-escalation to the return of the `Terrible Twenty' is, to understate the point, not the brightest of ideas. To begin with, there is the risk — which has already turned real with Islamabad preparing a counter-roster of alleged Pakistani criminals living in India — that the diplomatic battle of wits will turn into a dreary and unrewarding battle of lists. Debates about lack of proof, discussions about extradition procedures, differences over details can only mean frustration and delay. Moreover, New Delhi is also helpless in a sense since it cannot prevent the fugitives from moving to other havens in the Middle East or elsewhere. India may have every reason to maintain a cautious scepticism while waiting to see whether Gen. Musharraf's bold words on January 12 against extremism and intolerance are translated into action. But at the same time, it cannot ignore the fact that the Pakistani regime has already initiated some courageous steps in cracking down on jehadi elements. At last count, some 2,000 Islamic fundamentalists have been put into prison, among them a clutch of national and local-level leaders.
It may be one of the many ironies of the present situation that an undemocratic Pakistani regime headed by none other than the architect of the Kargil occupation has initiated a process which holds out the hope of a radical reduction in infiltration and cross-border terrorism. But Gen. Musharraf (albeit reluctantly and under severe international pressure) has been pitchforked into a war against extremism and it is in India's own interest to ensure that he carries it through all the way. In reining in the jehadis, Gen. Musharraf has come under pressure from various segments (army, political, public) of his domestic constituency. Pushing him much further, by upping the ante or even maintaining the existing levels of heat, carries the risk of derailing the process he has initiated — a factor which must be entered into New Delhi's diplomatic calculus. De-escalation and an offer of dialogue would do more than reduce the risk of what could be only a futile and profitless war. It would thwart the impression that New Delhi has closed the window of opportunity thrown open by Islamabad's moves to contain Islamic extremism and is reluctant to negotiate a solution to the Kashmir crisis. Just as importantly, it might just provide Gen. Musharraf — who has promised that acts of terrorism in the name of Kashmir will no longer be tolerated — with the necessary elbow room to finish a job he has started.
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