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The Zhu visit
By K. K. Katyal
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It was a multi-dimensional visit by the Chinese Premier to India and the job for the two sides is to consolidate the gains through serious follow-up.
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AN IMPORTANT aspect of the Chinese Prime Minister, Zhu Rongji's visit to India earlier this month turned out to be its timing. It coincided with the stand-off between India and Pakistan and, as such, saw a new dimension added to it. His statements were closely examined. It would be foolish for anyone in India to expect even a slight weakening of China's relationship with Islamabad — it would continue to be "higher than the mountains and deeper than the sea" and Pakistan would remain an "all-weather friend". What stood out, at the same time, was the keenness to strengthen ties with India, notably in the economic field but not excluding political matters.
The practitioners of pretence diplomacy in the Foreign Office, however, went overboard, seeing meanings that were not there in Mr. Zhu's utterances. That was understandable as part of the public relations exercise but tended to generate undue hopes. There was the risk of disillusionment when situations do not follow the over-drawn picture. The message that Mr. Zhu conveyed was one of pragmatism and India would do well to adopt the same approach.
There is, no doubt, a sea change in bilateral ties which needs to be consolidated and expanded. Think of the low in the ties in 1998, because of the Defence Minister, George Fernandes' statements and the nuclear tests — think of all this and the progress made in the conscious efforts to control the damage, to reverse the negative trend and the movement in the positive direction will be clear. The credit goes to both countries. In the case of Beijing, it appeared to be part of a grand strategy which also manifested itself in China's bid to mend fences with Russia. The talk of a new strategic triangle taking shape in Asia, however, is to be discounted as wishful thinking by those who are keen — for good reasons, of course — on an early change in the present unipolar global pattern. In the case of India, the part played by the President, K. R. Narayanan, apart from the efforts of the External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, deserves special mention. Of late, however, there has been a slowing down.
Some say Beijing is warming to India as part of its response to the recent strategic changes in Asia and the adjoining region to its disadvantage — notably the American personnel in Central Asia (military bases in Kyrgystan, Uzbekistan), its ascendancy in post-Taliban Afghanistan, the new strategic ties with Pakistan and the stepped up activity in the Philippines. So what? If China is driven to promoting its ties with India because of these factors, is that a cause of worry? If China is impelled by realpolitik, should India back away from it?
New Delhi, however, will be justified in fixing its criteria to measure the progress in the bilateral field. The most important is the speed of the current exercise to clarify and confirm the Line of Actual Control. The inordinate delay in starting this process, even after the agreement by the two sides to undertake this job, was avoidable. The progress so far is tardy, too. The experts of the two Governments have exchanged maps in regard to the central sector which, in any case, is the least contentious: they have yet to take up the eastern and western sectors where it is certain to be tough going. In the east, China seems to have no problem with the de facto recognition of Sikkim as part of India, but it has been dragging its feet on de jure recognition. Beijing seems to prefer an indirect method — it wants the two sides to specify the points for border trade which, automatically, would mean China's acceptance of the status quo on Sikkim. India's preference is for the direct course of recognising the control line.
On its part, India, needs to be clear whether it has been alive to China's objections to the "political" activities of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan community in exile. To Beijing, the Dalai Lama is the head of a splitting clique and, as such, New Delhi has to be careful in ensuring that he confines himself to the religious field. The distinction between the religious and the political, at times, may not be easy but it will have to be scrupulously adhered to. Otherwise, New Delhi would be on weak ground while calling for China's restraint on military supplies to Pakistan.
On Kashmir and related matters, China has moved away from the earlier pro-Pakistan stand. It wants India and Pakistan to settle this problem bilaterally through negotiations. At one stage, China wanted Pakistan to put the difficult issue of Kashmir on the back-burner and concentrate on ways to promote cooperation with India in other— easier — areas. This point was made by the Chinese President directly to Pakistan during his address to the country's Senate. Of late, however, Beijing has refrained from saying so publicly. During Mr. Zhu's stay in New Delhi, the Chinese Foreign Office spokesperson, when queried on the subject, chose to repeat the present formulation — "settlement though bilateral negotiations". The Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, had not succeeded, during his recent visit to Beijing, in securing assurances of the type he was keen on in relation to the India-Pakistan stand-off. Mr. Zhu's was a two-track approach. One, China did not want to get involved in India's problem with Pakistan and, two, he hoped the current military build-up on the India-Pakistan border would not lead to a serious confrontation.
Though slightly overshadowed by the escalating India-Pakistan tension, the Zhu visit became a landmark in the ongoing processes of expanding cooperation between India and China. He set the right tone with his emphatic assertion that China did not pose a threat to India, elaborating the point thus: "China has never viewed India as a threat nor do we believe India will regard China a threat." What happened in 1998 seems a forgotten story, and the two countries are poised for a leap forward. It will be pointless to pretend that there are no differences but the two sides have decided not to let these come in the way of cooperation and convergence. The Prime Minister, A. B. Vajpayee, referred to the "maturity of our relationship that we can successfully move ahead in all areas of bilateral cooperation while sustaining a continuous dialogue to address our differences". And his counterpart was equally emphatic that "we have more common understanding than differences. Our interests far outweigh any friction". For the first time, India and China chose to jointly address the problems caused by the menace of terrorism, agreeing to set up a joint consultation mechanism, a sort of joint working group. Let no one interpret it as China's endorsement of India's position on cross-border terrorism and the involvement of Pakistan in it. But China has deep worries because of its own vulnerability close to Central Asia, in Xinjiang province, where sections of the ethnic Uighurs have created serious problems. The fact that these groups received jehadi training in Afghanistan during the Taliban regime made the threat particularly ominous. Here is a case where the two sides could exchange intelligence information to their mutual advantage.
The visiting Premier showed special interest in steps to promote economic cooperation. Of symbolic significance was the announcement to commence an air link between New Delhi and Beijing from March 28. In his address to Indian industrialists, he called for a major increase in bilateral trade from the current $3 billion to $10 billion, urging them to invest in China and promote joint ventures in potentially profitable areas of Information Technology, telecommunications, science and technology and education. According to him, there was considerable scope for complementing and collaborating rather than competing and, citing one instance, he drew attention to the fact that while India was strong in IT software, China was strong in hardware. In Bangalore, during his visit to Infosys Technologies, he sprang a surprise by announcing on-the-spot approval of the enterprise's request to set up a base in Shanghai. China, it was clear, was keen on access to India's technology. It was a multi-dimensional visit and the job for the two sides is to consolidate the gains through serious follow-up.
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