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A limited peace agenda
By Jayadeva Uyangoda
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All indications are that the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE are unlikely to move into discussing political or constitutional issues. Their primary focus will be on de-escalation.
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WHILE SRI LANKA'S newly-elected United National Front (UNF) Government is preparing to celebrate the nation's 54th Independence Day on February 4, the political management of the protracted armed conflict appears to be at the top of its agenda. The informal, and unilaterally declared, ceasefire between the Government and the LTTE has now entered its second month. Reports indicate that the two sides are likely to sign a formal ceasefire agreement, the terms of which are being worked out by Norwegian mediators. However, concrete evidence is yet to emerge to suggest when and where the much-anticipated `peace talks' would begin. In case negotiations are not forthcoming in the weeks ahead, the peace process may run the risk of losing momentum.
Most serious among the obstacles to early direct talks between the Government and the LTTE is the question of the LTTE's de-proscription. The LTTE is banned as a terrorist entity under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act. The LTTE argues that de-proscription is necessary for it to come to the table; that it will not talk to the Government as long as it is treated as an illegal, or criminal entity. Although the Ranil Wickremesinghe administration earlier appeared willing to lift the ban, strong resistance from the Opposition parties and the powerful Buddhist clergy has compelled it to find an alternative. Hence, talks about a temporary suspension of the ban.
The question of the LTTE's de-proscription runs deeper into the complexities of peace negotiations. For the LTTE, the ban has placed the movement in a state of inequality — a sort of structural asymmetry vis-a-vis the Government at negotiations. The LTTE's position is that it would participate in the talks as an equal of the Government, and not as a mere terrorist or guerilla group. This parity in status is a crucial precondition for the LTTE leadership to convince itself that the negotiation is a politically meaningful exercise. It is a belief emanating from the position that the LTTE represents the political aspirations of a nation with a right to sovereignty. For the LTTE, the Tamils are not an ethnic minority but a nation. As the LTTE leaders have been very careful to say during the past so many years, the Sri Lankan conflict is not about a minority problem or an ethnic question, but a national question parties to which are two nations, the Sinhalese and the Tamils. The LTTE's recent strategy of forcing most of the Tamil parties and groups to form one political unit, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), and then act as its political mouthpiece, needs to be understood in this context.
This time around, the Sinhalese nationalist opposition to the Government's political engagement with the LTTE is also centered on this question of de-proscription. As its spokespersons have recently argued, not incorrectly, de-proscription would grant the LTTE the status of parity with the Government. Some politically savvy Sinhalese nationalists argue that they are not opposed to Government-LTTE talks as such but are against removing the ban as a pre-condition. This argument also reveals a deep-seated ideological position held by Sinhalese nationalists of all hues: since Tamils are not equals with the Sinhalese, why share political power with an inferior, unequal minority?
Perhaps, the present United National Party (UNP) leadership understands this dilemma well and the Prime Minister is now trying to work around it in a most interesting manner that may or may not produce positive results. Mr. Wickremesinghe's inaugural policy statement in Parliament, presented two weeks ago, focussed extensively on the proposed negotiation and its complexities. But he was careful not to describe the problem as an ethnic question. To him, what he had to handle was the `North-East war'. And it had to be resolved due to two main reasons: economic compulsions and the pressure of the international community. If we take this statement as a guide, there is no ethnic problem in Sri Lanka for the UNF Government to resolve. Rather, there is a `war' to be terminated, or managed.
All indications are that the UNF Government and the LTTE are most unlikely to move into discussing political or constitutional issues. Their primary focus will be on de-escalation. After all, this is the so-called `realist' approach to peace. This reveals a fascinating convergence of approaches between the Government and the LTTE on `peace'. They seem to have a shared understanding of peace: de-escalation of war. In theoretical jargon, we may describe this as `negative peace'. Which means the absence of war. It is basically a conflict management, pragmatic approach that falls far short of `positive peace', meaning the eradication of conditions that produced, and may re-produce, the conflict. Positive peace entails more than negotiations between the two adversaries. It involves redressing the structural causes of the conflict, reforming the state and political structures, community reconciliation and peace building, democratisation, returning to normal politics, human rights, re-integration of communities and many more reconstructive measures. It seems that both the UNF Government and the LTTE are not interested in any of these transformatory objectives. Against such a backdrop, the present round of `peace talks' may not produce anything beyond de-escalation. For both sides, containment of war has become a politically desirable goal. Facing a disastrous economic collapse with a negative growth rate, the UNF Government finds itself unable to finance the high intensity war, which is the legacy of the previous PA Government's mishandling of the ethnic conflict. For the LTTE, in the context of the global `war' against terrorism, political engagement with the Government for some time to come is a basic compulsion. So, there is every reason for the present ceasefire to be formalised and extended for an indefinite period. But, prospects for a negotiated `settlement' do not seem to be as strong.
But, for those who seek lasting peace in Sri Lanka through ethnic conflict resolution, a limited peace process has positive consequences. One is that the Government and the LTTE have opened up a political front and want to stay in it for some time. Then, there is the international community to make the two sides accountable. If the present ceasefire extends for some time to come, it may generate new dynamics. Normalisation of civilian life, the return of the refugees and the displaced, re-construction and re-integration of the communities, people-to-people contacts — all these are possibilities. These can make conflict resolution preferable to conflict management of the pragmatic kind.
As international experience and Sri Lanka's own past clearly demonstrates, lasting peace is too serious a matter to be left to the two adversarial elites alone. A peace initiative requires multiple and parallel processes that can complement the negative peace pursued in track one. This is where civil society has a direct role to play in creating a sustainable peace process. This is also exactly where Sri Lanka's peace constituencies need to re-assess their own thinking, strategies and interventions.
(The writer is the Head, Department of Political Studies and Public Policy, University of Colombo.)
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