The Hindu : The U.S. and India: setting the focus

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Wednesday, Mar 13, 2002

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The U.S. and India: setting the focus

By Thomas P. Thornton

When we build upon issues and relationships that are bilateral in nature — this includes our commitment to democracy and freedom — we are on more solid ground.

FOR THE past several years, Americans returning from India have recounted with wonder the changes in attitudes toward the United States. Equally surprising and gratifying has been the growth of interest in this country concerning India. Bill Clinton ultimately discovered India with a vengeance, culminating in his highly successful visit in March, 2000, and few Presidents — certainly none since Jimmy Carter — have started off in office with such enthusiasm for Indo-U.S. relations as did George W. Bush. This enthusiasm has also infected Congress, the Pentagon, and the American business community. The Vajpayee Government has responded with alacrity and a steady stream of visitors has been shuttling between New Delhi and Washington. It would be misleading to claim that the new-found American interest in India rivals that shown for our European allies, Japan or even China; still, it is an immense improvement over the dreary record of most of the previous half century.

Indo-U.S. relations have seen moments of enthusiasm, but these were episodic at best. The U.S. was preoccupied with its global role, especially the contest with the Soviet Union; bilateral or regional interests in India were simply never sufficient to override our global concerns, whether anti-communism, non-proliferation, or IMF lending policy. In response, New Delhi incorrectly interpreted American insensitivity as part of a dark plot to limit India's international role. The situation was made worse in that India's forays onto the global scene tended to be more on the side of the Soviet Union, while U.S. intrusions into South Asia were more in the interest of Pakistan. There were certainly exceptions on both sides and there can be no question of apportioning blame evenly — in the nature of the situation, the U.S. would inevitably do much more harm than India. Recriminations about the past are pointless however; what we need to focus on is the fact that differences were rarely over bilateral relations between India and the U.S.: problems were likely to arise when one side or the other defined the relationship in terms of its quarrels with third parties.

The last decade of the twentieth century saw some fundamental changes as the Cold War ended. The U.S. no longer worried about Indo-Soviet ties and the many multilateral issues arising from that concern (and from reciprocal Indian concern about the intrusion of the Cold War into South Asia and the Indian Ocean) ceased to be a brake on the relationship. Key complimentary changes were taking place on the positive side of the ledger as well. First, Indian economic reform policies that had been sputtering along for some years gathered momentum and American business responded with enthusiasm. Second, as the Indian immigrant community in the U.S. grew to over one million and came to maturity, it began to develop a political voice that caught the attention of Congress and the President. Reciprocally, many more Indians now had ties to the U.S. For the first time, Indo-U.S. relations were developing a firm and reliable base in terms of specifically bilateral factors.

During the later 1990s, this foundation acquired an elaborate superstructure. The level of Indo-U.S. dialogue was raised as the two countries sought new post-Cold War strategies and America realised that a nuclear South Asia, bitterly contending over Kashmir, was too dangerous a place to ignore. Ironically, the sharp reaction of the U.S. following the 1998 Indian nuclear tests forced Americans and Indians to talk about security with an intensity unknown since at least 1962 . "Strategic relationship" became the catchword, and the dramatic events of September 11, 2001, provided another quantum jump as each side was able to define the relationship in terms of the highly emotive concept of terrorism. In the ensuing months, exchanges have become still more intense and new vistas of security cooperation are opening up.

Cooperation across the full spectrum of the Indo-U.S. relationship — including military — is welcome and overdue but we need to step back and consider what is happening. Does anyone have a clear idea what "strategic relationship" or "strategic dialogue" actually means (especially since New Delhi seems to find no incompatibility in having "strategic" relationships with Beijing and Moscow as well)? Can anyone expect that the unilateralist Bush administration will really heed Indian views on matters that affect important American interests? Or that New Delhi will acquiesce on American policies that are not in line with Indian preferences? Furthermore, the term "terrorism" is notoriously imprecise and U.S. and Indian definitions overlap only partially. Washington may agree that infiltration from Pakistan is unacceptable terrorist activity, but what about the activities of native Kashmiris who resist Indian rule? New ties to Israel notwithstanding, how many Indians view Palestinian suicide bombers as terrorists? What about Iraq or Somalia? We have already seen questions along these lines begin to arise.

Even if we clearly understood how our security interests relate, security cooperation, especially when relating to third parties, cannot provide reliable building blocks for a strong, lasting relationship. There are too many possibilities for the kinds of disagreement, sadly familiar from the past, that can once again lead to disillusionment and bitterness. Furthermore, this security superstructure is very much hostage to the attitudes of the Government of the day. Especially on the Indian side, one can envision national Governments that would not want to follow the present coalition's policies towards the U.S. and on global issues. Economic cooperation and person-to-person contacts are more immune to electoral vicissitudes. There is an additional problem lurking in overenthusiastic commitment to fight terrorism and build a strategic consensus. Not a few Indian nationalists toy with the idea of a Hindu-Christian (and perhaps Jewish) entente to counter "Islamic fundamentalism". A small but articulate minority of Americans thinks along similar lines. Down this road lies a conflict of cultures that would be suicidal for the basic values and interests of both countries.

Left to their own devices, Governments and the media focus on the glamorous and exciting security issues that populate the policy superstructure. These are certainly important, but we need to keep our attention at least equally focussed on the less exciting factors that have served so well to strengthen Indo-U.S. relations in the past decades. An excellent example is the U.S. Ambassador, Robert Blackwill's January speech to the Chamber of Commerce in India that pointed out the important work underway in the economic field — but also, how much more needs to be done to regain momentum.

Americans and Indians have an exceptional opportunity to shape a new relationship. The lesson of the past is clear: when we get involved in third-party issues we learn that our interests and world roles are not fully congruent and the gaps between them can lead to dissension. When we build upon issues and relationships that are bilateral in nature — and this certainly includes our commitment to democracy and freedom — we are on more solid ground. If we make enough progress in solidifying this foundation, our strategic concepts may well draw closer together and cooperation will be better founded. To approach the situation from the opposite direction, focussing on a still fragile superstructure, creates unsupportable expectations and invites renewed disillusionment and bitterness.

(The writer, who teaches at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, previously held senior positions dealing with South Asia on the State Department Policy Planning Staff and at the National Security Council.)

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The U.S. and India: setting the focus