The Hindu : Rumblings in the NDA

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Monday, Mar 25, 2002

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Rumblings in the NDA

By K. K. Katyal

Neither Mr. Vajpayee nor the allies may find it easy to maintain the delicate balance.

THEY SURVIVED the assault from outside but may find it hard to counter the threat from within. This is the unhappy lot of the ruling combine, the National Democratic Alliance, and its leading constituent, the BJP. They suffered a debacle in the Assembly elections and, as a result, their credibility was badly dented but it did not pose a danger to the Government at the Centre. Their majority in the Lok Sabha remained intact — which was what mattered for the coalition's survival. The decline of the BJP did cause worry to the allies, but there were no desertions — there could not have been — because of the shared vested interest. The glue of power held them together.

The situation has changed materially because of the sudden spurt of internal contradictions between the BJP and its allies over Ayodhya-related issues. As a result, the alliance's unity could not be taken for granted and the earlier assessments about the Government's long-term stability have to be revised. The Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and his strategy managers got busy repairing the cracks and succeeded in getting over the immediate problem. But the scars left by the ugly public confrontation between the two sides may not easily disappear and the danger of aggravation will remain.

Even in the "normal" course, the alliance, it was widely believed, would develop strains with the approach of the next general elections (due by October 2004). A year before the due date, the allies — that was the general assessment — may re-appraise their continued association with the BJP. This stage may well be reached earlier. Whenever that happens, the current developments would be regarded retrospectively as the starting point of the break.

Apart from the fruits of office, what held the allies back from taking an extreme step was the absence of a viable alternative. That situation has not changed. The Congress(I), the main Opposition, is too far away from the half-way mark in the Lok Sabha to be able to lure to its side the BJP's secular allies. The Congress(I) and others in the Opposition, though still outnumbered by the NDA, could through a united front tempt the allies into crossing over. But the chances of such an alliance are bleak, given the reservations of the Left parties and the Samajwadi Party about the Congress(I) — in the first case on ideological grounds and, in the second, because of personality clashes.

This was evident from two recent developments — the Ministry-making moves in Uttar Pradesh and the proceedings of the recent CPI(M) Congress in Hyderabad. The Congress(I) hesitated in committing itself firmly to supporting Mulayam Singh Yadav in his bid to form a new Government in Uttar Pradesh. Many saw it as retaliation for Mr. Yadav's action in 1999 in refusing support to Sonia Gandhi in forming an alternative Government after the first Vajpayee dispensation lost a vote of confidence.

The CPI(M) Congress, sensing acute disenchantment in the NDA camp (among the BJP's allies), decided on giving a push to the third front plan. Implied in it was the distrust of the Congress(I) which, though regarded a secular force qualifying for a joint anti-BJP campaign, was not considered worthy of an electorate alliance because of its flawed economic policies and its occasional compromises with communal forces. Priority, thus, is to be given to the third front — and, what is more important, not the Congress(I) — as an alternative. Whether these plans click is not so important as the nature of this formulation.

In the past, the moves to revive the third force — or the united front — were pursued only sporadically. At one stage, they appeared to be taking some concrete steps, such as formulation of a common programme and criteria for the admission of constituents but nothing has been heard of late. It is hard to avoid the impression that the united front — proposed or real — is no more than the sum total of important individual leaders and groups, wielding influence in their respective strongholds, and not a positive force on its own. To say this is not to underestimate the potential of the third force or to question its validity, but to drive home the point that the required efforts had not been made.

The Congress(I), on its own, did show signs of recovery. It has been lucky, by and large in the Assembly elections and is in power in more than a dozen States. As against that is its failure to recapture its lost constituency in Uttar Pradesh. Here it remains a marginal force — and without this key State in its bag, no party could hope to be in power at the Centre.

It was the realism of Mr. Vajpayee, and others of his way of thinking, that helped ward off the immediate threat to the NDA Government. They recognised the intensity of feeling among the allies against the BJP's attitude — of pushing its agenda rather than that of the NDA — and provided the necessary assurances. Mr. Vajpayee was able to persuade the VHP to give up its plans for an "asthi yatra" (of taking the ashes of the Godhra train carnage victims to various parts of the country). The BJP's allies had taken strong exception to the yatra and rightly so — because of its potential for inflaming communal sentiments and for alienating the minorities. Its cancellation as also the acceptance of the suggestion for "more frequent and extensive consultations" and for calling the joint NDA Parliamentary Party meetings went a long way in mollifying them. On their part, they agreed not to air in public their grievances about the functioning of the NDA. Whether it was a patch-up, the product of the tactical approaches of the two sides, or a genuine change of heart would be clear only in the future. But two developments did not go unnoticed. One, the action of the allies in holding their conclave, prior to the meeting of the NDA (where the crisis was defused). The action of the allies in drawing up their strategy for the full meeting was significant and, to the extent that it serves as a precedent for the future, it would be a source of internal pressure and possibly of irritants for the BJP. Two, the whispering campaign among the hardliners in the BJP and hotheads in the Sangh Parivar, about the Prime Minister's "appeasement" of the allies for the sake of office. The second is the bigger of the two dangers.

The current whispers in the Parivar as also the sequence of the recent Ayodhya-related developments do not augur well for the smooth functioning of the NDA. In the agenda of the combine, Hindutva has no place, but the Parivar hawks are not prepared to put Ayodhya on the back-burner. They may have chosen to lie low for tactical reasons but they are not reconciled to the "concessions" made to the non-BJP constituents. At some stage, they may come out in the open again posing yet another threat to the ruling alliance. Those who can carry their perversity to the extent of conceiving and planning a diabolical move like the "asthi-yatra" cannot be expected to develop moderation and reasonableness. As for the Prime Minister, there is a limit to his capacity for tightrope walking. In the past he, at times, failed to maintain the correct balance as evidenced by his support to the idea of a "symbolic puja" by the VHP in the "acquired land" in Ayodhya or the stand taken by the Attorney-General in the Supreme Court. But he will keep on working in that direction. On their part the allies may keep on making harsh noises for the consumption of the minorities but refrain from rocking the boat. Neither Mr. Vajpayee nor the allies may find it easy to maintain the delicate balance. And therein lies the danger — though not in the immediate context.

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