The Hindu : Ban battlefield nuclear weapons

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, Apr 22, 2002

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Ban battlefield nuclear weapons

By R. Rajaraman

Whatever military advantage tactical sub-kiloton weapons may offer, it is not worth the price of destroying the time-tested psychological barrier blocking the road to nuclear holocaust.

THE NOTION of using tactical nuclear weapons as just another piece of arsenal in waging war, rather than as a deterrent against nuclear attacks, has started rearing its head again. During the Afghan offensive, the U.S. Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, when asked whether the U.S. planned to use tactical nuclear weapons to "flush out" the Taliban and Al-Qaeda members from their shelters, would not rule out such contingency plans. In the event, no nuclear weapons were used in Afghanistan, but one cannot remain sanguine about the prospects of such reticence in future conflicts if one goes by the recent disclosures of a "Nuclear Posture Review" document prepared by the Pentagon. The document reportedly recommends contingency plans to use tactical nuclear weapons not just in retaliation against biological or chemical weapons but even in the event of surprising military developments. Stronger, nuclear tipped earth-penetrating weapons are also on the anvil. In the words of a nuclear arms expert, all this "makes nuclear weapons a tool for fighting a war rather than deterring it".

It is vital to register strong worldwide opposition to the use of such weapons. In countries fortunate enough not to possess them already, such as India and Pakistan, there should be a mutually agreed ban on their development.

At first sight, a call for opposing the less potent tactical weapons may seem silly in a world which already has loads of giant nuclear bombs going up to the multi-megaton range. Historically, the branching out of weapon builders into smaller tactical bombs has taken place relatively unopposed. As the initial arsenal of 15-20 kiloton fission bombs of the type used in Hiroshima gradually grew to include "hydrogen" (fusion) bombs running into megatons in TNT equivalent, each stage of this growth was met with alarm and protest by anti-nuclear activists. But somewhere along the line started a parallel development of smaller "tactical" nuclear weapons, originally intended for use in Europe should conflicts flare up between the NATO and Soviet blocs, far away from the Cold War principals. Advocates of such battlefield nuclear weapons argue that with their relatively low yield they need not be viewed as such horrendous things since they would not cause significantly more damage than a barrage of giant conventional bombs.

But there are very sound reasons for vigilantly opposing these battlefield nuclear weapons which pose a grave danger of a different sort, no matter how low their yield. That danger stems from opening, after a very long gap, the nuclear Pandora's box. It should be remembered that subsequent to the two atom bombs dropped on Japan in rapid succession at the end of World War II, there has been no known incidence of nuclear weapon usage except for tests. This despite the fact that the nuclear arsenals have grown from a handful of weapons in the hands of the Americans to tens of thousands of far more powerful bombs spread among a half a dozen countries. It is not as if there has been a shortage of major conflicts involving countries possessing nuclear weapons. We have had, among others, the Korean War, the Vietnam war, the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the Iraqi war, the Sino-Soviet border skirmishes and most pertinently for us, the Kargil conflict. Some of these were long drawn out wars with heavy casualties. The U.S. in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan had to bear the ignominy of losing the wars to smaller and technologically less developed antagonists. One might have imagined that under such severe circumstances nations would employ all available weapons in their power to turn defeat into victory. Yet, none of these countries used a nuclear bomb even once.

There were a variety of different reasons behind each of these examples of abstinence from using nuclear weapons. But one major common factor contributing to all of them has been an ingrained terror of nuclear devastation. The well documented images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the awesome photographs of giant mushroom clouds emerging from nuclear tests in the Pacific and the numerous movies based on nuclear Armageddon scenarios have all contributed to building up a deep rooted fear of nuclear weapons. This is not limited just to the abhorrence felt by anti-nuclear activists. It permeates to one extent or another the psyche of all but the most pathological of fanatics. It colours the calculations, even if not decisively, of the most hardened of military strategists. The unacceptability of nuclear devastation is the backbone of all deterrence strategies. There is not just a fear of being attacked oneself, but also a strong mental barrier against actually initiating nuclear attacks on enemy populations, no matter how much they may be contemplated in war games and strategies. As a result a taboo has tacitly evolved over the decades preventing nations, at least so far, from actually pressing the nuclear button even in the face of serious military crises.

It is this taboo which will be broken if battlefield nuclear weapons, however small, begin to be used. Once the line dividing nuclear weapons and conventional bombs is crossed, it will become acceptable to use "baby nukes" and the radiation deaths that go with it. A gradual erosion of the feeling of abhorrence against nuclear weapons is bound to occur. The use of a sub-kiloton artillery shell in battle by one country will elicit a similar response with possibly a heavier yield weapon, if not in the same war, somewhere else. The ante will keep going up till eventually the use of bigger multi-kiloton and megaton weapons would be contemplated more seriously as realistic military alternatives. The single largest universal deterrent against nuclear holocaust will be lost forever.

In India tactical nuclear artillery has presumably not yet been assembled let alone deployed, despite the inclusion of sub-kiloton devices in the Pokhran tests. Now is the time to firmly oppose their production, no matter how strong the military argument for their use in the battlefield. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine declares a No-First-Use policy and claims that the sole purpose of our nuclear arsenal is to deter the other side by the threat of unacceptable retaliatory damage. Such deterrence does not require battlefield nuclear weapons.

Tactical nuclear weapons also bring with them more difficult problems of command and control. Their control will necessarily have to be less centralised than for the strategic weapons, particularly during wartime. Or else they will lose their operational value in the battlefield. With such unavoidably looser control and broader distribution, all the risks of inadvertent, hasty or unnecessary firing attendant with strategic weapons become further multiplied for tactical weapons. So does the risk of pilferage by terrorists or other non-state actors. Smaller than heavy-duty nuclear bombs, nuclear artillery shells would be easier to steal, hide and fire on the target.

It is best not to cross the Lakshman Rekha separating nuclear weapons from conventional arms. Whatever military advantage tactical sub-kiloton weapons may offer, it is not worth the price of destroying the time-tested psychological barrier blocking the road to nuclear holocaust.

(The writer is Professor of Theoretical Physics, JNU.)

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