The Hindu : Indo-Pak. de-escalation: a tall order

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Wednesday, May 01, 2002

Opinion

Opinion - News Analysis

Indo-Pak. de-escalation: a tall order

By K. K. Katyal

NEW DELHI APRIL 30 . Going by the stated position of the Government as also the thinking in the non-official strategic community, any de-escalation along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir and the international border with Pakistan in the near future does not seem to be on the cards. At the most there may be a reduction in the alert status — which, perhaps, is already the case, though there is no formal announcement. This is certain to disappoint those who had hoped for an early return to normality — not only the winding down of military measures but also withdrawal of the embargo on Pakistani overflights and resumption of the air and train travel between the two countries. Given this pessimistic scenario, any plea for resumption of the dialogue, especially at the top political level, is too tall an order. The point to be examined is whether the build-up could stay at the present stage or whether it would lead to further escalation in a serious form.

The advocates of the hardline adduce several arguments, both military and political, some of which are as follows: One, there is no fundamental change in Pakistan's policy. The anti-terrorism package announced by its President, Pervez Musharraf, was confined to the domestic situation and did not cover even the Pakistan-occupied area of Jammu and Kashmir, what to say of cross-border operations. Even the momentum of the drive against domestic terrorism has tapered off, while the jehadi outfits continue to be active in their operations across the LoC.

There has been no let-up in terrorist violence. It is, however, conceded that the number of terrorists killed in the first three months this year is higher than that in the corresponding periods of the two preceding years — 167 now as against 81 in 2001 and 94 in 2000. At the same time, the casualties of the armed forces were comparatively less. This is mentioned as a success of the strategy based on the build-up on the border. And from this, a case is made for continuing the pressure, not for relaxation.

Two, a de-escalation now will serve to erode the credibility of future options. "If we withdraw now, and there is an emergency after a while, will our build-up then generate the desired pressure?''

Three, Pakistan will be interested in disrupting the elections in Jammu and Kashmir, scheduled around September, because any advance in the political action in the State does not suit its objective. A de-escalation now will enhance Islamabad's capacity to derail that process.

Four, any decision by India to send the troops back to peace-time locations will be regarded as a personal triumph by Gen. Musharraf.

The implications of these arguments are disturbing. It amounts to a case for virtually an indefinite continuation of the build-up. If Pakistan did not respond positively when the Indian pressure, caused by the sudden build-up, caused it deep worry, there is no reason to believe it would do so now. The presence of American troops on its territory gives it a psychological boost to resist Indian exhortations. The advantage on which New Delhi counted in the beginning — that the military measures would help reinforce diplomatic moves — is no longer available now. The sympathy and support for India's case by the world community will be subjected to the law of diminishing returns.

The hardliners tend to rely on over-simplifications — that the financial cost of the escalation is bearable, that the political and diplomatic cost is not worrisome, that the morale of the Indian troops will not be affected. This last issue needs to be examined closely and objectively and the reports that the morale may not be as high as it was in, say, January and February, are not to be dismissed as disinformation.

There is contradiction in some of their contentions. On the one hand, they say that terrorist violence has not diminished. On the other hand, they cite figures, suggesting a decrease in the casualties of Indian security forces.

If the European nations could live with eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation between the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces for decades, why should a grim view be taken of the build-up by India — and the reciprocal steps by Pakistan?

This, certainly, is not the model India needs to follow — of subjecting the country indefinitely to the tensions, uncertainties and worries of the type experienced by some of the European nations during the cold war. There is another problem here. Despite their adversarial stances, the two blocs had established contacts at various levels — and, in some cases, agreed to a set of dos and don'ts to keep the situation manageable. There are no such contacts between India and Pakistan.

The Indian build-up has led to a peculiar frenzy and hysteria — at various levels, right upto the top. "We can keep up the build-up for five years, for 10 years'' is the refrain. India is in a predicament, is on the look-out for a face-saver, to de-escalate — this is another recurring remark.

Not long ago, these very people used to accuse India of planning for a war. None of these two observations is a voice of sanity.

Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Opinion

Stories in this Section

The task before Mayawati

Modi and the peace march

Craving for power

One-man democracy

Indo-Pak. de-escalation: a tall order

Mockery of democracy

Wrong moves

Why include Modi?

Adding insult to injury

Why burden petrol users?

Spare senior citizens