The Hindu : Pakistan after the referendum

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Tuesday, May 07, 2002

Opinion

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Pakistan after the referendum

By Suba Chandran

The referendum may not be for the democratic polity of Pakistan, but it will certainly result in stability.

As expected, Pervez Musharraf won the referendum in Pakistan. The military regime claims that 98 per cent of the people who voted backed him as President for five years. The Opposition parties claim that less than five per cent participated in the referendum, hence Gen. Musharraf should quit. Both the claims cannot be taken at face value; Pakistan's media and Human Rights Commission have reported poll irregularities. The percentage of votes polled in the elections since 1989 have declined steadily. In the last elections, in 1997, only 35 per cent of the people voted. If the military regime's claim were to be believed, more than 55 per cent of the total electorate voted, the highest in the last two decades.

However questions such as low turnout and rigging and other related irregularities are now insignificant, as General Musharraf is now President. What should be focussed on are the implications of the referendum result. First, the military regime is sure to interpret it as the people's verdict to make changes that would lead to political stability. This, for the military regime, would invariably mean introducing a series of amendments to the Constitution of Pakistan, before the general election. These amendments could include restoring the President's powers to dismiss the Prime Minister and Parliament; appoint the Chief of the Armed Forces and the Supreme Court judges. This happened during Zia-ul-Haq's period. After gaining an affirmative vote for his "Islamisation" process of Pakistan in a referendum held in December 1984, Zia made basic amendments to the much-abused 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. This referendum could, similarly, be the first step to a series of crucial administrative and constitutional amendments. These measures are sure to increase the role of military personnel, bureaucrats and technocrats. With the National Security Council already in place, this group rather than the elected representatives would take major decisions and policies, curtailing the role of any elected representatives in the future. Also, the role of the military in Pakistan's polity could be further institutionalised.

The second implication would be for the October elections to the national and provincial assemblies. How free and fair will they be? And, will they be held on party basis? Zia, after organising a referendum in 1984, conducted non-party elections in February 1985.

Third, even if political parties are allowed to contest, will the leaders of the PPP and the PML, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, be allowed to return to Pakistan and contest? Gen. Musharraf has already ruled this out. In fact, before the referendum he repeatedly declared that an affirmative vote in it would also imply that the people support his policy of not letting these two leaders enter the country. The political process and the party system in Pakistan without these two leaders would be fragile and easily amenable to the wishes of the military regime. The MMA (Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal comprising the leading religious parties) and the ARD (Alliance for Restoration of Democracy led by Nawabzada Nasrullah and consisting of a number of minor parties) would remain ineffective. The military regime is sure to increase its support to pro-military outfits such as the Millat Party and other factions of the PML and could attempt to install Farooq Ahmed Leghari or Shujaat Hussain or Qasim Syed Kabir Ali Wasti or Imran Khan as puppet Prime Minister.

The changes that Gen. Musharraf could carry out in the Constitution as a result of the imaginary powers he had acquired from the people through the referendum would result in more powers to the President at the cost of other democratic institutions such as Parliament and the Prime Minister. An unavoidable offshoot of this process would also be the strengthening of the position of an individual.

It had happened in the past in Pakistan that leaders, be they democratic or military, who came to power with a lot of popular support turned all-powerful, thus undermining all other institutions of the state. Zulifikar Ali Bhutto, Zia and Nawaz Sharif all came to power with a lot of popular goodwill, but ultimately lost their support due to centralisation of power in their own hands.

The Eighth Amendment that was passed by Zia is also set to make a comeback, perhaps in some other form. The Eighth Amendment, which was repealed by the Nawaz Sharif Government, originally provided enormous powers to the President to impose emergency, dismiss the Prime Minister and Parliament. With the National Security Council already in place, such moves will have serious repercussions for the slow and dented growth of the democratic process and governance, which of course have been abused by the political parties led by the PML and the PPP. On the positive side, the referendum may result in bringing internal stability and security to Pakistan. The stability and security of Pakistan depends on societal stability, economic growth and all round development. The policies that have been initiated by the present military regime aimed at controlling sectarianism, jehadi violence and the madrassas, and at checking corruption on the economic front, may not have yielded great results as yet, but are sure to improve the stability and security of Pakistan, if pursued earnestly. The political leadership in the past had failed to curb these menaces and in fact most of the problems that Pakistan faces today are the result of deliberate mis-governance by the politicians.

Given the divided nature of the political parties and the `popularity' of their leaders, any open elections in the near future will not result in a stable polity, both inside and outside Parliament. An unstable polity in Pakistan is a recipe for disaster. With a fractured mandate expected in the October elections, it would be better for Pakistan to have a strong President so that there would be continuity in the social and economic policies pursued by the state. Thus, the referendum may not be for the democratic polity of Pakistan, but it will certainly result in stability. The question then is whether a democratic polity which will result in bad governance is better than a militarised society that will result in stability and development.

(The writer is Research Officer, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.)

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