The Hindu : A truly unipolar moment

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Saturday, May 25, 2002

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A truly unipolar moment

By Seema Gahlaut

India has been ahead of the curve in recognising that we do not live in a multi-polar world.

ON APRIL 22, the United States single-handedly led the charge that removed the Brazilian head of the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), Jose Bustani, on unspecific accusations regarding general financial mismanagement and abrasive administrative style. The news wires, think tanks, and citizens' groups throughout Europe were abuzz since March when the U.S. had gone public with its intention to oust Mr. Bustani. Every other report and analysis complained about yet another sign of U.S. unilateralism. Prominent European citizens wrote to their Governments and experts wrote to the entire membership of the OPCW, exhorting them to oppose U.S. efforts to undermine the independence of this unique international organisation, the first truly non-discriminatory disarmament treaty. Yet, when all was said and done, the OPCW members voted 48-7 in favour of the U.S. proposal, and 43 countries abstained. Those who voted in favour said they did it to ensure that the U.S. remained a member and contributed its share (about 22 per cent of the annual budget) to the cash-strapped OPCW. The two surprising votes were France, which abstained, and India, a supporter of Mr. Bustani, which voted in favour of his removal.

Instead of recriminations, India deserves praise. Not because the U.S. demand was right but because India has been ahead of the curve in recognising that we do not live in a multi-polar world. The "unipolar moment" was already evident when the U.S. Senate rejected the CTBT, when it refused to accept the International Court of Justice, and when it categorically denied that its disarmament-related commitment, given during the conference on the indefinite extension of the NPT, had anything to do with disarmament. But many in the non-proliferation community ignored such signs, and continuously referred to the supposed European (sometimes also the Russian and the Chinese) objections as reasons why the U.S. was unlikely to get its way. Many of the same analysts decried Indian attempts at a pragmatic rapprochement with the U.S. It seemed like India was betraying its glorious foreign policy heritage by accepting U.S. formulations, all in return for limited strategic gains. It seemed especially inopportune at a time when qualitatively (Europe) and quantitatively (developing states) significant segments of international opinion were against the U.S. But a serious examination of events in the past few years, of which the latest OPCW vote is the most recent example, would show that Indian foreign policymakers had judged the playing field more accurately than the others.

A case in point is the Indian decision to tacitly support the U.S. in its quest for a National Missile Defence (NMD) system and to modify the ABM Treaty. Several months ago, there was a spate of articles in the Indian (and foreign) media criticising this. A persistent theme was that India had opted to support the NMD when not just Russia, but even the U.S. allies in Europe were staunchly against it. India, it seemed, had stuck its neck out at the wrong time. However, within a few months of this and much before September 11 or even before Russian acceptance of the death of the bilateral ABM Treaty, the so-called European opponents of the NMD changed their tune one by one. The mistaken analyses from the non-proliferation community are easily explained. There has been a plethora of articles in European and American journals about the weakening trans-Atlantic alliance. These discussions point to a range of issues: the dispute over beef and banana exports, the negative implications of the European Rapid Reaction Force for NATO solidarity and of the European Space Agency for the U.S. space industry, and the rift over international treaties such as the Landmine Ban, the Biological Weapons Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol. The underlying factors detailed in such analyses also traverse a wide range — from socio-cultural to military-strategic. At issue is the apparent growing chasm between the U.S. and its European allies. This is either referred to as a consequence of unfettered American unilateralism or that of growing European assertiveness. This is what gave confidence to the non-proliferationists around the world.

However, a closer look at the actual working of the U.S.-European relations indicates that the differences, although not superficial, are nonetheless exaggerated. Quite often, the so-called European assertiveness is no more than public posturing to gain advantage in some bargaining with the U.S. on a limited bilateral issue rather than a truly divergent approach to general principles. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is yet another example. About a month ago, inspired leaks in the American media revealed that the NPR included options of U.S. nuclear strikes against chemical and biological facilities in hostile states. The Pentagon, it seems, has recommended the development and deployment of "bunker busters" — mini-nuclear bombs that would penetrate reinforced concrete structures deep underground.

Even where there is a true divergence of approaches, when push comes to a shove, Europe bends its principles to accommodate firm U.S. stands. And this goes beyond mere economic gains. There is a truly deep recognition that in an uncertain world, common cultural heritage and half-a-century of strategic cooperation are the two certainties about the U.S. that Europe cannot afford to ignore. To be sure, this does not stop the allies from pressuring America in the name of strengthening the supposedly weakened alliance. Recent complaints have got them better terms regarding U.S. technology exports, more joint ventures in advanced technologies, and entry into the U.S. arms market. For its part, the U.S. uses calibrated deference to European concerns when it comes to maintaining status quo on issues where there is either little domestic interest or where a change is controversial. American non-proliferation policies regarding India are a prime example. It seems that the biggest obstacle to changes in U.S. policy regarding Indian civilian nuclear programmes is not the U.S. itself but European opposition to rewarding Indian nuclear intransigence! European opinion on this particular issue has seemingly tied the hands of India's friends in the U.S. Executive Branch and in Congress.

The bottom line is that strategic analysts in India, and India-specialists abroad, need to stop berating India for being pragmatic. The two groups that can actually oppose unilateral U.S. moves on international treaties are the economically and technologically strong European allies of the U.S. and the numerically strong group of developing countries. However, neither feels inclined to challenge the U.S., no matter what the provocation. Unlike opposition from the European allies, opposition from India only cements New Delhi's anti-U.S. credentials. Similarly, taking on the "leadership" role on behalf of the developing states has also brought India very little kudos. The "followers" have time and again ditched India to make bilateral deals with the U.S. It is correct for India to look after its own interests, maintain good relations with both Europe and the developing world, but recognise who really pulls the international strings currently.

(The writer is Director, South Asia Program, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, U.S.)

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