The Hindu : The warped logic of nuclear gambles

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Monday, May 27, 2002

Opinion

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The warped logic of nuclear gambles

By Jean Dreze

The main issue is to protect the country from the sinister adventurists who are pushing the region into the nuclear abyss under the cover of patriotism.

IT IS difficult to attribute a shred of rationality to the war preparations that are taking place in India. Aside from being ethically objectionable, they serve no useful purpose. The impulsive side of the situation is easy to understand. As the Indian leadership sees it, cross-border terrorism cannot be allowed to continue. Sooner or later, "we have to hit back". Let us for the moment accept this discourse of counter-terrorism, even though it may hide more sinister designs, as discussed below. Where will this "reaction" lead? Pakistani leaders have made it clear that if they are pushed to the wall, they may use nuclear weapons. Indian strategists dismiss the threat on the ground that Pakistan would never "dare" to do this, since it would invite a devastating second strike. This confidence is misplaced, for several reasons.

First, it is far from clear if India would really respond to a Pakistani first strike with a devastating "second strike". That would certainly be a foolish thing to do, since India has nothing to gain (and plenty to lose) from a nuclear showdown with Pakistan. Also, international intervention may prevent it. Of course, a second strike cannot be ruled out. The point is that India's response is anyone's guess. The uncertain nature of India's response makes it, in turn, difficult to rule out a first strike: if the stakes are high enough, Pakistani leaders may take the risk.

Second, even if a second strike is certain, it does not follow that Pakistan would necessarily refrain from a first strike. It would be naive to expect nuclear decisions in a war situation to be based on a rational assessment of the consequences. Further, suicide is not incompatible with rationality. A military commander who believes that martyrdom leads to heaven is quite capable of launching a nuclear missile even if he knows that a devastating response is certain.

Third, nuclear war does not proceed in neat and predictable steps such as "first strike" and "second strike". It is more likely to be the outcome of a process of escalating violence. The risky, unpredictable and even irrational nature of escalatory processes is well understood in the strategic literature. History, too, tells us that massive armed conflicts often begin with trivial skirmishes, initiated on the cheerful assumption that hostilities are going to be "limited". Even World War I essentially happened through escalation.

Indian strategists have produced all sorts of warped arguments to convince us that the military option is "safe". The smartest of them all, K. Subrahmanyam, has recently argued that we can sleep in peace because if Pakistani fingers come anywhere near the nuclear button the U.S. army will "disarm" Pakistan's nuclear facilities through surgical strikes. Give us a break, my friend. What if this highly speculative reasoning turns out to be mistaken, for whatever reason? What if the U.S. strikes on Pakistan arrive a little late — say an hour late, enough for a dozen Pakistani missiles to leave the launch pad? What if some of the U.S. missiles miss their target, leaving enough firepower for Pakistan to nuke a few Indian cities?

The bottom line is inescapable: if India attacks Pakistan, nuclear war simply cannot be excluded. In answer to this, many argue that "Pakistan has much more to lose from a nuclear war than we do". Big deal. When Delhi is in flames and Jaipur has been reduced to ashes, what consolation will it be that the sufferings of our brethren across the border are even worse?

The problem with nuclear war is that grasping its horrors is often beyond our imaginative powers. That makes it possible to talk about nuclear war as if it were a "game". We can discuss the pros and cons of "taking out" enemy cities or "settling scores" with Pakistan with the same detachment as chess players or cricket fans. The cool language of strategic thinking insulates us from the excruciating agony of the victims.

Assuming that we could somehow trust the impending war to be "limited", what would India gain from it? No one has explained this clearly. It would certainly be childish to expect that a limited war between India and Pakistan would end cross-border terrorism, let alone help bring peace to Kashmir. On the contrary, there is every chance that the violence would increase. After months of merciless bombing in Afghanistan, the U.S. is more vulnerable than ever to terrorist attacks. Israel's recent experience is much the same. Like it or not, the sledgehammer approach does not work.

Even if a war is averted, troubling questions arise about the strategic value of this kind of nuclear bullying (or "coercive diplomacy", as it is called in strategic circles), not to speak of its ethical acceptability. The gains (if any) are small, and the risks are enormous. The military build-up on the border has effectively put India at the mercy of enterprising terrorists: any loose cannon with a few grenades and Pakistani chocolates in his pockets can potentially trigger a nuclear conflict in the region. The situation has already been skilfully exploited by the perpetrators of the Kaluchak massacre; the military build-up is almost an invitation for further incidents of this kind.

Given the transparently counterproductive nature of war preparations from the point of view of halting cross-border terrorism, we are forced to consider an alternative reading of the whole situation, which actually makes more sense to anyone with a minimally critical mind. For many people who are frighteningly close to the levers of power, cross-border terrorism is just an excuse for a war they have been seeking all along. The BJP hardliners have never made any secret of their military ambitions. Go to any RSS headquarters and you will see a map of Akhand Bharat, the promised land, which includes not only "Pakistan-occupied Kashmir" but also the rest of Pakistan.

Further, the Gujarat massacres have made it painfully clear that the Sangh Parivar "means business". Surely, those who have supported the mass killing of innocent Muslims in Gujarat can also condone a "nuclear showdown" with Pakistan? Indeed they are making no secret of this apocalyptic dream: they are proclaiming it in open meetings, in television interviews, and other public forums. The writing is on the wall, in capital letters and fluorescent paint. I fear that future generations of Indians may have good reason to blame us for ignoring it.

Seen in this light, the main issue is not whether and how India should respond to cross-border terrorism (important as it might be). The main issue is to protect the country from the sinister adventurists who are pushing the region into the nuclear abyss under the cover of patriotism.

What is most distressing in all this is the lack of concern, on all sides, for the people on whose behalf the violence is supposed to be taking place, namely the Kashmiri people. In this respect, the official policy on Kashmir is a bundle of contradictions. On the one hand, Kashmir is held to be an inalienable part of India. On the other, Kashmiris are not deemed worthy of the basic human and civil rights owed to all Indian citizens. Until their aspirations are addressed, the iron fist approach to cross-border terrorism will be futile and the violence will continue.

(The writer is Visiting Professor, Delhi School of Economics.)

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