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By Balraj Puri
THE KALUCHAK massacre and the attack on the Raghunath temple two months earlier reinforce the need for rethinking the security strategy for the Jammu region. So far, the approach has been to treat the violence as a mere extension of the militant movement in the Valley; when due to the mounting pressure of the security forces, militants on the run took shelter in the Jammu hills. This has proved to be a fatal miscalculation. The differences in the topography as also the character, composition and objectives of the militant groups active in the two regions have to be factored in while evolving a game plan. The shift in strategy by those across the border in trying to convert the Kashmiri movement into a Muslim one and the consequent introduction of non-Kashmiri militants saw new depths of brutality being plumbed. For example, the killing of 25 Kashmiri Pandits at Wandhama and 35 Sikhs at Chhattisinghpora. But this created a far more adverse reaction among the Kashmiri Muslims than the perpetrators and their masters had anticipated. Unfortunately, the killing of five innocent Kashmiri Muslims by the security forces after declaring them killers of the Sikhs and later unsuccessful attempts at fudging the evidence caused confusion among the local people on the question of the culprits' identity. Another factor in the shift in the militants' strategy was the expectation of a better response from the Muslim-majority parts of Jammu because the people there were ethnically closer to the new cadre of non-Kashmiri militants mostly hailing from Pakistan's Punjab province. There was also better access geographically and linguistically, to the Muslim-majority parts of Jammu. Moreover, unlike the Kashmir Valley, most parts of the Jammu region are hilly where people live in sparsely populated and scattered hamlets that cannot be easily defended. The new brand of militants started mass killings in the unprotected hilly areas of the region. About 25 innocents were cut to pieces at Prankote in Udhampur district, and about the same number at Chapnari in Doda district where two marriage parties were fired upon indiscriminately. A bus near Kishtwar was stopped and Hindu passengers were segregated from the Muslims and killed. About 20 Hindus were similarly separated near Padar in the northernmost part of Jammu and done to death. The list of innocent families brutally killed in fives or tens in the last three years is too large to enumerate here. Of course, many Muslims met a similar fate when they were suspected to be informers of the security forces or pro-India. At Kalakote, 15 members of a Muslim family were roasted alive. Muslims are liable to be victimised by both sides. At places, security forces ignorant of local situations and personalities accepted the guidance of those seeking to settle personal or communal scores. Such lapses proved costly. In one case, 19 members of a big Muslim family were killed in Sallan in Poonch for which the State Human Rights Commission held the security forces responsible. In April alone, 30 members of four Muslim families in the same district crossed over the LoC to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. In the hilly areas of mixed population, militant activity sometimes provoked communal tension and vice versa. In such situations, Hindus seek security with the forces while Muslim youth swell the ranks of militants. Thus, one of the foremost objectives of militancy in the Jammu region is to deepen the communal divide. My colleagues and I have visited many sensitive spots. Our experience everywhere was that such visits invariably succeeded in removing misunderstandings and in restoring traditional relations between communities; which also brought down the level of violence. Thus, peace workers have as vital a role in containing militant violence against innocent civilians as the security forces. For, without local support militancy cannot survive. Though, on the whole, the people of Jammu have behaved remarkably well, certain political developments have weakened their resolve. After the National Conference joined the BJP-led coalition at the Centre, both parties became more aggressively hostile to each other at the local level. For, their raison d'etre was threatened by this alliance. To reassure its followers that it had not given up its traditional role of opposition to what it called Kashmiri domination, the BJP would repeatedly demand the dismissal of the National Conference Government and find it indistinguishable from the militants. The National Conference leaders, to assure followers that the alliance with the BJP did not mean surrender of the secular agenda, at the local level expose the communal and anti-Muslim role of the BJP. Both parties are trying to consolidate their spheres of influence on a communal basis. Moving a step further, the NC Government proposed to divide the Jammu region along communal lines. In a panic reaction, the RSS sponsored a movement for separate Statehood for Jammu. Without the support of the Muslim-majority parts of Jammu, it, in practice, reinforces the proposal of Farooq Abdullah. The division of Jammu along communal lines is in no sense complete at the ground level. Nor would it be fair to term the entire Muslim following of the NC communal or sympathetic to the militants. But the signs of distrust was enough signal to encourage the militants to expand their area of operation till they started hitting Jammu city and adjoining areas. The Government reacted by giving extra powers to the security forces through extension of the Disturbed Areas Act and the Special Powers Act to the entire Jammu region. But, reducing the powers and functions of the civil administration, has only added to the difficulties of the anti-militancy operations. For, only civil officers have the knowledge of who's who in every area. Security forces cannot acquire this during their brief stay. Some of the loopholes in the security system that have been hinted at in the reports on the Kaluchak massacre e.g. lack of coordination between intelligence agencies and the various security forces need to be plugged. The reasons for the delay in fencing the international border have also to be addressed. Fresh pressure on Pakistan through "coercive diplomacy" and America's good offices to stop cross-border terrorism, should of course, be tried. Any measures being contemplated will be of little avail if the civil administration is paralysed and the political discourse remains vitiated, and if frustration, insecurity, mutual distrust and alienation from each other and the Government among the people continue to grow. At a time when the premier militant organisation of the Kashmir region and various separatist leaders are debating on a dialogue for a solution of the Kashmir problem, complete lack of thought about the situation and the people in the Jammu region can upset whatever progress is expected to be made on the peace moves in the Valley.
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