The Hindu : Losing strategic credibility

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Wednesday, Jun 05, 2002

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Losing strategic credibility

By V.R. Raghavan

That India could choose war in the face of an unstable nuclear deterrence is seen as casting doubts on its strategic acumen.

INDIA'S POLITICAL leadership is beginning to lose credibility in managing the country's strategic interests. The series of policy initiatives since last December's attack on Parliament have left both the Government and the nation's interests vulnerable in military and political terms. Political and strategic analysts in major capitals are unable to fathom what the Government in New Delhi seeks to obtain by going to war. They are also unclear on what the major powers can do to help India fight the proxy war imposed on it. There is a perceptible turning away from the perception that India is a stabilising influence on the international scene. The Indian Government's past successes in building a matrix of strategic understanding with major powers are under risk of being unravelled.

India is on the front page of every international newspaper and figures at the top of news channel headlines. The common impression such coverage conveys is of an intransigent Government determined to start a war. Pervez Musharraf and Pakistan's role in creating a war-like situation gets coverage just as much as his difficulties in curbing the role of right wing and jehadi saboteurs. The overall impression remains that of an India under pressure from Pakistan-inspired terrorism but unable to see the perils of war between two nuclear neighbours.

In meetings in Paris with a range of experts on strategic, diplomatic and military issues, some questions come up repeatedly. These relate to the unstable nuclear deterrence that operates in the subcontinent, about the nature and kind of war India would fight and what purpose it sees as obtainable from it. Another issue often raised is about the need for war, when one is already being fought by artillery and mortar firing that is depopulating entire villages. There is also reference to India wanting the world to look at terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, but not at the root cause of alienation in the State. By raising the probability of war India and equally Pakistan are seen as being irresponsible and irrational and worse, unconcerned about the impact of war on other countries.

Amongst those who have done a great deal of work on war and nuclear deterrence, a sense of dismay is unmistakable at the way an India-Pakistan war would progress. The belief expressed by the Indian political leadership that a war can be fought and won despite nuclear weapons being present, creates disbelief on the understanding in the two countries on what nuclear weapons are all about. That nuclear weapons have made the political leadership confident of taking greater military risks instead of avoiding them defies logic in knowledgeable circles. That India, which demonstrated a better grasp of nuclear deterrence than Pakistan during the Kargil war, is now determined to wage war across international borders comes as an unexpected shock to all.

As for the nature of war India is contemplating, there are grave anxieties expressed. If the war is to force Gen. Musharraf to change policy, Indian forces will have to impose severe costs on Pakistan. These costs will need to be of territorial losses, military attrition, and infrastructure destruction. That Indian forces are capable of imposing such costs is not in doubt. That Pakistan would be forced to take recourse to nuclear weapons because of such a capability is also not in doubt. Assuming otherwise would be both a political and military irresponsibility. In short, a decisive outcome from the war is directly linked to catastrophic possibilities. On the other hand, a less than decisive outcome from the war would make the latter purposeless.

Why would New Delhi seek recourse to war when the dangers are apparent, or why would Gen. Musharraf be willing to fight the war when its costs are obvious? The answer lies not in the logic of nuclear deterrence nor in the absence of rationality in the leadership of the two countries. It lies in the belief that war can be used as political theatre to demonstrate resolve against the adversary. It rests in the assumption that war can be limited after it starts. This misplaced confidence comes from disregarding the elemental dynamic of escalation built into the conduct of war.

There is no definitive answer against the instrument of terror. Democracies and liberal societies will remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The military instrument of the state will continue to be an insufficient weapon against terrorism. The answer to terrorism lies in grasping the nature of threat it poses. International terrorism depends greatly on sanctuaries in countries that wage wars of proxy. A military response against international terrorism is perfectly in order if it is backed by international consensus. That consensus needs to built and sustained. India has succeeded handsomely in creating a consensus on its being targeted by international and cross-border terrorism. This international consensus needs to be sustained if an Indian military response is to succeed. Success for India is likely to be seriously undermined if its actions exceed beyond what is internationally acceptable. A war whose ramifications are going to be felt well beyond India and Pakistan exceeds that threshold of acceptabilityNew Delhi's inability to accommodate international concerns even as it seeks international support to its security challenges is doing it little good. New Delhi has chosen cross-border terrorism and infiltration from across the Line of Control (LoC), as the measure of its patience. New Delhi also wishes to remain the sole judge to decide if the level of infiltration has gone down. Gen. Musharraf has, on the other hand, begun to assert that he has acted and would continue to act against this happening. In the face of these opposite positions, a sentiment is emerging that Indian and Pakistani claims should be subjected to some degree of verification or monitoring. International support to India's search for backing to its cause is therefore likely to have a price tag. New Delhi will find it very difficult to accept it, just as major powers are going to find it difficult to accept New Delhi's unilateral assessment on infiltration indefinitely.

The high admiration and respect for Indian restraint against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism still remains strong. That Indian patience cannot be endless is also repeatedly acknowledged. India's choice of war to force the issue, which has defied solution for five decades, therefore comes as an inexplicable counterpoint to its erstwhile strategy. Risking a possible nuclear exchange and overlooking India's great stakes as an emerging great power, defies the understanding of both its friends and admirers. That India could choose war in the face of an unstable nuclear deterrence is seen as casting doubts on its strategic acumen.

There is a growing degree of international quandary about helping India face the terrorist challenge. New Delhi is seen to be right in its anger and frustration while its insistence on the extreme choice of war is clearly viewed as unacceptable. Indian sensitivities on any country attempting to suggest prescriptions weigh heavy amongst policy makers in major capitals. There is a flurry of consultations on what can be done to make India take counsel. New Delhi also needs to be accommodative of creative ideas that would sustain international support to its cause.

Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Opinion

Stories in this Section

Tilting at Windmills

The verdict in Goa

Losing strategic credibility

Dismantling an accord

Did U.S., Osama talk?

Give up n-weapons

Next President

Wasteful expenditure

Politics and suicides