The Hindu : Managing the crisis

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Friday, Jun 07, 2002

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Managing the crisis

By Chinmaya R.Gharekhan

We should persevere with the diplomatic option, give time to major players to persuade Gen. Musharraf to stop cross-border activity.

THE COMBINATION of melting snow and monsoon clouds will produce an explosive mixture over the next few weeks. The several thousand Al-Qaeda terrorists who have positioned themselves in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) since Operation Enduring Freedom are getting ready to move into Kashmir, with the full support of Pervez Musharraf. The onset of the rainy season will reduce the possibilities of ground action by the Army. While the concern of the international community is perfectly understandable, its leaders cannot escape at least part of the responsibility for giving undue credence to Gen. Musharraf's promises of halting the trans-border infiltration.

The possibility of war is now being taken very seriously, as evidenced by the decision by several Governments to advise their nationals to leave India and Pakistan. Things have come to such a pass that some experts are openly arguing that in case of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, India would suffer grievous consequences but survive whereas Pakistan would simply disappear, vanish, evaporate. In other words, India can afford a nuclear war, Pakistan cannot. Consequently, it is alright for India to start a conventional war with Pakistan without worrying too much about the danger of escalation to a nuclear war. Hopefully, such a suicidal approach is not shared by more that a lunatic fringe. In any case, the Government has scrupulously avoided indulging in such irresponsible rhetoric, unlike Pakistan which seems obsessed by the need to remind India and the rest of the world that it would be ready to use its nuclear arsenal any time it chooses to.

One must sympathise with the predicament in which the Government finds itself — damned if it does, damned if it does not. Of course, the Government should take comfort in the fact that the Opposition is even more cautious and restrained than the leaders in the ruling coalition. The Opposition, of course, has the luxury of not having to take any decisions in this extremely complex and emotional situation. On the whole, the foreign policy-security team of the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, has acquitted itself admirably so far. It has had remarkable success in mobilising international opinion against the failure of Gen. Musharraf to check and stop cross-border infiltration. The de facto leader of the international community and U.S. President, George W. Bush, did not mince words on May 30: "He (Gen. Musharraf) must stop the incursions across the Line of Control. He must do so. He said he would do so. We and others are making it clear to him that he must live up to his word." The fact that the U.S. President used these words of admonition to Gen.Musharraf after the latter had claimed in his May 27 speech that there was no cross-border terrorism must have come as a shock to the people of Pakistan who just a few days before had ostensibly confirmed him in his assumption of power.

The Indian Government has maintained from the time the international coalition was formed after September 11 that we will fight our own war against terrorism and that we do not want others to fight it for us. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that both the Government, and even more so the people, have expected the Americans not actually to go to war on our behalf to liquidate the cross-border terrorism but at least to put heavy pressure on Pakistan to stop it. To that extent, Mr. Bush's words are to be warmly welcomed. However, we must not forget that the U.S. needs and will continue to need Pakistan for a long time to come in the prosecution of its war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban many of whose leaders have taken shelter in western Pakistan's tribal areas. American priority remains its own war against terror; anything and any country that comes in the way of the prosecution of that war will not be tolerated. This means the U.S. will be willing to lean on Pakistan so long as India does not go to war, limited or otherwise.

Some analysts argue that India does not have to worry too much about American sensitivity or reaction and that America might in fact respect us more if we went ahead and did what America did to Afghanistan or what the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, did to the Palestinians. Alas! We are not a superpower and Pakistan is not an insignificant military power. The situations are not comparable at all.

There is plenty of loose talk of a salami slice or PoK chop military action, of capturing 300 km of territory across the Line of Control (LoC) or of a 100-km deep attack inside PoK and of capturing Skardu. There is an implicit and dangerous assumption that Pakistan will be taken unawares and will not retaliate at a place and in a manner of its choosing. There is another important aspect. A significant gain, achieved after considerable sacrifice by the Indian armed forces, of the Kargil episode was the recognition by the international community of the LoC's sanctity. We in India were particularly happy about this strengthening of the semi-permanent character of the LoC. Should we be the ones to violate the Line? Would an action across the LoC achieve the objective of increasing the cost to Pakistan of its support to terrorists in Kashmir?

The May 14 Kaluchak massacre seems to have acted as the proverbial last straw for India's patience. We have succeeded in convincing the world about Pakistan's involvement in this as well the ongoing cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir for the past dozen years. Even the United Nations Secretary-General, normally keen on avoiding taking sides, came out with an unambiguous call to Gen. Musharraf to implement what he had promised to do in his January 12 speech. We must not fritter away this important diplomatic high ground. There is a new international coalition, this one working actively to prevent a war between the two South Asian nuclear powers. In view of the rhetoric of some of our leaders, the rest of the world would quickly come to hold India responsible in case of armed hostilities breaking out in the Subcontinent. Given our experience in the past, it would not be advisable to take the matter to the Security Council. But Pakistan and others certainly will, in case active hostilities commence. It would be a good idea to keep the Secretary-General briefed about developments on a timely basis. By doing so we would not be inviting his mediation; war and peace are the legitimate concerns of the U.N.

In sum, we should persevere with the diplomatic option, give time to major players to persuade Gen. Musharraf to stop cross-border activity. He might be amenable to doing so, not necessarily in response to our show of armed might but to oblige his benefactors, hoping they in turn will help him agitate the Kashmir issue. It should not matter to us why he would decide to rein in the terrorists, we are concerned with the infiltration ending, so that the people of Kashmir are able to go to the polls in a peaceful atmosphere.

In case, however, Pakistan, rather than India, were to be tempted to initiate the hostilities, it could be a different story altogether.

Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Opinion

Stories in this Section

The crisis in Maharashtra

Churning the modern corporation

Managing the crisis

Water policy blues

Confidence-building at home