The Hindu : What next from New Delhi?

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Monday, Jun 17, 2002

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What next from New Delhi?

By K.K. Katyal

The differences over a monitoring mechanism (on infiltration across the LoC) can be pursued but should not come in the way of a calibrated, incremental process for de-escalation.

IT WAS pointless for Islamabad to have reacted angrily to the U.S. Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld's remarks in New Delhi on the presence of Al-Qaeda elements in areas near the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. So strong was the mood of protest that the subject figured at some length in his talks with the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, and others, and dominated his press conference. Later, both the Government and non-official commentators seemed to have derived comfort from Mr. Rumsfeld's "retraction" — "that the U.S. did not have evidence of Al-Qaeda's presence but a good deal of scraps of intelligence", etc. The verbal jugglery may have satisfied the Pakistanis but did they not indulge in costly self-delusion by turning a blind eye to a major problem that affects their country's peace and stability?

Al-Qaeda may or may not be present near the LoC but do they seriously believe that it is not present in Pakistan — in the tribal belt and elsewhere? Or that the blasts and killings in Karachi and Islamabad are not its handiwork? For purposes of propaganda, it may suit them to foist the blame on Indian agencies but could they afford not to take into account the reality (of which their Government should be having a pretty good idea)? This past Friday's blast near the U.S. consulate in Karachi should serve as a wake-up call. It is certainly not a good policy to ignore the national interest because of the obsession with Kashmir. Al-Qaeda is a problem for India, but it poses a threat to Pakistan too.

According to an editorial in The Economist of London, "the Pakistanis who since the 1980s have fought alongside the mujahideen and the Taliban in Afghanistan are the same people who have fought India in Kashmir. Furious with Gen. Musharraf for betraying them in Afghanistan, and perhaps now in Kashmir, the militants have every reason to destabilise him. The several thousand Al-Qaeda fugitives at large in north-western Pakistan would certainly want to help."

The cover story of the latest issue of Newsweek concludes: "In order for Musharraf truly to make good on his promises (to proceed against militants), he will need something extraordinary in this conflict — some help from India. Already the President has climbed out on a very flimsy branch to move against the militants. If New Delhi does not respond with some conciliatory gestures of its own — restoring full diplomatic ties at least, if not opening talks on Kashmir — Musharraf himself could become a target. Security around the President has been tightened. His movements are kept secret and his travel route frequently changed at the last moment because of growing fears that he could meet the fate of the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat — assassination by Islamic militants.'' This may be too alarmist a scenario but it highlights the problem aptly.

Leaving aside the Al-Qaeda controversy, what is the end result of the visits of the two senior functionaries of the Bush administration, the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, and Mr. Rumsfeld? For an answer, it is important to keep in mind the parameters within which Washington conducts itself in the subcontinent. One, its resolve to prevent an armed conflict between India and Pakistan. Two, continuance of the fight against terrorism which was not completed despite the ouster of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. There is nothing original about these points, but we in India tend to lose sight of their implications and take to facile assumptions — either because of wishfulness or pretences created and encouraged by the foreign policy establishment or out of naivete.

To check an armed conflict resulting from India's preparedness, the U.S. gave priority to New Delhi's concerns on trans-border terrorism. This entailed some strong messages to Gen. Musharraf to crack down on terrorists, to stop infiltration and take other necessary steps. There were no further demands on the Pakistani ruler. On the other hand, there was an understanding of the predicament he found himself in for fear of a backlash from the extremists. Also, there was the realisation that he needed to be strengthened and that among the ways this could be done was a positive response from India to his assurances on the terrorism issue. Mr. Armitage summed up the outcome of his visit to the subcontinent thus: "President Musharraf was quite categorical about the fact that the activities across the Line of Control would be stopped permanently. And he is quite keen to enter into a dialogue on the whole question of Kashmir... the Government of India noted that President Musharraf made this commitment to the international community and to the U.S. And I think they will be watching to see if the actions follow the words."

This was about the war avoidance part of America's subcontinental agenda. Other details, particularly those related to the monitoring of the LoC — offer of technology, offer of intelligence-sharing — flow out of it and more will be heard of these matters in the days to come. The second part — the continuation of the fight against terrorism — will see Washington aiding both India and Pakistan to enhance their capabilities to deal with what is recognised as a formidable challenge.

The visits of the two American officials, though in pursuance of the same agenda and the same objectives, covered different areas — Mr. Armitage was mainly concerned with the political and diplomatic and Mr. Rumsfeld with the operational. Some overlap was unavoidable because the problem could not be divided into two neat compartments. But Washington would have done well to adopt an integrated approach in physical terms, apart from the conceptual — that would have avoided the confusion and contradictions of the type Mr. Rumsfeld landed himself in. The Defence Secretary's job was difficult. Mr. Armitage had to seek the commitment of the two countries to such worthy objectives as avoidance of war and the fight against terrorism, while Mr. Rumsfeld had to get the two sides to agree to the mechanics of achieving these objectives. He could not. As for generalities, he merely repeated what was stated by Mr. Armitage.

The first visit was followed by two positive steps by India — removal of the ban on the over-flights of Pakistani planes and withdrawal of warships from positions near Pakistan's shoreline. The second, on the other hand, was not followed by any significant announcement, either by New Delhi or Islamabad.

What is to be New Delhi's strategy? It has to seize upon the assurances of Pakistan that "the activities across the LoC would be stopped permanently" or that the steps to end infiltration would be both transparent and permanent. The differences over a monitoring mechanism can be pursued but should not come in the way of a calibrated, incremental process for de-escalation. If in the absence of a formal system, it was possible to track the ups and downs in the terrorist activities after January 12, it should be possible to ascertain the real position from now onward, with the help of intelligence reports of others, the U.S., for instance. Now that the international gaze is fixed on Gen. Musharraf's assurances, it would be difficult for him to mislead the world community. The opening is there. It has to be made use of judiciously — of course, while exercising utmost care.

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