The Hindu : From the jaws of self-defeat

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Friday, Jun 21, 2002

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From the jaws of self-defeat

By Chris Gagne

Both India and Pakistan could claim a victory of sorts by embracing change... Most importantly, the Kashmiris would benefit from a reduction in violence.

THE WAR clouds over Kashmir are finally beginning to part, but they could gather again soon if Indian and Pakistani leaders lack the diplomatic agility to permanently jettison traditional, self-defeating policies. In many ways, India and Pakistan have been their own worst enemies since the nuclear tests in 1998. The tests initiated by New Delhi internationalised the Kashmir dispute — something India has desperately tried to avoid — by making it easier than ever before for subsequent conflicts to be characterised as "nuclear flashpoints". Toward that end, overt nuclear capabilities emboldened Pakistan to turn up the heat in Kashmir, since the rules of deterrence appeared to inhibit a major reprisal from India. India's mismanagement of Kashmir, including rigged elections and misappropriated funds, has been fuelling the fire in the Valley for over a decade. Rejecting U.N. monitors on the LoC, jailing political dissidents, and driving away foreign journalists and NGOs have only encouraged more violence of both the domestic and imported varieties.

Islamabad's attempts to take advantage of India's miscalculations have been just as counter-productive. Using uncontrollable militants for brinksmanship in Kashmir became wholly unacceptable after 9/11, and the international attention long sought by Pakistan proved to be quite the opposite of what it had hoped for. Furthermore, after 13 years of trying to "bleed India by a thousand cuts", Pakistan itself is haemorrhaging from domestic terrorism it has unwittingly supported in the name of Kashmir.

As this latest crisis recedes, India and Pakistan have an opportunity to turn away from failed policies before they become even more deeply entrenched. India cannot wish away nuclear weapons in the Subcontinent (even if it wanted too), particularly with China modernising its forces next door. However, it could reduce the temperature in Kashmir by ensuring that upcoming elections in the State are free, fair, and credible to the Kashmiris. Toward this end, political dissidents could be freed and allowed to contest elections. International election monitors, requested by a number of political groups in the Valley, could be invited as a gesture of sincerity on the part of the Government of India. U.N. monitors could be allowed to patrol the Indian side of the LoC as symbols of international support for an end to cross-border terrorism.

While some steps, such as releasing political dissidents, could be unilateral, others would involve the international community in ways that have been traditionally unacceptable to India. India might benefit from being more receptive to a modest international role in reducing tension vis-a-vis Pakistan and Kashmir. New Delhi already appears to be moving in this direction by allowing the United Kingdom and the United States to facilitate de-escalation along the LoC. However, international assistance in de-escalating previous crises has been short-lived, allowing the cycle of violence to reassert itself soon afterward. If India again turns away from the international community once the immediate danger is over, it would be shooting itself in the foot. The U.S. has never shown so much sympathy for the Indian position as it has since Kargil. First, the Clinton administration reaffirmed the sanctity of the LoC, and now, the Bush administration has stood behind India in condemning Pakistan's military and logistic support for the insurgency in Kashmir. If New Delhi fears that Washington's fickle politics might work against it in the future, it has all the more reason to welcome U.S. facilitation now while it could reap lasting benefits.

Any third party involvement in India-Pakistan relations and Kashmir would be minimal, and not just because India is apprehensive. New Delhi can rest assured that no one in the international community, least of all the Bush administration, wants to get mired in the details of the Kashmir dispute. Washington might, however, be allowed to continue to do what it has been doing for the past several months: facilitate communication, verify claims made by both sides (essential in an atmosphere still devoid of trust), and encourage meaningful dialogue on Kashmir and other issues of contention. Of these, the role of verification might be the most difficult for New Delhi to accept should it lead to a third party operating within its own borders. Monitoring of the LoC could be improved with technological assistance from the U.S. (U.N. monitors along the Indian side of the LoC would have little practical effect in verifying Pakistan's claims that it has stopped infiltration, but might be desirable for their symbolic value.) The verification of a legitimate political process in Kashmir will prove more challenging. Nonetheless, India's credibility among Kashmiris is weak; a third party, perhaps in form of official election monitors, could go a long way toward overcoming this problem and stifle some of Pakistan's objections. India does not need to prove its democratic credentials to the international community; election monitors in Kashmir would merely help New Delhi prove itself to the Kashmiris.

Pakistan's policy challenges are greater, but progress has already begun. Pervez Musharraf has repeatedly stated his intention to cut off military and logistic support for the militants in Kashmir and the U.S. and the U.K. have vouched for his sincerity. Results are beginning to show on the ground both in Kashmir and in Pakistan. If Gen. Musharraf can weather the discontent of Pakistan's religious right and its foot soldiers while he dismantles the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Kashmir, he will have removed a major obstacle to his authority, and that of future Pakistani leaders. Furthermore, a permanent change in Pakistan's Kashmir policy would allow Islamabad to reclaim the moral high ground and lobby more effectively for the rights of Kashmiris in international fora.

The above policy changes are not mutually exclusive or zero-sum in nature. Both sides could claim a victory of sorts by embracing change. India could rightfully claim that it has won the recognition and support of the international community in the fight against cross-border terrorism. It could ride this wave of support into a dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir once the gun has been holstered and the sanctity of the LoC has been upheld. Pakistan could finally have its dialogue with India regarding Kashmir, without being held culpable for violence in the region. Islamabad could also claim to have paved the way toward greater political freedom in Kashmir. Most importantly, the Kashmiris would benefit from a reduction in violence as terrorist attacks and Indian overreactions both subside. A reduction in violence would logically bring about a reduction in Indian forces in the region, something that everyone, including the Indian Army itself, would welcome.

A political process in Kashmir would have to follow. The difficulties in negotiating this process would be great, especially without third party facilitation. Clearly the Kashmiris themselves would have to play a key role in such deliberations. The road to a final settlement would be long and arduous, but if it begins soon, with a clean break from failed policies, future generations of South Asians might finally know peace.

(The writer is a Research Associate at The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington.)

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