The Hindu : Our `best bet' in Kashmir

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Wednesday, Jun 26, 2002

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Our `best bet' in Kashmir

By Harish Khare

It is about time New Delhi realises that the Abdullahs are not the solution but a part of the problem.

THE ABDULLAHS have performed yet another vaudeville act in Srinagar. The father-and-son duo has again proceeded as if the National Conference was a piece of family silver and Kashmir was its zamindari. The father wants to be "rewarded" for his "sacrifices"; and, the son talks of favours New Delhi owes his father. After four years of a cozy relationship with the NDA, the son suddenly discovers the Sangh Parivar's communal spots. Cynicism and calculation have been the only impulses of the Abdullahs.

The Abdullahs, like any other dynasty, are incorrigible. They will not change because they have no reason to change, as their demands have invariably been sought to be satisfied. But it is about time New Delhi realises that the Abdullahs are not the solution but a part of the problem called "Kashmir". The reason is simple: the Abdullah dynasty is not interested in a resolution of the dispute, as its very raison d'etre would disappear the moment there is peace in Kashmir. And the Abdullahs will see to it that there is no movement forward in the direction of reconciliation and peace.

However, it would not be all that easy for New Delhi to see the Abdullahs as part of the problem and not the solution. Farooq Abdullah is a man who understands New Delhi better than sometimes New Delhi understands itself. With the possible exception of Jyoti Basu, Dr. Abdullah has been the most enduring of the Chief Ministers; but unlike Mr. Basu, he is not encumbered by any ideological principles or constitutional niceties, and has cynically manipulated whichever regime presided over the power arrangement in New Delhi.

The NDA regime is no exception. Within months of coming to power in 1998, L. K. Advani fell to the wiles of Dr. Abdullah. The Chief Minister gauged correctly and merrily pandered to Mr. Advani's need to have an enemy to hate. And the Chief Minister has craftily exploited the contradictions with the ruling coalition, often working on the Union Home Minister's susceptibilities, sometimes stoking the Defence Minister's dormant anarchic impulses, and, when needed, exploiting the Prime Minister's indulgent habits.

But the abiding interests of the Indian state cannot be allowed to be held hostage to the NDA regime's vulnerability. Unless New Delhi is willing to liberate itself from the "our best bet in Kashmir" trap, it will find it difficult to pursue its obligation to explore the possibility of reconciliation and peace in Kashmir.

It is not that the obligation is not recognised. A recognition of this obligation has indeed been very much at the heart of the Prime Minister's many initiatives. Be it the Ramzan initiative or the Agra summit, the implicit assumption was an unstated acknowledgement that there was alienation and disaffection among a section of the Kashmiris, and if Kashmir had to be moved away from its obsession with the gun then something would have to be done to address that alienation. Even in his last New Year's "thoughts" the Prime Minister had committed himself to a "search for a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem, both in its external and internal dimensions". This commitment, it needs to be noted, was reiterated despite the massive provocation of the December 13 outrage.

Yet, each of the Prime Minister's initiatives was sought to be derailed by the Abdullahs, albeit with not so inconsiderable support from the Union Home Minister. When Mr. Vajpayee talked of negotiations with the Hurriyat within the parameters of "insaniyat", the Chief Minister responded with the "autonomy" demand; and, Mr. Advani promptly dismissed it. The net result was that New Delhi was once again seen mired in its old orthodoxy. And then, the Ramzan initiative was finally killed when Mr. Advani insisted on not permitting Syed Ali Shah Geelani to travel to Pakistan.

Dr. Abdullah was, once again, a happy man; he had got Mr. Advani firmly in his corner. Meanwhile, Dr. Abdullah remained singularly indifferent to the demands of good governance; all acts of omission and commission were explained away in terms of militants' activities. His modus operandi has been to keep demanding more funds and more Central forces to deal with the militancy. And, when the discourse changed after September 11, he was the first to outtalk everyone else against Pakistan. Critics of his indifferent governance, in and outside Kashmir, were dubbed anti-Indian, ignorant of Pakistan's meddlesomeness. Nor would the Chief Minister permit other democratic forces the requisite space. He was not amused when the Prime Minister promised from the Red Fort a "free and fair" election in Jammu and Kashmir.

And while the Prime Minister and his aides sought to explore the possibility of a reconciliation with the separatist camp, the Chief Minister saw to it that even the most moderate of the Hurriyat leaders were made to feel the heat. Abdul Gani Lone, the most courageous moderate leader, was rendered vulnerable; finally, he was gunned down. After the Lone assassination, the Hurriyat once again gravitated towards the hardliners headed by Mr. Geelani.

And then, suddenly, after all these years, the Abdullah Government discovered that the Hurriyat leaders were getting money from Pakistan. Mr. Geelani has been put in jail making it impossible for any Hurriyat leader to be seen as interested in a dialogue with New Delhi.

The Abdullahs have put New Delhi in a terrible bind. While the Indian state has effectively demonstrated its capacity and stamina to stay put in Kashmir even after a decade-long Pakistan-sponsored jehadi campaign, and Indian diplomacy has finally managed to convince the world community of Islamabad's involvement in the so-called "freedom movement", the Abdullahs have left New Delhi little room in its endeavour to reach out to the separatist constituency.

The Abdullahs-controlled State Government apparatus would keep on discovering incriminating "evidence" against leaders of the separatist camp, making New Delhi's task difficult. And, the irony of all ironies is that the Abdullahs are the first one to make a hoo-ha over the Government of India wanting to make overtures to the separatist camp while ignoring "loyal" Kashmiris like them.

New Delhi's dilemma is, thus, acute. If the election process, even the much-promised "free and fair" affair, is to result only in another innings of six years for the Abdullahs, then the exercise can have no attraction for dissatisfied voices. People such as Shabir Shah or even Mufti Mohammed Sayeed cannot be expected to lend their presence to a process that would only legitimise the Abdullah dynasty.

The minimum requirement is that New Delhi provide a level-playing field to all those who want to explore the potential of Indian democracy. That means the elections should not be allowed to take place under the Abdullahs' not-too-benign writ.

Jammu and Kashmir can do well with a spell of Governor's Rule. Only when the Abdullahs are not calling the shots in Srinagar can the process of peace dialogue possibly take off.

The international community expects New Delhi to undertake such an exercise; Pakistan would keep the pressure on. In the days to come, New Delhi would be called upon to make tough decisions: how to make democracy work genuinely in Jammu and Kashmir, and how not to let the Abdullahs give Indian democracy a bad name.

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