The Hindu : Winning the battle over Kashmir

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Monday, Aug 05, 2002

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Winning the battle over Kashmir

By Malini Parthasarathy

For the Indian Union to retain Kashmir as a constituent unit, it will have to accept that this particular State is historically entitled to a much larger degree of autonomy than the other States.

THE VAJPAYEE administration is glowing with pride over its success in having got the international community particularly the United States and the European Union to endorse its emphasis on the ending of cross-border terrorism and infiltration as a precondition to a dialogue. That much is true. Today the United States, Britain and the rest of the world's powers have said publicly that Pakistan and its president, Pervez Musharraf, need to take action to end the infiltration of terrorists across the Line of Control into Kashmir. These countries have indeed brought strong pressure to bear on the General, producing a dramatic decrease in the level of infiltration, more than eighty per cent of these cross-border sneak-ins have come down, a result that is certainly pleasing to the Indian Government. But one unwelcome consequence of having adopted a strategy that depends so heavily on the good offices of Washington and London to bear down on Islamabad is that we now have to contend with strong interventionism on the part of the United States and its allies, despite their disclaimers.

Parliament was up in arms last week over the remarks made by the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, that Kashmir is "on the international agenda". The subsequent demurrals from Washington that Mr. Powell's statement did not at all imply that the U.S. would become a mediator, are really nothing more than soothing words to fretful Indian opposition politicians who have not really understood how far the strategic game in the subcontinent has spun out of India's control. And this situation is entirely the result of the stubborn refusal of the Vajpayee administration to adopt a more skilful and autonomous diplomatic approach that would include an engagement of Pakistan's military establishment. By angrily cutting off all contacts with Islamabad, New Delhi unnecessarily yielded the initiative to Washington, placing it in the virtual position of an intermediary entrusted with the task of conveying India's demands to Pakistan. Thus the United States now has a locus standi in the dispute, albeit still unspelt out, a position that Washington with its own developing stakes in this part of the world, is bound to use to its own advantage.

Only the naive could really believe that there were no hidden costs in the alacrity with which the Western powers endorsed New Delhi's demand that Pakistan end cross-border terrorism first before any dialogue with India could begin. The high-profile visits of the U.S. Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, and the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, to the region ultimately wrested the promise from General Musharraf that he would act decisively to stop infiltrations. Yet the Pakistani President agreed to do so only after he received specific assurances from the U.S. and its allies that they would likewise exert pressure on India to reciprocate by taking deescalatory steps militarily. More significantly, Pakistan was assured that the Western powers would urge New Delhi to resume its dialogue with Islamabad on all issues including the dispute over Kashmir. In other words, the timing, the sequence and the scope of India's diplomatic and strategic approach to Pakistan and India's own internal strategy on Kashmir have now become subjects of international scrutiny.

Some of those who participated in the meetings of Mr. Powell with the Prime Minister and his senior colleagues during his recent visit testify that the Indian side was somewhat taken aback and discomfited by the detailed focus reflected in Mr. Powell's queries on the forthcoming elections in Jammu and Kashmir, which seemed to indicate a new interest on the part of the United States in the actual substance of the political and electoral process that India was planning for the troubled State. The tenor of the recent Powell visit could be just one hint of the real costs of the strategy to invite Western intervention to pressure Pakistan to meet India's demands. The attitude of the international community to India's arguments in this regard is likely to increasingly depend on its own evaluation of the transparency and sincerity of India's attempts to satisfactorily address the aspirations of the alienated Kashmiri people.

The bitter irony that the BJP-led administration in New Delhi will have to swallow if it is to ensure the credibility of its political and strategic approach as regards Kashmir, is that it will have to jettison its traditional aversion to Article 370 and the idea of a higher degree of autonomy for that particular State. It will have to accept the reality that autonomy as envisaged under Article 370 is a historical right of the Kashmiri people which the Indian Union had committed itself to preserve at the time of its accession. For the Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, to argue that greater devolution is possible but not autonomy is to repudiate a solemn Constitutional obligation that the Union of India has towards this State.

It is widely known that the people of Jammu and Kashmir have a unique social contract with the Union of India in which the accession of the State is contingent on its retaining autonomy of decision-making on a wide range of subjects, other than defence, communications and foreign affairs. The agreements signed by Sheikh Abdullah with Jawaharlal Nehru in 1952 and reaffirmed in essence by Indira Gandhi in the pact of 1975 made categorically clear that unlike in the case of the other States, the residuary powers of legislation would be vested in the State rather than the Centre.

It is important to recognise that the 1975 agreement in no way sought to question the basic commitment made in the 1952 pact that the residuary powers of legislation would remain with the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The 1975 pact also reaffirmed that "Article 370 shall continue to govern" relations of the State with the Union of India. Another significant point to note is that in both the agreements of 1952 and 1975, it was made very clear that Kashmir was a constituent unit of the Indian Union. For instance in the 1952 agreement, it was agreed that while the State could fly its own flag in addition to the national flag, it would "not be a rival of the Union flag". In the 1975 agreement, it was agreed that Parliament "will continue to have powers to make laws relating to the prevention of activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India". What better affirmation of the State's unquestioned accession to the Indian Union could anybody want than what has been spelt out in these two milestone agreements which indicate the desire of the State to be part of the Indian Union even as it retains its own special status within the Union?

The inescapable political reality is that for the Indian Union to retain Kashmir as a constituent unit, it will have to accept that this particular State is historically entitled to a much larger degree of autonomy than the other States because of the fact that it was only on this condition that its accession was secured. It cannot be argued post facto that the historical context has now radically changed rendering the autonomy issue redundant because if anything, the mood of the people of the Kashmir Valley has darkened into deeper alienation and anger.

To make the forthcoming elections and their inherent promise of reviving India's political responsibilities to its estranged citizens in the Valley more credible and to rekindle the interest of the Kashmiris in participating in India's rich democratic experience, the Vajpayee administration will have to publicly declare its commitment to fulfilling the historic and Constitutionally-mandated obligation of the Indian Union — to restore full autonomy, as was envisaged originally, to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. If this bold step is taken, it would render it easier for political leaders including those from within the Hurriyat to defy the death threats of the jehadis and come forward to participate in the forthcoming elections. There can be no better way of infusing moral authority and political legitimacy into India's rule over Kashmir.

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