The Hindu : Powell's visit

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, Aug 12, 2002

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Powell's visit

By Achin Vanaik

For all the posturing by India and Pakistan, it is the U.S. that will most successfully manipulate the other two in the triangle that joins all of them.

COLIN POWELL has come and gone. Those with higher expectations will feel disappointed that he chose to give gratuitous advice on Kashmir and interfered in internal matters: witness his comments about releasing "political prisoners". But they will console themselves at India's defiant insistence against internationalising the Kashmir issue. And wasn't Mr. Powell told in no uncertain terms that Pakistan's support for terrorism was the key problem? In the larger scheme of things, however, these minor political frescoes are of little consequence. The basic contours of the India-Pakistan-United States triangle have already been set.

Pokhran-II permanently internationalised the Kashmir issue, eliminating the diplomatic advantage India had secured after 1964 (reinforced by the1971 Shimla Accord) when for the next 34 years, the world was quite happy to let Kashmir fester as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. After Pokhran-II, the Kashmir imbroglio had to be internationalised because the prospect of a war over Kashmir leading to a possible nuclear exchange could never be considered a purely bilateral matter. The advocates of Pokhran-II did not at the time even realise that this was bound to happen, just as they proclaimed that the nuclearisation of South Asia was actually a good thing which would lead to much greater regional stability and peace. A more inept judgement or prediction it would be difficult to find! Between May 11, 1998, and September 11, 2001, views had begun to change. For an ever-widening circle of "strategic thinkers", it became increasingly obvious that nuclearisation meant some degree of unavoidable internationalisation since Kashmir was the key point of friction between India and Pakistan. Rather than pursue the old line of insisting on pure bilateralism, it would be wiser to recognise the inevitable and begin operating to turn this `internationalisation' in one's favour. This would now be possible because of the wonderful new turn in Indo-U.S. relations towards a new strategic partnership. Such was the growing weight and importance of India in regional and world affairs that Pakistan had to pale into insignificance besides it.

Such was the `new thinking' mirrored in many an editorial and article. The aftermath of September 11 brought good and bad news. The good news was that it afforded a new opportunity for India to rope in the U.S. to put more pressure on Pakistan in the name of its "global war on terrorism". The bad news was that, in some ways, Pakistan's importance would be reinforced. However, the dominant view within India's "strategic community" was that the good news would ultimately outweigh the bad. Even today, this judgment is not being seriously questioned, for that would amount to having grave doubts about the whole thrust of India's foreign policy behaviour vis-a-vis the U.S., namely the search for a new `partnership' based on the assumption of a `basic convergence of interests' between the two states. Explanations about the limited outcome of Mr. Powell's visit have been of two types. One is to claim that the basic foreign policy orientation of India is fine, only New Delhi may have been somewhat too obsequious or reliant on Washington and therefore had expectations it should not have had. So, learn the lessons from this and don't depend too much on the U.S. to pull our chestnuts out of the fire. The U.S. will not be a problem for us unless we make it one. All we need is firmness in our foreign policy and more realistic and lower expectations from Washington. The other assessment is more generous to the U.S. There was nothing really out-of-the-ordinary in what Mr. Powell said. Everybody wants proper and fair elections to be successfully held in Kashmir, and this would in fact strengthen the Indian position. We do need to involve the U.S. in Kashmir but as "facilitator" not "mediator" and, contrary to the cynics, this is a subtle but important distinction that the Government fully understood when it officially stated it. At most, Mr. Powell's visit was a slight hiccup in the otherwise smooth and deepening process of strategic collaboration between the U.S. and India which Pakistan has every reason to be worried about in the longer run.

Perhaps, it is a matter of ingrained habit. But Indian strategists in the name of realism are always concerned about how India should fit the U.S. into its foreign policy perspectives, therefore the need to shed older reflexes of `anti-Americanism'. But such is the enormous extent of asymmetry of power between the U.S. and India that despite all the rhetoric about `partnership' and `convergence of national interests', the proper prism for trying to assess the future geo-politics of this region must start from the opposite premise. We have to look, above all, at how India and Pakistan fit into U.S. foreign policy perspectives! To assess this properly we must shed completely the assumption that US intervention in this part of the world is primarily motivated by the need to fight against terrorism in general, or Al-Qaeda, in particular.

This is only a minor though necessary part of the whole story. First, September 11 gave the U.S. the opportunity it had long been looking for — to establish a new kind of international legitimacy for a new kind of specifically military flexibility. In the name of fighting global terrorism it is now much freer than ever before to carry out, and get away with carrying out, military attacks on whomsoever it decides, whenever and wherever it decides, in whatever way it wants, and for as long as it deems necessary. Second, it has politically-militarily implanted itself as never before in its history into the Central Asian and the Caspian Sea region, which is not only important from the perspective of oil and gas but abuts the territories of three of its most important potential rivals over the next decade or two — Iran, Russia and China.

Geo-politically, both India and Pakistan have an added relevance. For India, U.S. ambitions are southwards and eastwards. India is to be incorporated as a junior and obedient ally for domination of the Indian Ocean region. India is also one of the `ten big emerging markets' that American capital (in alliance with European capital) has its eyes on for 'takeover' with the help of junior, more rentier-oriented allies amongst Indian capital.

But Pakistan remains important northwards and westwards. Its connection with Saudi Arabia (one leg of the tripod — Egypt and Israel are the others — on which U.S. dominance of West Asia is based) remains useful to the U.S. Moreover, Pakistan's importance as a crucial staging-post for U.S. actions in Central Asia has only been enhanced after September 11.

Both countries should know their place and follow the script. Washington needs stable client regimes in India and Pakistan (India wants to call it `partnership', so be it) and therefore cannot afford to destroy the domestic credibility of either `ally' by taking sides over Kashmir. Besides, it must now get down to the hard task of working out its own range of preferred policy perspectives, options and outcomes in Kashmir that would best suit its own wider regional and geo-political perspectives.

We are going to see more `interference' by the U.S. We are going to hear more reassurances from both Islamabad and New Delhi about things being under control. Sometimes, the signs of growing uneasiness might even surface. For all the posturing by India and Pakistan, it is the U.S. that will most successfully manipulate the other two in the triangle that joins all of them.

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