The Hindu : Needed: a Kashmir policy

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Wednesday, Aug 21, 2002

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Needed: a Kashmir policy — I

By Muchkund Dubey

The resumption of a dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir in the very near future appears to be an inevitability.

THE EVENTS since the launching of the proxy war by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir in 1989, have demonstrated the dire need for a Kashmir policy for India. Successive Central Governments have treated the situation in the State as a law and order problem, but they have been unable to overcome it in spite of the massive deployment of security forces. Some of our Prime Ministers, including the present one, displayed remarkable courage by taking initiatives for holding a dialogue with their Pakistani counterparts, on Kashmir and other bilateral issues. But in the absence of a Kashmir policy, these have proved abortive.

The Western powers on whom India has recently come to rely excessively for putting an end to Pakistan's proxy war, have started exerting renewed pressure on India to start a dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir. The French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, in an interview with an Indian journalist on August 1 said: "... to await the total cessation of all terrorist activities before a dialogue can be resumed is to resign oneself to the maintenance of a high level of tension, keep the prospect of an armed conflict open and, ultimately, run the risk of intensified violence." During his recent visit to the Subcontinent, the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, expressed the hope that if things go well, it would be timely to press for the beginning of a dialogue in the middle of August this year. Though the United States still stands by its position that the dialogue should come only after the cessation of cross-border terrorism by Pakistan, there are indications that in the ultimate analysis India will also be required to pay some price in terms of greater flexibility in its position on resuming the dialogue. High-level U.S. emissaries who have visited India since the launching of the "global campaign against terrorism" have made this clear to their Indian interlocutors in informal discussions. It is also becoming clear that Pakistan is going to use its most potent option of the proxy war as a bargaining counter to oblige India to come to the negotiating table. The major Western powers appear to have accepted this position. Therefore, the resumption of a dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir in the very near future appears to be an inevitability. But as in the past, India will go to the talks unarmed, without a Kashmir policy.

As compared to the previous interactions on Kashmir, India is likely to have much less manoeuvrability this time. The major powers have now openly recognised the centrality of the Kashmir issue in India-Pakistan relations. This was confirmed by the Deputy Spokesperson of the U.S. State Department, Philip Reeker, when he stated on July 29 that "everybody is now focussed on it (Kashmir). Everybody understands that one had a close run thing about a month ago... and the ultimate cause of that potential conflict was Kashmir". Thus the talks will be on Kashmir along with other bilateral issues rather than the other way round. This is precisely what the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, has been pressing for ever since he came to power nearly two years ago.

Finally, these talks are unlikely to be allowed to meander along aimlessly, as their progress is likely to be closely monitored by major Western powers. Unfortunately, in spite of the vastly changed salience of the coming talks, in the absence of a Kashmir policy India will stumble upon it virtually blindfolded.

We have set high store by the coming elections in Jammu and Kashmir. In this we have fortunately the full backing of the U.S. Mr. Powell during his visit to Delhi stated that the polls could be "a first step in the process aimed at addressing the grievances of the Kashmiris and leading the two countries back to the path of dialogue''. He said he would be speaking to the Pakistani side "to make every effort to avoid disturbing these elections". He stood by his promise and while in Islamabad he called upon all parties to ensure that the polls "can be held in safety and without interference from those who would like to spoil these elections".

We were somewhat rattled by his observation that the U.S. "looked forward to concrete steps by India to foster Kashmiri confidence in the election process" and that "permitting independent observers and freeing political prisoners will be helpful." The Indian Government spokesperson promptly rejected both these suggestions on expected lines. This is more due to a chink in our armour than a reflection on the legitimacy of the U.S. suggestions. After all, such suggestions have emanated from several quarters in India also.

The coming Jammu and Kashmir elections are not going to solve the Kashmir problem. It is a mandatory constitutional process we have to go through in order to put a formally elected Government in power. In all probability, the elections will result in the maintenance of the status quo in Kashmir, i.e. the continuance of the National Conference Government in power while leaving the Kashmir problem intact. As a matter of fact, it will be far more difficult to resolve the Kashmir issue in the post-election situation than would have been the case if honest and earnest efforts were made to resolve it during the course of the preparations for the elections. The elections would hopefully be free, both from violence and rigging; but they are unlikely to be fair. Almost all political groups claiming to represent the will of the Kashmiri people will not be able to go to them because they would not have anything up their sleeves to offer by way of a political solution to the problem. If they join the election fray without being able to make such an offer, they would be making themselves unwitting victims of the militants' violence. Hence, only those parties which have little or no following among the people and whom the people are likely to ignore are likely to contest the elections. The turnout in the election is, therefore, going to be extremely low, even without the All-Party Hurriyat Conference actively working for a boycott.

As a matter of fact, the 1996 elections were politically far more significant than the 2002 elections are ever likely to be. The former restored the democratic process in the State. They brought a formally elected Government to power after a constitutional hiatus of two years. And finally since the National Conference Government was elected mainly on the platform of autonomy, it opened up a historic opportunity to solve the Kashmir problem through a broad-based dialogue on the extent, nature and content of the autonomy to be granted to the Kashmiri people. Unfortunately, this opportunity was frittered away because the then Central Governments failed to muster the courage to take initiatives in that direction and because of Farooq Abdullah's short-sighted objective of sticking to power at any cost.

This double failure opened up a vast space for Pakistan to operate freely in Kashmir and bring about a qualitative change in the situation. The Hurriyat, Pakistan's Trojan Horse in the State, firmly established itself as a separatist movement with links extending to Pakistan's ISI and the militants supported by it on both sides of the border. It also came to acquire a degree of respectability by virtue of its frequent contacts and commiserations with foreign diplomatic missions in Delhi. Indian security forces were overstretched in Jammu and Kashmir because of the vastly enhanced scale of violence perpetrated by the Pakistan-controlled militants. The harassment, oppression and indignities heaped upon the Kashmiri people as a logical corollary of the security forces' operation in very adverse circumstances resulted in an almost total alienation of the Kashmiris from the Indian mainstream. This created for the militants a more hospitable environment to carry out their acts of terror.

Printer friendly page
Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Opinion

Stories in this Section

Hurriyat and elections

Of cricket, contracts, cash and country

Testing democratic institutions

Needed: a Kashmir policy — I

Boosting Indo-U.S. ties