The Hindu : Kashmir — a way forward?

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Monday, Sep 02, 2002

Opinion

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Kashmir — a way forward?

By Chinmaya R.Gharekhan

If ever a solution is to emerge, it would have to be built around the Line of Control.

THE KASHMIR Study Group is a group of individuals in the United States who have taken it upon themselves to suggest concrete, apparently scholarly ideas to show to India and Pakistan the way forward for a solution of the Kashmir problem. It is put together by Farooq Kathwari, an American of Kashmiri origin, and has as its members a U.S. Senator, a couple of U.S. Congressmen and various academics and former diplomats with experience of South Asia.

The first proposal developed by the group in 1998 recommended that a portion of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir should be reconstituted as a sovereign entity but one without international personality enjoying free access to and from both India and Pakistan. The territory of the proposed entity would be determined by an internationally supervised ascertainment of the wishes of the people on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC), in other words a referendum or plebiscite. India, Pakistan and the representatives of the people of Kashmir would have to agree to the proposal.

The entity would have its own Constitution and would be responsible to manage all its affairs except defence and foreign affairs. Pakistan and India would be jointly responsible for the defence of the entity, but it was left unclear how its foreign affairs would be run and by whom. The entity would have its own currency. Neither India nor Pakistan would be allowed to place troops on the LoC which would remain in place.

The proposal was given to Government officials in India and Pakistan. It is claimed that the reaction from many persons in the two countries was "generally positive", though the authors of the report are careful not to state these persons were in Government.

The Study Group brought out a revised proposal in 2000 with three ideas: creation of two Kashmiri entities, one on either side of the LoC; a single Kashmiri entity straddling the LoC with its own Constitution, etc; and finally, the creation of only one entity on the Indian side of the LoC.

The first suggestion for two states would involve ascertaining the wishes of the people about the areas to be included in them. The authors presume that all the people imbued with `Kashmiriyat' would opt for the entity on the Indian side whereas all the inhabitants of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir would wish to join the new entity.

This proposal is obviously unlikely to commend itself to India; it calls for a referendum of some sort, it invites international intervention, it indirectly calls for division of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of religion; it legitimises Pakistan's aggression without offering prospects of tranquility along the LoC. It does not say specifically what will happen to the `non-Kashmiriyat' areas, namely most of Jammu and Ladakh; presumably, and generously, they will remain with India. The areas of the former princely state which Pakistan has swallowed up are not mentioned anywhere in the report.

The second proposal for a single Kashmiri entity comprising territory on either side of the LoC is the same as the one made in 1998 and is even more unrealistic. The third proposal of a Kashmiri entity only on the Indian side is totally one-sided. In fact, a State of Jammu and Kashmir already exists on the Indian side; all it needs is peace, absence of interference from across the LoC and a resolution of the grievances of its people.

The Study Group's paper, however, does contain interesting ideas for streamlining the LoC. Admittedly, they have been suggested in the context of the implementation of the specific proposals for the creation of one or two independent entities, but they could be useful as and when a serious effort is underway for the solution of the Kashmir problem. While it is good to be imaginative and innovative, it does not help to be too impractical.

Incidentally, the Ambassador of a non-permanent member of the Security Council had sought to invite in June this year three so-called independent experts to talk to the members of the Council in an informal setting known as the Arria formula. Mr. Kathwari was one of them. The other two were Barbara Crosette of The New York Times and Nicolas Plat, currently President of the Asia Society and a former American Ambassador to Pakistan. The idea was to obtain, for the Council's benefit, an in-depth analysis of the situation in Kashmir.

The Pakistan mission was, understandably, delighted with the initiative. It took a fair amount of legwork by the Indian missions in New York and Washington to foil the attempt with the help of friendly countries.

It is, or should be, obvious to anyone interested in the Kashmir problem that if ever a solution is to emerge, it would have to be built around the LoC. A formula will need to be crafted which will endow an element of durability, even finality, and authenticity to the LoC. If Pakistan is not going to reconcile itself to this concept, some time or the other, it would be futile to even attempt to look for a solution. India can be generous up to a point in adjusting the LoC, as it was earlier, but to expect it to give up the whole Valley is to be naive.

The most enduring solution would be to convert the LoC into the international boundary, but this might not be possible to bring about for political reasons. It would be extremely difficult for either country to take a formal initiative in this regard. Organisations such as the Kashmir Study Group could perhaps be useful in suggesting creative ideas of investing the LoC with a semi-permanent status. The Shimla Agreement does this but it might be necessary to arrange a new mechanism for the purpose.

It is almost certain that if ever the Kashmir issue is going to be resolved, some help from outside would be needed. The precondition for any prospective third party wishing to help is that it must be absolutely impartial and must not have any agenda of its own. Its first task would be to convince India and Pakistan of the impossibility of attaining their maximum objectives, either through war or through diplomacy. Each will have to make some sacrifice. India recognises this. A third party can play an immensely positive part if it can make Pakistan realise, and make it act in concordance with this realisation, that no amount of proxy war or `internationalisation' will succeed in snatching the Valley away from India.

Equally or even more important is to persuade the militants that they will never ever succeed in their campaign either for independence or integration with Pakistan. They should be made to realise that Pakistan is harping on the outdated U.N. resolutions simply because they provide for integration with India or Pakistan, none of them mentions the so-called third option. The militants have to be disabused of their illusions. Once that happens, the discussions about autonomy etc. can be conducted with a much better chance of success.

A way forward for the solution of the Kashmir problem probably lies along the above lines.

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