The Hindu : Engaging Pak., a better option

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, Sep 09, 2002

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Engaging Pak., a better option

By K. K. Katyal

It is in India's interest that the Kashmir problem, which has done incalculable damage over the past 55 years, is resolved.

IT WAS, doubtless, highly speculative — a report in a Pakistani daily, The News, last week that Pakistan's President, Pervez Musharraf, would "discuss a strategic headway for Kashmir solution" with the U.S. President, George W. Bush, during his Washington visit. The package, according to it, provides for a bargain — recognition, by both India and Pakistan, of the Line of Control as a permanent border, withdrawal of India's claim on "Azad" Kashmir and the Northern Areas, and Islamabad's message to Kashmiri groups that the Assembly elections in "held" Kashmir are to be treated as an internal affair (of India). The Indian newspapers which reproduced the story highlighted the point that the formula enjoyed the support of a "strong lobby of Generals, politicians, Cabinet Ministers, strategists and experts" in Pakistan. But the other part, related to the American interest in the plan, did not attract attention. This was about Washington's idea to request Pakistan for a base for its troops in the Northern Areas, most probably in Skardu. The purpose: to conduct operations against terrorist outfits and to safeguard U.S. interests in the region on a long-term basis.

It was not difficult to dismiss the report as conjectural but not that easy to find out the how and why of its publication by a mainstream newspaper. There was no originality about the "formula" — such ideas had been mooted informally from time to time by all manner of persons taking interest in the settlement of the Kashmir problem — it only evoked instant fierce opposition in Pakistan, both by the Establishment and others. The former Pakistan Foreign Minister, Abdul Sattar, used to dismiss such suggestions with a curt one-liner: "The LoC is the problem, not the solution." Such suggestions were regarded as part of a "conspiracy" by anti-Pakistan elements, and a ploy to deprive the Kashmiris of the "right to shape their destiny". And now this very proposal gets respectability through publication in The News — and what is more surprising, it is supposed to enjoy the support of the "generals" among others. The Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman predictably denied it, but the disclaimer was not as strongly worded as would have been the case in the past.

Various theories are doing the rounds in New Delhi. One, the report could have been inspired by anti-Musharraf elements to discredit him for departing from cherished policies and to project it as the culmination of the process that began with a u-turn vis-a-vis the Taliban and the campaign against religious extremists in the country. Or that he could go to any limit at the behest of the Americans. Two, this could be intended to lure India into a dialogue on Kashmir, forcing it to give up the "no talks till the end of cross-border terrorism" line.

Three, the formula was favoured by the U.S. as a compromise between the rigidly-held positions of India and Pakistan, with the additional merit that an early settlement would help the Americans who "are going to make their stay in the region longer than initially perceived and, for this purpose, need some mini-garrisons in close but safer areas for logistics and operational purposes" in their campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

India did well in refraining from reacting to the speculative report. But New Delhi could have avoided reiterating its line against resumption of the dialogue. In any case, talks before the end of the Kashmir Assembly elections and the parliamentary elections in Pakistan are out of the question — and a positive response by New Delhi now would not have made any difference at the practical level. There is another aspect. A reasonably peaceful election in Jammu and Kashmir would generate strong pressures for talks, which India would be unable to resist. A positive line on the dialogue would have restored to New Delhi the diplomatic space it had lost through its persistent "no".

Cross-border terrorism is, undoubtedly, the major concern of India and it could not be blamed for not sharing the view held by a large section of the world community crediting Gen. Musharraf with genuine efforts to check infiltration. There were reasons to believe that the clandestine movement was not the handiwork of just the rogue elements or the members of divided families or that all sections of the ISI had not fallen in line with the officially-stated policies. All that is true but, on balance, there is greater merit in engaging Pakistan than in refusing to do so.

It is in India's interest that the Kashmir problem, which has done incalculable damage over the past 55 years, is resolved. To say this is not to suggest a sell-out of national interests but to make a case for using any opening that becomes available, in an effort to settle the issue. Similarly, New Delhi could afford to take a positive line over "facilitation" by the U.S., while taking care that it does not approximate to arbitration or a third-party role. Haven't we willingly involved the U.S. in the fight against terrorist violence and cross-border flow of militancy? If there is no harm in U.S. participation in the counter-terrorism drive in Jammu and Kashmir, any move by Washington to bring India and Pakistan to the conference table on Kashmir could not create problems. After all, India agreed at Lahore to discuss with Pakistan all outstanding issues "including Kashmir". Gen. Musharraf was free to change the Lahore formulation to "Kashmir and other issues".

The dialogue need not be held, in its entirety, under the glare of publicity. At some stage, when the sensitive aspects of the Kashmir issue are taken up, secret diplomacy would be highly useful. The two sides did try this process after Lahore — it survived Kargil, but could not withstand the pressures generated by the military coup in Pakistan. The 1999 secret discussions, it became known later, revolved round the division of the Valley. True the two sides could not agree, during the limited time at their disposal, on the dividing line. They considered various possibilities — division along the LoC with slight variations, along the Jhelum or the Chenab. They may well have succeeded had their mission not been cut short by factors beyond the control of the negotiators.

Even at the risk of repetition, attention needs to be drawn to the informal discussions in 1972 — at the time of the Shimla Agreement — by the leaders of India and Pakistan, Indira Gandhi and Z.A. Bhutto, on converting the LoC into the international border. Mr. Bhutto accepted the proposition but sought time to make a formal announcement, in order to prepare the public opinion in his country. Later — after securing the release of 93,000 prisoners of war and the territory captured by India in the preceding war — he went back on the informal, unwritten understanding.

A noted Pakistani commentator, Humayun Gauhar, called it Bhutto's diplomatic artistry. Gauhar's oft-quoted comment on the disclosure of this episode by the then Prime Minister's Principal Secretary, P.N. Dhar, acquires a new relevance now — "If it took a private talk between Mr. Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi in which he made certain commitments to her but which he was clever enough not to have written down in the Shimla Agreement, or on a separate piece of paper, then it was diplomatic artistry of the highest order. He would have known better than anyone else that such a private secret agreement, which is only verbal, was worthless. Face it Mr. Dhar, even if we accept what you say, Mr. Bhutto fooled your Prime Minister."

Fooling may give satisfaction to one side or the other but it does not serve the interest of the subcontinent and the vast mass of the poor residing here. India will be justified in guarding against any double-dealing or the tendency to score cheap propaganda points. While taking these precautions, New Delhi could shed hesitations and engage the Pakistani side, with the objective of finding a solution to the Kashmir problem, not letting it linger on.

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