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By C. Raja Mohan
AS HE prepares to meet the U.S. President, George W. Bush, on Thursday and address the United Nations on Friday, the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, is caught between two competing imperatives. One relates to the continuing tensions with Pakistan and the other is the new global debate on the ends and means of the second phase of the American war on terrorism. Within the complex response designed to deal with these two impulses, Mr. Vajpayee would also want to salvage the Indo-U.S. relations from potential stagnation. Having chosen to limit his engagement with the leaders of American public opinion and the press in New York, Mr. Vajpayee has few occasions to unveil his thoughts on the security predicaments of India as well as the world after September 11. With Pervez Musharraf revelling in his lionisation in the United States after September 11 and launching a public relations blitzkrieg on this tour, Mr. Vajpayee needs to present India's views about terrorism and the war against it in a sharp and incisive manner in his talks with Mr. Bush and in his speech at the U.N. Mr. Vajpayee and his foreign policy aides need to avoid looking grumpy about the new attention Gen. Musharraf is getting in the U.S. Neither constant complaining about cross-border violence from Pakistan nor wallowing in self-pity that India is the biggest victim of international terrorism would make an impression. What will get respect and understanding from the American and international interlocutors is a higher level of argumentation from Mr. Vajpayee on the meaning of September 11, the lessons India has learnt from its own experience in battling terrorism, and on where his Government stands in the next phase of the global war on terror. The first task for Mr. Vajpayee, as he joins the international commemoration of the victims of September 11, is to reaffirm India's own unstinting support to any global effort, however incomplete and inconsistent, to combat terrorism. There is no doubt about the deep disappointment in India at the turn of events in the Subcontinent since September 11, particularly in the wake of its own strong support to Washington's war on terrorism. The return of Pakistan to the affections of the U.S. and the perceived reluctance of the Bush administration to fully confront Gen. Musharraf on the sources of terrorism inside Pakistan has resulted in a sense of letdown in New Delhi. India is not unaware of the gains it has made after September 11 in terms of the American and international positions on the Kashmir question and Pakistan's responsibility for fomenting cross-border terrorism. Nevertheless, India's expectations have clearly not been fully met. Yet, India should not allow this disappointment to come in the way of affirming its understanding of the issues at stake in the global war against terrorism that there are forces of evil, some of them using religion as a cloak, to engage in activities that threaten the very foundations of the modern world; and that there are states which have cynically encouraged and manipulated these forces for their own political benefits. India needs to re-emphasise that it is this state support, either willingly by some or those that get taken over by the radical forces, which has given new power to international terrorism. Ending state support to terrorism or ending states and regimes that back terrorism, then, becomes the central element of the war against terrorism. This is a lesson India has learnt from its own bleeding war against terrorism, and there should be no hesitation in proclaiming this in the U.N. The second set of issues of concern to India relate to the means that must be employed in the war against terrorism. As the U.S. prepares to oust the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, the Bush administration has begun to make the case for "preventive and pre-emptive wars". While Mr. Bush's determination to wage war against Iraq has deeply divided the international community, the idea of a pre-emptive war itself is not new. It has long been an instrument in the foreign policy tool kits of great powers. The idea, however, has acquired a new urgency and intensity in the current context of the war against international terrorism. The elusive nature of terrorist organisations, the fact that the initiative always rests with them and the demonstration of their power to inflict unimaginable damage on the urban world on September 11, are factors that have made it inevitable that the world will pay renewed attention to the notion of a pre-emptive war. The world cannot keep waiting for these groups to strike but will have to hunt for them and their allies before they strike. Having been the biggest victim of international terrorism, India should have little difficulty in appreciating the case for a preventive war. In fact, the Indian decision to mobilise its military forces on a large scale after the shocking attack on its Parliament on December 13 was rooted in the conviction that New Delhi had no option but threaten a preventive war against Islamabad if it did not end its support to cross-border terrorism. Having bled for more than a decade, New Delhi came to the conclusion that it would have to handle the sources of terrorism in Pakistan and not just their manifestation on Indian territory. While India has eased off a bit since June, amidst promises from the U.S. that Pakistan will be forced to stop cross-border terrorism, it has not given up on the option of going to war. In other words, even before the Bush administration has developed the concept of a preventive war, India had already turned to that idea in dealing with the condition that it found itself after December 13. That brings us to the third set of issues in play in New York in relation to Pakistan. An Indian support to the idea of a preventive war will reverberate more loudly in the portals of the U.N. than all the whining against Pakistan and the dossiers on Islamabad's support to cross-border terrorism that Mr. Vajpayee's aides are handing out in Washington and New York. The world began to pressure Pakistan only when it understood that there was a real prospect of India going to war last summer on the question of terrorism. The current debate on a pre-emptive war, initiated by the U.S., provides an entirely unexpected opportunity for India to underline that its patience is running out and that its restraint cannot be taken for granted. In fact, every single argument that the Bush administration marshals on a pre-emptive war against Iraq applies with even greater clarity to Pakistan. Mr. Vajpayee does not have to do much except affirm the same right for India and a commitment to exercise that right judiciously. While reserving the option of a preventive war, Mr. Vajpayee also needs to affirm his own vision for peace with Pakistan. If the obstacle of cross-border terrorism is removed and Pakistan is ready to embark on a reformist path, Mr. Vajpayee must proclaim, India is ready to extend a friendly hand and sit down to expeditiously find a final solution to the Kashmir question. Instead of ducking the hard issues being debated at the U.N. and scrambling to respond to potential surprises from Gen. Musharraf, Mr. Vajpayee must boldly convey India's resolve to defeat terrorism by all the means at its disposal as well as a readiness to walk the high road to peace and prosperity with Pakistan, if Gen. Musharraf puts the gun down.
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