The Hindu : Re-engaging Pakistan

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Thursday, Oct 10, 2002

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Re-engaging Pakistan

By C. Raja Mohan

Refusing to talk at all, by insisting that an appropriate atmosphere has not been created by Islamabad, would take the political initiative away from New Delhi.

AS THE results of the elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly come into view and Pakistan heads to the polls, the time has come for India to review the strategy it has adopted towards Pakistan since the terrorist attack on Parliament on December 13, 2001. In what was widely called coercive diplomacy, India threatened to go to war unless Pakistan put an end to cross-border terrorism. As the world intervened to prevent a potential war, New Delhi pressed for and obtained unprecedented promises from Islamabad that it would curb cross-border terrorism.

India may have many reasons to be disappointed that Pakistan's President, Pervez Musharraf, has not fully implemented those promises. One was the declaration of last January that he would not allow Pakistani soil to be used in the conduct of terrorist operations against other nations, particularly India. The second one was in June, at the height of the international fears about a nuclear war in the Subcontinent, when he conveyed to the United States that he would put an end to cross-border infiltration on a permanent basis.

More recently in August, Gen. Musharraf told the U.S. that he would rein in violence during the elections to the Kashmir Assembly.

It has been tempting for India to argue that since Gen. Musharraf has not kept his promises, it is not obliged to begin negotiations with Pakistan on all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. Gen. Musharraf, of course, says he has done all he could on his part to curb cross-border violence. The international community concedes that Gen. Musharraf's promises have not been fully implemented. But at the same time it is keen that India take the first steps towards a resumption of the bilateral dialogue that has remained suspended since the Agra summit in July, 2001.

As India debates its options on a potential dialogue with Pakistan, the Government will have to make up its mind soon. Staying in the rejectionist mode for too long will begin to dissipate the gains, in terms of international support, which India has made from its coercive diplomacy.

But rushing into a dialogue, New Delhi would worry, might signal to Gen. Musharraf that he is under no obligation to implement his promises on curbing cross-border violence. Of even greater concern for India is that Pakistan has apparently been stepping up infiltration in recent days, with the clear objective of pushing through as many people as possible before winter sets in. This will make it even harder for the Government to say a conducive atmosphere for talks with Pakistan has been created.

Gen. Musharraf's harsh rhetoric in recent weeks has not helped matters. His reference to the communal riots in Gujarat at the United Nations General Assembly has vitiated the political atmosphere. The General appears determined not to give any political space for the Indian leadership on recasting its strategy of engagement with Pakistan.

But too rigid a formulation on future talks with Pakistan may not be in India's interest. Injecting some flexibility into its position would allow New Delhi to build upon the gains from coercive diplomacy since December 13. Refusing to talk at all, by insisting that an appropriate atmosphere has not been created by Islamabad, would take the political initiative away from New Delhi.

It is India which set the terms of engagement in the last few months. An inflexible stance now will lead to a growing chorus of international demands that India begin to engage Pakistan. Instead of waiting for that pressure to build up, and acting reluctantly, New Delhi needs to take the initiative on re-engaging Islamabad. During his summit level talks with the European Union this week in Copenhagen, the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, will certainly hear of the international community's desire to see the renewal of the dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad.

It is possible to argue that India's threat to go to war will only bring diminishing political returns. And the time may be now to think of imparting a little more diplomatic content to India's coercive diplomacy.

The external political environment has never been more favourable to India in dealing with Pakistan. It will be unwise to squander that advantage.

India, of course, cannot move from no talks to talks in one swift moment. There has to be at least a brief phase that would focus on "talks about talks". One can only hope that New Delhi had not cut off all channels of communication with Islamabad over the last year. India is hopefully intensifying these informal contacts with Pakistan and sending the message that ending public rhetoric against New Delhi by Islamabad must be the first step towards renewal of the dialogue.

Besides back channels, the other communication with Pakistan has been through the U.S. and Britain which have played key roles in defusing the military crisis in the summer by extracting promises from Gen. Musharraf on ending cross-border terrorism. India has expressed its disappointment to the Anglo-American interlocutors that the promises they had delivered have not been met. But India must make an assessment now whether taking a hard line on talks with Pakistan will lead to a better implementation of those promises or reduce the current pressure on Islamabad.

During the visit to New Delhi of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Christina Rocca, both sides discussed the prospects for an India-Pakistan dialogue. A higher level of engagement between New Delhi and Washington in the next few weeks could provide the opportunity for a thorough discussion of a road map for a future India-Pakistan dialogue beginning with small steps. Keeping the Americans in has been a key political objective of India's coercive diplomacy in the last few months, and that remains at the heart of New Delhi's strategy to rework its relationship with Pakistan.

In rethinking its stance on talks with Pakistan, India must come up with ideas that will help create a conducive atmosphere for a substantive dialogue on the key issues of Jammu and Kashmir and the comprehensive normalisation of bilateral relations. New Delhi must propose a ceasefire between the two military forces on the border and the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir.

Along with a ceasefire which will help bring the tensions down, India must offer technical talks at the level of the Directors General of Military Operations on finding an effective mechanism for ending cross-border infiltration.

Although Islamabad has disfavoured New Delhi's proposal for joint patrolling, it is worth India's while to offer talks on various possibilities for cooperative monitoring of the border and the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir. Such talks will test Pakistan's argument that it is not in a position to control all cross-border activity.

If Pakistan is serious when it says it has done all it can in curbing infiltration across the LoC, it should have little difficulty in working with the Indian forces. A ceasefire and a credible mechanism for the monitoring of the LoC could create the appropriate conditions for a resumption of dialogue at the political level between India and Pakistan.

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