The Hindu : Beyond deterrence to pre-emption

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Saturday, Oct 19, 2002

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Beyond deterrence to pre-emption

By V.R. Raghavan

Pre-emptive attacks, based on threat assessments made unilaterally by one state, will open windows of opportunity to others now checked by international laws.

THE NEW strategic doctrine of the Bush administration is at the centre of an intense international debate. The doctrine laid out in the document, "the National Security Strategy of the United States of America", marks a significant shift from beliefs that had dominated Cold War strategic thought. The new doctrine goes beyond the Cold War strategy of deterrence, to one which backs pre-emptive attacks against terrorists and states with weapons of mass destruction. The new doctrine makes the argument, "given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the U.S. can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past... we cannot let our enemies strike first. As a matter of common sense and self-defence, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed." The nature and scope of this doctrine has been expanded in recent weeks, by what many regard as the imperious demand of a regime change in Iraq if pre-emptive military action is to be avoided. The implications of the new doctrine can be both uncertain and dangerous.

Pre-emptive attacks have been made before. The Israelis dramatic air attack which destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor near Osirak is one example. This was immediately condemned by the U.S. and Britain as a grave breach of international law. The American media was equally emphatic and called the attack inexcusable aggression and state-sponsored terrorism. The U.N. Security Council condemned the attack through a unanimous resolution. The sense of outrage was based on the belief that pre-emptive attacks would seriously undermine the basis of international peace. U.S. attacks on Libya after Libyan agents blew up a Berlin discotheque in 1986 killing one American soldier were justified as pre-emptive on grounds of a pattern existing to the Libyan action. Terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania saw Cruise missiles being fired on Sudan as pre-emptive attacks.

During the Cold War, the U.S. and Britain had adopted the doctrine of pre-emptive strike with nuclear weapons, against a potential advance by conventionally armed Warsaw Pact forces. In other words NATO was ready to cross the nuclear threshold first, to terminate the attack. The Bush doctrine goes beyond by reserving the right to military strikes even without an imminent threat. It should be remembered that in 2001, the U.N. Security Council accorded approval to the U.S. for military action against the perpetrators of the September 11 attack, under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The Council did not accept the right of retaliation of the U.S. It argued — controversially — that the New York and Washington attacks were of a magnitude which could be viewed as declaration of intent of further strikes in the future.

Article 51 of the U.N. Charter endorses the "inherent right of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the U.N., until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". The right of self-defence thus becomes operative if an attack actually occurs. The circumstances can, however, be complicated in a number of ways. There are opinions being expressed that Article 51 was framed in 1945,when international developments at the beginning of 21st Century could not have been foreseen. Some others are of the view that the right of self-defence which existed in customary international law before 1945, could be seen as coexisting with Article 51.

The range of opinions on first strike is equally varied. At one end of the opinion spectrum it is believed that the right of self-defence only exists if the affected country has no time to take the matter to the U.N. Since there is no proof that an attack by Iraq on the U.S. is imminent, an attack in self-defence amounts to usurpation of the Security Council's role. At the other end of the spectrum there is the view related to the Security Council failing to act against an imminent threat of attack. In that case, the right to self-defence through a pre-emptive attack by the state in danger would exist. Others hold the view that an attack against Iraq at present clearly falls short of the right to self-defence. One is therefore back to international realpolitik where legality is in the eye of the beholder. In real terms, it depends on a combination of politics, power, and enough states looking the other way. What is essential is the need to insist on the principle that no single country has the right to the intentions of another.

There is within the U.S. a serious divide on both the constitutional and ethical issues involved in implementing the George W. Bush doctrine. James Baker, Secretary of State to the senior Bush, has opposed the notion of pre-emptive strike. The former President, Bill Clinton, has warned against the "unwelcome consequences" of pre-emptive action. There is a divide in the U.S. military on unilateral military action. Senior military commanders do not refuse to take risks, but equally insist on a coalition of allies to shape the battlefield politically. The Bush doctrine is also seen to be going well beyond what is reasonably provided in the U.S. Constitution.

The impact of the Bush Doctrine, when implemented against Iraq, will be considerable to say the least. Pre-emptive attacks, based on threat assessments made unilaterally by one state, will open windows of opportunity to others now checked by international laws. The risks the doctrine entails to an already fragile international order are obvious in principle but wholly unpredictable in outcome. The central conclusion which would be drawn from the doctrine being put into practice, would be about the pre-eminence of military power in the international architecture of coming decades. The doctrine would hasten and reinforce beliefs, amongst determined elements to develop, acquire or possess weapons of mass destruction. The unravelling of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regimes would be completed by the Bush doctrine justifying pre-emptive strikes.

The Bush doctrine also raises questions for India and its nuclear weapons status. There has been an Indian ministerial endorsement of the Bush doctrine. India has claimed the right to pre-emptive strike in self-defence as inherent in deterrence doctrine. Semantics apart, if deterrence is the same as pre-emptive attacks in self defence, what credence can be placed on India's doctrine of `No First Use' of nuclear weapons! The separation between conventional and nuclear war waging which had been crafted in India's nuclear doctrine would be blurred by an endorsement of the Bush doctrine. That would place a wholly new perspective on Indian policies in South Asia, no less than the Bush doctrine threatening to seminally reshape U.S. foreign policy.

The Bush doctrine notwithstanding, there is little doubt that threats of major terrorist attacks are real and serious for many states, including India. Recent reports in the U.S. have all highlighted its vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks from within. Whether these relate to anthrax attacks, readiness to cope with biological and chemical attacks, or, to smuggling of nuclear devices into the country, the emphasis is on internal system inadequacies. All these reports recommend improved homeland security management, rather than pro-active military action outside the U.S. What the Bush doctrine does, is to link the internal vulnerability quotient to its unmatched ability to project military power externally. It attempts to optimise its strength to offset its weaknesses. The doctrine is reflective also of the Bush administration's perspectives on the future power structures it desires to have in place in the Middle East. The super power's search for security and stability from that region are not contrary to global needs. The question really comes down to the means being adopted to attain such ends.

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