The Hindu : Back to the barracks... what next?

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Sunday, Oct 27, 2002

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Back to the barracks... what next?

Finally, it dawned on the Government that full-scale military mobilisation was becoming counter-productive. writes Amit Baruah.

Postings back to peacetime locations are imminent.

THE WORD used was "redeployment", not withdrawal. Whatever be the semantics involved, a decision has been taken to end the unprecedented military mobilisation after the December 13 attack on Parliament House.

The National Security Advisory Board met just before a session of the Cabinet Committee on Security and the Defence Minister, George Fernandes, announced the pullout decision to the press. Months of speculation preceded the decision.

After having upped the ante and adopted a threatening posture vis-a-vis Pakistan, what would the Government do? Would it keep the troops along the border while maintaining a policy of restraint?

Finally, it dawned on the Government that full-scale military mobilisation, which led to sharp, albeit private, responses from the international community, was becoming counter-productive and having little impact on Pakistan's adventurist behaviour. The objective of pressuring Pakistan remains unrealised.

Bang in the middle of the military mobilisation, there have been a series of high-profile terrorist attacks in Jammu and Kashmir and, of course, the tragic killings in the Akshardham temple in Gujarat.

There has been no end to cross-border infiltration, cross-border terrorism and the "infrastructure of terrorism" (a popular construct in the corridors of power in New Delhi) in Pakistan remains intact. No action has been taken by Pakistan on India's wanted "list of 20", the Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, even made noises saying he had given no commitment as far as a permanent end to infiltration was concerned.

The decision to end the mobilisation, which appeared to be in preparation for a full-scale war against Pakistan, was taken when it dawned on Government strategists that nothing was being gained from such a posture.

There was, of course, one crucial fallout of the mobilisation — Western visitors came in droves to New Delhi (not to forget the twinning of visits with Islamabad) and lectured India on the need to maintain restraint.

The series of attacks in India by Pakistan-based terrorist groups had exposed the Vajpayee Government. Public opinion had to be placated. Hence, the preparations for an attack on Pakistan.

These Western visitors, while publicly supporting India's position on cross-border terrorism and the exertion of pressure on Pakistan and Gen. Musharraf, were privately telling New Delhi that it better not move beyond mobilisation. Nothing was lost if words were spoken in support of the Indian position.

In Islamabad, they lauded the General for taking on the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban while gently telling him that he needed to do more to meet Indian concerns.

Prime Ministers, Defence Ministers and Foreign Ministers all made their way to New Delhi and Islamabad. In the end, these visits began to irritate New Delhi for they were saying nothing that meant a "success" as far as pressuring Pakistan was concerned.

Yes, the mobilisation might have pushed Pakistan into matching India. But, for a state whose basic mission is anti-India, matching New Delhi's war preparations was almost automatic — no Government can survive if it doesn't match India word for word, manoeuvre for manoeuvre. Resources can always be found in Pakistan if the action is directed against India.

But, all the Western pressure did not make the General hand over even one on the list of 20. Neither did he show any inclination to initiate any bilateral mechanism with India to deal with the menace of terrorism.

Clearly, short of mobilisation, New Delhi has few ideas about dealing with the "jehadi groups" operating from Pakistan. Their mission to "break" India needs to be tackled at the earliest.

Specific, pinpointed, covert actions, which would have conveyed a message not just to Pakistan but also to the "jehadis", appear outside the capabilities of the Indian state.

Between military mobilisation and appearing to be doing nothing, a range of options were available to the Government. But, the state has little imagination and the intelligence agencies little appetite to deal with very real threats to Indian national interests.

What now after the de-mobilisation? The American-led international community has gone public calling on India and Pakistan to resume their dialogue now that the threatening posture along the International Border has been dropped.

Other Western interlocutors while welcoming the decision to de-escalate, have said the same thing.

As was evident during the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit to Denmark for the India-European Union summit earlier this month, Western public opinion looks at the India-Pakistan equation as having perpetual scope for conflict and nuclear escalation.

So, what do you do with two errants with nuclear weapons? You pressure (or at least try) them into behaving like "good boys".

While India may have taken the decision to withdraw for its own reasons, there is little doubt that the international community had far more success in advising India to act with restraint than in pushing Pakistan to rein in the "jehadis".

The question in many minds is this — will India now begin talking to Pakistan? Would that be the correct decision given that terrorist activities directed against India have not ceased?

In the weeks and months ahead, India can expect concerted pressure from the international community to resume the snapped dialogue with Pakistan. There is little harm in India maintaining "contacts" with Pakistan given the fact that we still have diplomatic relations with Islamabad.

Talking or engaging is hardly a sign of weakness — it is about gauging the intentions of the other side.

There are some other measures, too, that can have a bearing on the overall India-Pakistan equation.

For instance, resumption of rail, bus and air links would be a major relief to the divided families living in the subcontinent apart from boosting the flagging energies of civil society in both the countries. Restoring the pre-December 13 situation should be a priority as far as New Delhi is concerned.

The problem really is that in both countries policy is dictated by domestic politics. Often, in India or Pakistan "policy" is a mere extension of domestic requirements. Or, the result of international pressures.

There is no need to rush into yet another Vajpayee-Musharraf summit. It is unlikely to lead to anything substantial given that the Indian side has little faith in the General.

After all, there is the June 1997 framework agreement for dialogue, which was improved upon in New York and Lahore subsequently.

Summits between India and Pakistan (Lahore under-prepared and Agra unprepared) should only take place under two circumstances — when they have a prepared document to sign or the leadership meets as often as required to draft and eventually sign an agreement.

In the case of India and Pakistan, meeting in itself is an event. For all practical purposes, Agra was a failure. There was no advance. It was a setback in the sense Lahore was a success in terms of taking the negotiation process forward.

There are documents signed in Lahore which can prove a basis for future dialogue. As one diplomat put it to this correspondent some time ago, India and Pakistan should not be seen as raising the level of failure.

So, if there is to be a dialogue it should be at the level of officials or at best between the Foreign Ministers.

Summits and summitry should be avoided given the recent experience. And, if that possibility is marred by terrorist strikes in future, then India should concentrate its energies on talking to the representatives of Jammu and Kashmir after the election that has taken place there.

If the Hurriyat Conference wants in, all to the good. If not, New Delhi should extend every possible degree of autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir.

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