The Hindu : Command and control

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Tuesday, Jan 07, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - Editorials

Command and control

THE BROAD OUTLINES of the announcement detailing India's nuclear command and control structure and its nuclear doctrine contain no surprises. Control over the use of nuclear weapons has been placed completely in civilian or political hands, the country's commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons has been reiterated and the doctrine of pursuing a credible minimum nuclear deterrence has been reaffirmed. As the draft report of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) had recommended, the authority to release nuclear weapons has been vested at the highest political level, the office of the Prime Minister. Given the nature of our constitutional system, the command and control of nuclear weapons could hardly lie with anyone else. Moreover, nuclear weapons are at best only politically coercive tools to achieve strategic objectives; given their horrendously destructive nature, they are not — particularly in an increasingly nuclearised environment — weapons that may be regarded from a narrow perspective of military utility.

The nuclear command system or structure in any country must harmonise with its nuclear strategy and doctrine. India's defensive no-first-use strategy implies that its nuclear weapons do not have to be maintained at hair-trigger alert. Correspondingly, this also means it is unnecessary to delegate powers in a manner which is required if one's nuclear strategy embraced procedures for launch-on-warning or launch-on-attack or to delegate them specifically to military commanders in the field (as the U.S. and the Soviet Union did during the Cuban missile crisis, for example). However, what a defensive policy does imply is that in the event deterrence fails, the country's nuclear weapons systems must have the survivability and effectiveness for a rapid punitive response. This raises the obvious question: what is the alternative chain of command to conduct a retaliatory strike in the event that a first strike wipes out the civilian/political leadership?

The Cabinet Committee on Security is said to have approved the arrangements for alternative chains of command for retaliatory strikes but has chosen to remain silent about what they are or how they will work. This is probably in the interests of security — in order to prevent these alternative chains of command from being also destroyed in a first strike. While secrecy does confer this advantage, it is arguable that a clear and publicly stated succession of command (which is in place in other countries such as the U.S.) strengthens the credibility of deterrence and increases public confidence in a world which is increasingly wary of nuclear decisions being taken without proper authority and nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. The announcement about the nuclear command authority, however, does envisage a body that will act as a consultative group to assist the Prime Minister — namely, an Executive Council that will be chaired by the National Security Adviser.

One rung below the rarefied level of planning and advisory inputs is the Strategic Forces Command, which will exercise overall operational control over the nuclear forces and for which the Cabinet has approved the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief (who is likely to be Air Marshal T. M. Asthana). The selection of an Air Force officer to man the job is not surprising given that, for many years from now, combat aircraft will be the chosen vehicle for nuclear warheads, serving as they do the basic requirements for dispersal and deception. As for the timing of the announcement of the nuclear command authority, it is hardly germane whether it was intended, as suggested in some quarters, to send a tough signal to Pakistan (whose President, Pervez Musharraf, recently claimed India had refrained from crossing the border because Islamabad threatened the use of non-conventional warfare). The fact is that the nuclear command authority has formally come into being almost a whole five years after Pokhran II, following which India declared it would maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. It may be only the official expression of what was contained in previous documents, but it fills a gap that was necessary to fill sooner rather than later.

Printer friendly page
Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Opinion

Stories in this Section

Command and control

Sinister irony

Democracy of judicial remedies

Globalisation: concept & concerns — II

Nuclear building blocks

A reverential tribute

U.S. and the U.N.