The Hindu : Setback to SAARC

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, Jan 13, 2003

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Setback to SAARC

By K. K. Katyal

Progress was slow from the start at the SAARC but it became jinxed from the end of 1999, from the time of the military coup in Pakistan.

THE SOUTH Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has run out of whatever little steam it had. It will be unrealistic now to count on it for promoting concrete action programmes or for collective efforts in core areas such as trade and economy, people-to-people contacts, transport and communications. Mutual suspicions and distrust among most member-countries, especially the adversarial relations between India and Pakistan, are responsible for its troubles. Pity that an exciting venture, launched with great fanfare, failed to take off and is now, virtually, grounded. There was considerable potential for joint actions in diverse fields, with the initial enthusiasm giving rise to hopes for steady progress if not for spectacular results. In practice, however, it remained confined to tokenism. The disappointment thus generated led to the emergence of lobbies in some member-countries, India not excluded, virtually advocating the abandonment of the grouping. They will be rejoicing now.

The SAARC may not have had any achievement to its credit in the areas of its operation but, surprisingly, it produced results in the items not covered by its charter. The various summits provided occasions for holding informal discussions on intractable bilateral problems. The declarations at the summits pointedly hailed and commended these contacts on the sidelines of the formal meetings. On at least two occasions, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan utilised the summits to address the bilateral stalemate and to evolve modalities for efforts to resolve the outstanding issues. One was in Male in 1997, when the Prime Ministers of the day, I. K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif, were able to identify the problems that needed to be tackled, and draw up a list in a mutually acceptable form. The second was in 1998 in Colombo, when it was the turn of Atal Behari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif to establish a personal rapport. In both the cases, there was considerable promise for advance. It was, however, a different story that things did not work the way the two Prime Ministers had intended. The Male initiative was significant, being the first follow-up after the Shimla Agreement. The Colombo meeting evoked tremendous interest because it was the first encounter between a Pakistani Prime Minister and his counterpart from the BJP. It was also the first such contact after the nuclear tests by the two countries. No immediate results flowed but that was the beginning of a process that culminated in the Lahore bus journey. That Lahore was scuttled by Kargil is another matter.

Progress was slow from the start at the SAARC but it became jinxed from the end of 1999, from the time of the military coup in Pakistan. The summit scheduled thereafter got postponed because India did not like to be seen in the company of a military usurper. For some two years, New Delhi stuck to that position but changed its stand when it found the people in Pakistan accepting (or made to accept) the army rule and their protests, though widespread, appearing too feeble in the face of the military might. The delayed summit held in Kathmandu a year ago did carry forward the move towards a preferential trade regime but the follow-up action was far from satisfactory. This was primarily because of the untenable position taken by Pakistan which was not keen on promoting trade with India in the absence of a meaningful advance, as Islamabad put it, on the "core issue" of Kashmir. It, thus, administered a hefty blow to the SAARC.

In turn, New Delhi seized upon Pakistan's intransigence in its pursuit of its hard line — especially on the resumption of the bilateral dialogue. For a variety of reasons, the foreign policy establishment was opposed to any engagement with the western neighbour. It did not want to relax the embargoes announced in the wake of the attack on India's Parliament. Though the troops massed along the Pakistani border and along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir as part of coercive diplomacy were withdrawn recently (partly because of international pressure and partly because the continued mobilisation was proving counter-productive), the curbs in the bilateral field remained. The two sides have yet to appoint high commissioners in each other's capitals (their missions are now headed by the deputy chiefs), the ban on the air flights from one country to the other remains in position, rail and road travel continues to be stalled and visa restrictions have been tightened.

Ironically, for the first time in the SAARC's history the opportunity for informal talks on the sidelines of the Kathmandu summit was not utilised. The Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, made some theatrical gestures, primarily for purposes of propaganda, but there was no genuine effort on his part. As for India, there was no sign of willingness to relax its tough posture.

Another irony. For years, Pakistan had been wanting the SAARC to take up its problems with India, especially the Kashmir issue, saying the India-Pakistan crisis came in the way of regional cooperation. New Delhi rightly resisted these moves citing the SAARC charter which barred discussion of bilateral and contentious issues. Pakistan and the others supporting its demand were charged with working against the charter. Has New Delhi not exposed itself to this very charge? Lukewarm about participation in the summit scheduled in Islamabad, India adduced various reasons: one, there was no point in holding the meeting when Pakistan was not serious about the vital issue — promotion of trade and economic cooperation. Two, the Prime Minister would not like to be in Pakistan till that country ceased organising violence in Jammu and Kashmir. It was an open secret that Mr. Vajpayee avoided going to Pakistan lest he should find himself engaging with Gen. Musharraf. Such reservations would not have been expressed had Islamabad not been the venue. Has India not made use of its bilateral problem with Pakistan for delaying the summit — and, thus, causing damage to the grouping?

The possible collapse of the SAARC in its present form, though highly regrettable and disappointing, could be a challenge for devising a new effective mechanism in its place. The sentiment in favour of regional cooperation is strong, though not evenly spread in the region. No responsible person in the region, in the Government or outside, intellectuals or others, could dare make a case against regional cooperation. At the non-official level, commendable efforts have been made to conduct studies to achieve this objective. Like, for instance, the South Asia Centre for Policy Studies (SACEPS), a network of organisations involved in addressing issues of regional concern. Under the SAARC's auspices too, considerable groundwork had been done in devising ways to rid the regional trade from nagging restrictions within prescribed deadlines.

Even as New Delhi took a tough line on the SAARC summit, the External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, came out, at a New Delhi seminar, with a grand vision of regional cooperation. India, he said, was ready for a free trade arrangement "from tomorrow" (he did not want to go through the time-consuming and circuitous route of preferential trade etc.). He was for a free flow of investment and services and wanted South Asia to act as a trading bloc with a commonality of approach. And finally he favoured a South Asian Union with not only economic but also a political dimension.

This vision is at complete variance with the present-day reality. Let us hope Mr. Sinha's approach helps neutralise the current setback to the SAARC, and put in place a better substitute. Meanwhile something needs to be done about the present-day reality. As Mr. Gujral put it at that very seminar, there was no option but to cooperate. Terrorism, apart from other things, vitiates the atmosphere, creating a climate of suspicion and distrust. Let this situation not be compounded by stopping rail, road and air travel (between India and Pakistan) and creating problems in the way of people-to-people contacts and track II initiatives.

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