The Hindu : A strategic mis-step?

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, Jan 13, 2003

Opinion

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A strategic mis-step?

By W. P. S. Sidhu

While trying to present the case of being a responsible state with nuclear weapons, India might have, inadvertently, taken a strategic mis-step.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT establishing the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) to deal with the induction, deployment, targeting and, in extremis, the use of India's burgeoning nuclear arsenal is yet another logical and, perhaps, overdue step in the establishment of the three Cs (Capability, Credibility and Communication) traditionally associated with nuclear deterrence. In addition to providing an assured nuclear retaliation against any nuclear, biological or chemical strike, the SFC pronouncement is also unusual in that New Delhi has attempted to provide a degree of transparency, both within and without India, regarding its nuclear decision-making. While trying to present the case of being a responsible state with nuclear weapons, India might have, inadvertently, taken a strategic mis-step.

Although India's nuclear weapons capability (initially proven through a single test in 1974) was loudly endorsed through a series of underground tests in May 1998, the credibility of India's nuclear arsenal, which is dependent not only on the possession of nuclear weapons but also on the ability to deliver these weapons and the will to use these weapons, if necessary, remained suspect. Despite India's regular pronouncements, potential adversaries were convinced that these words were unlikely to be matched in deed. Even the `draft' nuclear doctrine, released in August 1999, which explicitly based itself on a triad at a time when not even the first leg of the arsenal was evident, lent an air of incredibility to India's claim of possessing a `credible minimum deterrent'.

In this context, the establishment of the SFC (which should, in fact, have preceded the formulation of the nuclear doctrine) is the right step towards establishing credibility. Similarly, the articulation of the chain of command related to the release and use of nuclear weapons would also go a long way in communicating India's credibility not only to potential adversaries but also to friends and strategic partners who have often lamented the absence of a visible and viable command and control structure.

However, given the no-first-use posture, India would first have to absorb a nuclear strike, which in all likelihood will be aimed at striking a decapitating blow at the very centre of civilian nuclear decision-making that the SFC has so clearly elaborated. This may well communicate to an adversary that a bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack aimed at the political and executive leadership might well be the best way to prevent a retaliatory Indian nuclear strike. While a physical separation of the political and executive branches of the SFC would be one way of ensuring survivability of the retaliatory capability, there is also an urgent need to elaborate the chain of succession of the political and military chain of command. This is critical to send home the message that even a successful decapitating first-strike is unlikely to prevent a massive retaliatory second-strike from India.

The SFC's multi-service character is certainly not unique and is reminiscent of the Strategic Rocket Forces of the erstwhile Soviet Union. There, the entire nuclear force was placed under a single strategic command, although there were different air, land and sea components within it. In India the joint-services SFC is not necessarily designed exclusively to provide for greater operational efficiency but is, clearly, prompted by the desire to nip any bitter inter-service rivalry (as was witnessed between the Army and the Air Force in the early nuclear history of the United States) in the bud.

In that sense a tri-services SFC might well be an ideal composition, although some element of inter-services rivalry can still be expected when the other elements of the triad (particularly the sea-based component) come into being. However, given the absence of any worthwhile experience of a tri-service command — the Fortress Andaman command at Port Blair is the only other instance where the three services have collectively managed a single, albeit minor, command — it remains to be seen how effective a joint-services SFC is likely to be.

Another aspect that needs to be explored further is the relationship between the conventional capability and the nuclear capability in general and how the conventional Indian armed forces should be dovetailed with the capabilities of the SFC in particular. This is critical for a number of reasons. First, as a consequence of the nuclear no-first-use posture there might be a propensity on the part of the Indian military to conduct pre-emptive conventional operations, during the course of which the nuclear assets of the potential adversaries would also be targeted. This is, clearly, part of the current strategy of the Indian Air Force and was also evident in the `limited war' concept propounded in the wake of the Kargil conflict. Such a strategy, especially one designed to take out the nuclear delivery capability of the adversary, might well force the nuclear-armed opponent into a "use 'em or lose 'em" corner and lead to an inadvertent nuclear exchange.

Second, it is also not clear how India would respond to a similar conventional contingency. For example, if an adversary were to launch an attack on its nuclear forces using conventional means, would New Delhi regard this as a first use, thus giving India the right to retaliate with its second-strike nuclear capability? In which case, would it not be a violation of the no-first-use posture? Or would India confine itself to a conventional response and try to take out the nuclear assets of the adversary even at the risk that such retaliation might lead to a nuclear escalation?

The most troublesome aspects of the SFC and the accompanying doctrinal pronouncements, however, are the ones related to the use of nuclear weapons to counter even a biological or chemical attack. Even the U.S., despite enjoying the unique uni-polar moment, has been circumspect about making such a categorical linkage, perhaps because Washington realises that such an explicit link reduces the deterrence value of nuclear weapons and particularly enhances the value of chemical weapons, which have always been regarded as "a poor man's nuclear weapons". Moreover, while Washington's tenuous posture has been considered irresponsible even by some of its staunchest allies; New Delhi's explicit stance is likely to attract equal if not greater disdain.

Besides, it is not clear which of India's potential adversaries are likely to use chemical or biological weapons in preference to nuclear weapons. Almost all of India's neighbours and potential adversaries have signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) which not only prohibit the possession but also ban the use of these weapons. Besides, those countries in India's neighbourhood which are not fully on board (in that they have signed but not ratified) the CWC and BWC such as Afghanistan, Bhutan and Myanmar, do not have the capability to use these weapons against India even if they had them. Moreover, even if a chemical attack had been launched, for instance, from Afghanistan, it would be highly unlikely that New Delhi would retaliate with a nuclear strike, especially given the presence of the U.S. and other international forces in Afghanistan.

This only leaves the usual suspects — North Korea, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria (non-signatories to the CWC) and Israel and Kazakhstan (non-signatories to the BWC) — which could use these weapons against India. However, it is not clear why any of them would do so. More importantly, even if these countries did manage, in an improbable scenario, to use these weapons against India, it is highly unlikely that New Delhi would be able to mount a successful nuclear retaliation against any of them. Such inaction, apart from prompting domestic scorn, would cause an irreparable dent in its nuclear credibility that the entire SFC exercise was designed to mend.

(The writer is Professor of International Relations at Delhi University.)

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