The Hindu : Nuclear weapons' evolving role

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Friday, Jan 17, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Nuclear weapons' evolving role

By V. R. Raghavan

Nuclear weapons have been used as negotiating levers and as means of compelling political, military and economic responses preferred by the smaller nuclear state.

THE YEAR just ended and the one begun are marked by an unmistakable nuclear meaning. Nuclear weapons have played a major part in the strategic considerations of both major and regional powers. They show every sign of continuing to do so this year. They may even pave the way for a new approach to exploit the possession of these weapons. The frequency with which nuclear weapons have been brought into play in the realpolitik of managing strategic interests is a pointer to a disturbing if not dangerous future. It demonstrates the confidence in exploiting or failing to comprehend, depending on the nuclear prism of the users, the meaning and purpose of a nuclear deterrent by new nuclear powers.

At the end of the Cold War, analysts in the nuclear weapons states had talked of the Second Nuclear Age. The phrase was meant to differentiate the changed strategic interests and challenges that were emerging after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The growth of new regional powers, possibility of new nuclear weapons states and the absence of the Cold War certainties of bipolar nuclear deterrence had changed the strategic scene dramatically. Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and test ban initiatives that were launched with great power assumptions soon floundered in the face of double standards applied for the nuclear haves and the have-nots. There was a strong probability of the old nuclear order coming under stress. Today, after the readiness to use not only the grammar but instruments of nuclear deterrence demonstrated in South Asia and in the Korean peninsula, the Second Nuclear Age can be said to be truly in place. The shape of the new nuclear era is, however, not only not clear but raises serious apprehensions as well.

The South Asian and Korean nuclear play is marked by an uncanny mystique. It is not unlike the oriental shadow theatre where puppets are used with a cacophony of sounds to create an impact. The metaphor of shadow theatre is apt to distinguish the audience of major powers from the new nuclear weapons participants. South Asia witnessed a military crisis of unprecedented scope in 2002. This had been preceded in 1999 by the Kargil conflict in which the Indian strategy was to limit its operations to recapturing the territory Pakistan had stealthily occupied. This happened within months of the two states having gone overtly nuclear. The Indian leadership assessed that its restraint in the scale of military operations not only obtained international support but also put Pakistan on notice about taking recourse to military means against India. Pakistan's leadership assessed that nuclear weapons had deterred India from widening the conflict. The first conclusions of the two states' leadership on the role nuclear weapons could play were thus at the opposite ends of the deterrence continuum.

Faced with Pakistan's ever-increasing recourse to the instrument of terror against India and its belief that nuclear weapons had placed limits on Indian options, New Delhi concluded that the option of war needed to be exercised. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on India's Parliament, the public mood was extremely strong against Pakistan. The Indian military was placed at its battle stations and the Air Force and the Navy moved into a state of operational readiness. In Pakistan and India there were a number of statements from the leaders in charge of policy, indicating their readiness to use nuclear weapons if necessary. That credible threat of war from New Delhi evoked the predictable response. Major powers rushed to lean on Pakistan to end its terrorism policy against India. Nuclear weapons in the subcontinent played a decisive part in the conciliation role of the major powers. These weapons were thus raised from being deterrents to being productive.

When faced with strong international criticism the leaders in both India and Pakistan denied the intent of using nuclear weapons. Months after the two states started rolling back their war deployment, both sides continue to talk of having been ready to use the weapons. Pervez Musharraf leaves no room for doubt that India was restrained by his readiness to use nuclear weapons. In other words, he confirms his confidence in the value of nuclear weapons as instruments to obtain a political outcome on Jammu and Kashmir through terrorism. This perspective on nuclear weapons was considered both dangerous and unacceptable by the U.S. and the Soviets in their Cold War standoff. Nuclear weapons have, however, now become instruments of raising international fears and obtaining a political advantage through major power involvement. The dividing line between the shadow theatre of threats which are denied then repeated and reconfirmed, and the reality of catastrophic possibilities remains shadowy.

North Korea' s admission that it possesses nuclear weapons and its carefully calibrated moves to raise the ante against economic sanctions is now holding centre stage. States in North Korea's neighbourhood are clear about the immense dangers the latter's nuclear weapons pose. Pyongyang is in fact challenging the credibility of the U.S.' extended nuclear deterrence guarantees in the region. Its technology transfers and missile sales to different parts of the world are another bow in its nuclear armour. The threat of reactivating plutonium-processing facilities, ordering out of inspectors and the shutting down of monitoring instruments, are all designed to force the major powers to give up on sanctions. The vulnerability of the U.S.' allies to North Korean conventional and nuclear capabilities adds urgency to the short fuse lit by the latter. The U.S. has attempted to stem the situation by reiterating its ability to fight two wars simultaneously. It is, however, not the superpower's military capability that is in doubt but its ability to both keep its promises with allies and simultaneously work its military power in the new environment. It would be hard to deny that China as an old and strong nuclear power is part of the Second Nuclear Age problem. Its policy on transfer of nuclear technology has been contrary to its assurances. Its part in bringing about nuclear capabilities which are challenging the older deterrence assumptions has been significant. The implications of its role in and outside the club of five nuclear powers has not been lost on the new or putative nuclear powers. Its ability to persuade or coerce North Korea from desisting from its proliferation agenda remains doubtful even as its stand on U.S. military action against Pyongyang is unclear.

The meaning of the continuing nuclear discourse needs to be considered carefully. It is clear that new nuclear weapons states have found it advantageous to exploit the threat potential of their assets. They do not see nuclear weapons as merely a means to deter. There is a new value being added to nuclear weapons that goes beyond deterrence. They are visualised as instruments of a policy that creates global fears of a nuclear exchange taking place between regional adversaries. They are being used as tools to involve major powers to one's advantage in regional conflicts; they are being seen as levers which can force economic and political accommodation upon major powers as a price for nuclear restraint.

The evolution of nuclear weapons in the hands of new nuclear powers from deterrence to larger and more finite ends is apparent. They have in the recent past been and will continue to be used to fulfil other roles; they have been used as negotiating levers and as means of compelling political, military and economic responses preferred by the smaller nuclear state. We are also witnessing the use of nuclear weapons to impel international action in favour of one nuclear adversary against the other. From nuclear deterrence to compellence to impellence is an evolutionary cycle whose implications are yet to be clear. Whether it leads to a change in international behaviour from major and medium powers, or, reinforces the old assumptions of strategic power projection remains to be seen.

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