The Hindu : Preparing for regime change in Iraq

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Thursday, Jan 30, 2003

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Preparing for regime change in Iraq

By C. Raja Mohan

For the Bush Administration, this war is not merely about removing Saddam Hussein. It involves a much larger project about the political transformation of the Middle East.

IN DECLARING that Baghdad had "missed" the last chance to avert war by coming clean on its programmes for weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. President, George W. Bush, has signalled that war against Iraq is now inevitable. Acts of war are never easy for any leader. It involves careful weighing of all risks and benefits. In his State of the Union speech on Wednesday, Mr. Bush has made it clear that America has done its sums and is ready for a war to oust Saddam Hussein as Iraq's President.

But what about the debate in the United Nations Security Council on the latest report of the chief inspectors? The Bush Administration is not impressed with the view of Russia, China, France and Germany that the inspectors need more time to work in Iraq. Mr. Bush has now ordered his Secretary of State, Colin Powell, to present next week American evidence to buttress the claim that Mr. Hussein is cheating.

If the Security Council does not accept the American evidence, Washington is saying it is prepared to act on its own. As Mr. Bush said, "We will consult, but let there be no misunderstanding; if Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people, and for peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him". If the Security Council is prepared to go along with the United States it is fine. Otherwise, Washington is ready to lead a "coalition of the willing" into the war.

The charade of a debate in the Security Council on the inspections of the Iraqi programmes on weapons of mass destruction will continue in the coming days. It could at best delay the war by a few more weeks, but is unlikely to stop it. In the next few days, the leaders of the major powers will be under pressure to come to terms with the U.S. plans for war. Those like France might decide it is smarter to influence the nature of the war and its political outcomes than be left out. Those like Germany who have strong domestic peace constituencies to cater to would want to opt out. Russia and China, despite their many political reservations, could decide silence is better than resistance to the U.S. war plans.

The slim hopes that Mr. Hussein could be persuaded to go into exile too have not materialised. There could be fresh attempts in the next few days to induce him to fly out. But the prospects of their success remain bleak. Those who have closely followed the American debate on Iraq over the last two years have had no doubts about the Bush Administration's political commitment to oust the Hussein regime. The decision in the White House for regime change in Iraq was taken even before the tragic events of September 11, 2001.

The mock debate in the U.N. about the disarmament of Iraq is about garnering multilateral support for the American war. It was never about, what Mr. Bush called, a "scavenger hunt" for evidence on Iraqi special weapons programmes. The American decision to go to war against Iraq had preceded the move to go to the United Nations. The "multilateralists" in the Bush Administration like Mr. Powell argued that getting the U.N. cover would be useful and must be tried out before a unilateral act of war by the U.S.

The unanimous decision of the Security Council to demand tough inspections against Iraq seemed to boost Mr. Powell's case. But the danger that the inspections could become an end in themselves have put the hardliners on Iraq back in the driver's seat in Washington. For the ideologues of the Bush Administration, the challenge in Iraq was less from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction per se. The real threat, they insisted, lay in the nature of the regime in Baghdad. The emphasis on inspections and procedure, they demanded, should not undermine the principal strategic objective of regime change.

Further, Mr. Bush has gone too far down the road into the military confrontation with Iraq to now walk back, by clinging on to a compromise on inspections. Delaying the war now, Mr. Bush understood, will signal a weakness of resolve that could be detrimental to his entire foreign policy enterprise. Countries like North Korea have already begun to take full advantage of the crisis in the Gulf. Stepping back from the brink now would further weaken the international coalition that Mr. Bush has struggled to hold together.

For the Bush Administration, this war is not merely about removing Mr. Hussein. It involves a much larger project about the political transformation of the Middle East. Even before September 11, the radicals in the Bush Administration had come to the conclusion that a major overhaul in American policy towards the region was necessary. And the war on terrorism declared after the attack on New York and Washington had reinforced this objective.

There is profound scepticism across the world about the American ability to nudge the Middle East towards economic modernisation, political moderation, and representative governments. Mr. Bush's attempt to define the war as a liberation of the Iraqi people from the dictatorship of Mr. Hussein too might have few takers. Yet, those who dismiss the motivations of the Bush Administration might be underestimating the sheer audacity that underlies Washington's project to remake the Middle East.

It would be right to dismiss such boldness among weaker powers as mere rhetoric. But today the U.S. has accumulated military power and resources on a scale unprecedented in world history. When combined with political will, such extraordinary power could easily shatter the ossified structures of the Middle East. Those who see the impending war as a mere personal revenge by Mr. Bush or as a reflection of cynical oil politics might be missing the grand agenda of the American war in the Gulf.

The safe diplomatic position that India had constructed for itself in the current Gulf crisis would soon begin to unravel. Pious platitudes about avoiding the dangers of war serve no purpose except deluding oneself. Calls for restraint of the type the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, issued this week are of no consequence when war is imminent.

India's arguments that a war against Iraq could have grave consequences for itself — from rising oil prices to a political backlash in the Arab world — do have merit. But if war is inevitable and India cannot prevent it, New Delhi must begin to move to the next questions. How does India minimise the negative consequences of war? How does New Delhi protect its many interests in a post-Saddam Iraq and the Middle East?

India should know that where it stands before the war will significantly shape its influence when the peace treaties are drafted and spoils from the war are distributed. Sitting on the fence until it is all over is a risk free option. But such timidity might also marginalise India in the potentially historic arrangements that could emerge in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.

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