The Hindu : China, N. Korea & the nuclear issue

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Saturday, Feb 08, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

China, N. Korea & the nuclear issue

By Raviprasad Narayanan

China's policy on the North Korean nuclear issue has been torn between its desire to support an ally and its desire for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

WITH ITS admission on October 4 last year, that it had an ongoing nuclear weapons development programme utilising highly enriched uranium, North Korea triggered a crisis that while raising the spectre of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula also shook the very foundations of security in northeast Asia.

Contrarily, North Korea's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on January 10 this year, as a logical corollary to the "admission", signals a bargaining position. Earlier, in 1993, Pyongyang had withdrawn from the NPT, setting the stage for the Agreed Framework of 1994. If the past is any indicator, the current impasse should give way to a new agreement in the coming months. By reneging on its multilateral commitments and increasing the stakes, North Korea has brought to the fore its core concerns vis-a-vis the United States, namely, recognition of North Korea's sovereignty by the U.S., a non-aggression pact, and no obstacles in its path of economic development.

Despite the all-too-visible indications of public diplomacy involving, on the one hand, South Korea, Japan and the U.S., and, on the other, the subtle influence of Russia and China, the significant aspect that needs to be highlighted is the special equation China has with North Korea, and why it is imperative for active Chinese participation in any settlement of the dispute on the Korean peninsula.

A relationship, that in the 1960s and 1970s was described as "as close as lips and teeth", is going through a very severe test with the strain most revelatory in China's official statements since the crisis unfolded in early October last year. A clear indication of China's official position on North Korea's nuclear programme was articulated by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesman during the summit of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Los Cabos, Mexico in late October. "(We) emphasise that the Korean peninsula should be nuclear-free, and we hope peace and stability can be maintained on the Korean peninsula. We will use various means to express our position. This includes exchanges with North Korea where we will make clear our position," the spokesman, Kong Quan, said. Mr. Kong made these remarks after the Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, met his South Korean counterpart, Kim Dae-Jung, for talks where Pyongyang's secret nuclear programme topped the agenda. As far as China is concerned, the statement was unusual, as Beijing usually prefers not to criticise North Korea by name in order not to anger the unpredictable regime in Pyongyang. Mr. Kong added that "(As) a neighbour of the Korean peninsula, our view is that the problem should be solved through peaceful means and dialogue in order to protect the peace and stability of the area."

There is probably no aspect of China's external relations where the actual policy diverges from the declaratory policy as in the case of North Korea. The difference in large measure is due to the difficult character of the North Korean leadership and the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula. Conservative sections make out a case that in the event of the Sino-Soviet relationship becoming tense again, it would be very important for Beijing that Pyongyang does not "tilt" towards Moscow. The actual Chinese policy, clearly perceived as such by the North Korean leadership, is that Pyongyang should neither move militarily against Seoul, nor politically gravitate towards Moscow. Ironically, for the maintenance of these conditions, Beijing relies on the U.S. commitment to, and military presence in South Korea. Also, in a doomsday scenario, were North Korea to attack South Korea, a contingency the Chinese regard as unlikely, Beijing would "oppose" such a move: whatever that means, it clearly does not mean support.

On the other hand, Beijing plays an important role in "sustaining" North Korea economically with regular supplies of fuel, grain and other goods that in part redress the chronic shortages. Politically, China endorses Pyongyang's demand for an American withdrawal from South Korea and for a tripartite conference between the two Koreas and the U.S., on the question of unification of the peninsula.

China's policy on the North Korean nuclear issue has been torn between its desire to support an ally and its desire for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. As one of its few allies during the Cold War, China traditionally supported North Korea in its ongoing confrontation with South Korea and the U.S. However, with the changed realities after the Cold War, China has shown a reluctance to come to North Korea's aid especially when it challenges international norms, particularly on nuclear proliferation. Some analysts believe this reluctance is based not only on China's desire to be perceived as a responsible international power, but also on the greater importance it now attaches to good relations with the U.S. and South Korea. Yet another reason is China's concern over the instability on the Korean peninsula, which might threaten its security interests.

China's dilemma on the current crisis is further revealed by its divergent views on Iraq and North Korea. On Iraq, China has laid stress on the importance of the U.N. Security Council, while in the case of North Korea, it has repeatedly called for direct dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington. While China and North Korea have engaged in some nuclear cooperation, its nature and comprehensiveness remain shrouded in secrecy. Even as early as the 1960s, China had refused to assist North Korea in developing a nuclear weapon. In 1987, it pulled out its nuclear technicians from North Korea when it discovered that Pyongyang was aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. In 1989, both China and the Soviet Union refused to assist the North Koreans in developing a nuclear reprocessing facility. During the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis, in which North Korea refused to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its reactors and moved to withdraw from the NPT, China initially opposed the use of sanctions or other coercive measures to bring Pyongyang back in line with its NPT obligations However, Beijing soon changed its position from stating that it "would oppose" sanctions to saying it "would not support" sanctions — meaning that it would abstain rather than veto a U.N. Security Council resolution against North Korea.

This shift is widely believed to have been instrumental in bringing North Korea around to accept the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, in which Pyongyang agreed to suspend its nuclear programme, shut down its graphite moderated reactors and related facilities, allow IAEA inspections, and abide by the NPT in exchange for light water reactors and heavy fuel oil from the

U.S., Japan and South Korea. Of interest is the detail that China was not directly involved in the Agreed Framework, nor is it a member of the Korean Energy Development Organisation, the multilateral body created to implement the Agreed Framework.

While China has reason to be concerned at the current tensions on the Korean peninsula, its position on the issue can be inferred from a comment made by its ambassador for Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Sha Zukang, in 1999: "Dialogue and consultation is the best way to reach consensus on problem matters. In the case of North Korea, which is a very proud country, sanctions can only prove counterproductive. We should recognise that North Korea has legitimate security concerns. We need to continue the dialogue and practice more patience... But as for initiatives on the part of China, we can't go into the kitchen and do the cooking when we don't know how to cook."

(The writer is a doctoral scholar at the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, JNU.)

Printer friendly page
Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Opinion

Stories in this Section

Insufficient evidence

Transforming the UTI

China, N. Korea & the nuclear issue

Which Mrs. Iyer?

Diplomacy, not rhetoric, will help