The Hindu : India, the U.S. and Iraq

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Monday, Feb 10, 2003

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India, the U.S. and Iraq

By K. K. Katyal

There is an element of incompleteness about India-U.S. relations in the context of Iraq.

INDIA-U.S. relations have evolved, of late, under the influence of diverse factors — bilateral impulses, India-Pakistan conflicts, nuclear issues and the geo-strategic situation in Asia. To this has now been added global developments, those related to Iraq to be precise. It was the cumulative impact of these issues that counted, though the dominant matter, at a given point of time, set the tone. Last year around this time, the escalation of India-Pakistan tensions was instrumental in Washington's intense engagement with New Delhi (and Islamabad). The U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, visited the Subcontinent thrice and the American President, George W. Bush, called the heads of India and Pakistan, A. B. Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf, every other fortnight. The India-Pakistan standoff continues to be uneasy but the danger of war, because of the earlier eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation of the troops on their border, is off. There is no great urgency about Washington's dealings with the Subcontinent now. But by far the bigger reason is its pre-occupation with Iraq. The U.S. is immersed neck-deep, as it were, in hectic diplomatic activity, apart from the military build-up in West Asia for an attack, regarded a certainty. It is natural for Washington to view India and Pakistan, individually as well as their adversarial stances, through the prism of Iraq. Considering the equations it has with the two countries, Washington pins hopes on their support and understanding.

For India and Pakistan, however, it is not easy to take a categorical stand either way, especially if the U.S. chooses to act, as it seems likely, without the mandate of the U.N. Security Council. As for New Delhi, any such action would run counter to its principled view and, for Pakistan, it would create problems because of domestic pressures especially the assertiveness of the religious groups now firmly entrenched in the country's Parliament.

For the U.S., at this moment, Iraq is the topmost priority, the number one issue: it is uppermost in the mind of the U.S. administration in its contacts with other Governments. But our sense of timing does not seem right. It was odd, therefore, that around the time the U.S. was engaged in the most crucial phase of the diplomatic offensive against Iraq, with Mr. Powell presenting "clinching evidence" to the Security Council on Iraq's acts of omission and commission, India should be projecting the talks on technology transfer as the high point of its diplomatic moves in Washington. True that this is a highly important issue, a delayed follow-up by the U.S. of what had been agreed upon between Mr. Bush and Mr. Vajpayee months ago. True again, the Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sibal, one of the most suave diplomats in the foreign policy establishment, was eminently suited for the mission. But should not the concerns of the moment, arising out of the imminence of war, have been given priority by New Delhi? In Washington, Mr. Sibal met senior officials of the State, Defence and Commerce departments, apart from the National Security set-up, and Iraq-related matters could not but have figured in the discussions. The unpublicised talks on Iraq fit in with India's low key stance but the country needs to know whether, and if so to what extent, has New Delhi contributed to the efforts for averting military action against Iraq. Even America's close allies such as France and Germany apart from Russia and China have not minced words. This is not to suggest that India has sufficient diplomatic clout to influence U.S. policy-making processes but to emphasise the urgency of attempting to safeguard the country's interests, to be threatened by the action against Baghdad as also in the uncertainties of the post-Iraq order. Whatever the duration of the operation, India would be hit hard, mainly because of disruption of oil supplies from West Asia, the main source of imports. To say that the "regime change" in Baghdad would upset the current balance in the region is to stress the obvious. How would India be affected and what is to be its strategy to guard against adverse repercussions? The country needs to be assured on this count. There is no special virtue in carrying the low profile to its extreme.

The merits of the weaponisation issue apart, Iraq had been an oasis of secularism in the desert of religious extremism in the region and, if past experience is an indication, religious fundamentalism is certain to gain ascendancy in the region, after the collapse of the regime in Iraq. That has to be India's main worry.

In 1990-91, during the last Gulf War, India was placed in a difficult predicament — it had to reckon with the U.S. request, first, for over-flights and, then, for refuelling facilities, for its military aircraft from East and South-East Asia to the theatre of war. Luckily, there will be no such dilemma for New Delhi now. The U.S. has already completed its mobilisation from bases in Diego Garcia and the Mediterranean. Last time, New Delhi had to accept the American requests — the over-flights were allowed by the V. P. Singh Government, with I. K. Gujral as the External Affairs Minister, and refuelling arrangements were cleared by the Chandra Shekhar Government. It was meant to be a quiet affair but became known by sheer coincidence. The tyres of a U.S. military aircraft that landed in Mumbai burst and it was captured by an enterprising photo-journalist, leading to a storm of protests. There will be no such problem this time. The requests from the U.S. may not be for logistical facilities but for diplomatic and political support in the form of continued silence.

India is opposed to military action against Iraq; it is against the regime change doctrine but it has chosen to confine the expression of its position to behind-the-scenes bilateral exchanges with other countries or through occasional comments by the Foreign Office spokesperson. The Prime Minister's recent remarks, conspicuously brief, did not change the basic stand. The idea, obviously, is not to annoy the Americans. The Foreign Office claims appreciation of India's stand by Washington. It may be true but is not reflected in the American response to India's concerns — as regards, to cite two instances, the continued instigation and organisation of terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan and, delay in the removal of embargoes on the transfer of high technology. It is not realistic to expect extreme steps by Washington to force Pakistan to act on its promises to put a permanent end to infiltration, much less to declare Pakistan a terrorist state. Islamabad is a valuable ally to the U.S., with greater strategic relevance than India, in the context of future actions in Iraq and the current involvement in Afghanistan.

As regards the transfer of dual-use technology, Mr. Sibal's talks in Washington made a limited advance. The two sides signed a "statement of principles" (not a memorandum of understanding), with the U.S. agreeing to review the current (restrictive) policies on technology, but, at the same time, choosing to set up mechanisms to guard against its use for nuclear and missile programmes. The High Technology Cooperation Group is to meet "in the near future". The agreement, no doubt, was a "significant achievement" as claimed by the Indian side but could the caveats incorporated in it be wished away?

To sum up, the U.S., with its gaze fixed on Iraq, has pursued its objective — to have India (and Pakistan) on its side — while New Delhi has not fully exploited whatever little options are available in the present situation. The contrasting Indian stand in private (opposition to the U.S. policy on Iraq) and in public (muted response) may be a good tactic but is not a substitute for a creative policy. It will be difficult to maintain even this stance should the U.S. choose to act without the Security Council's authority. Ours is "guna-e-bey lazzat" (a sin without the enjoyment of a gain), to quote a Persian expression. There is an element of incompleteness about India-U.S. relations in the context of Iraq.

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