The Hindu : India, Pakistan and the U.N.

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Tuesday, Feb 11, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

India, Pakistan and the U.N.

By Chinmaya R. Gharekhan

The surer way of keeping Indo-Pakistan issues out of the Security Council's deliberations, even informal ones, is to resume the dialogue with Islamabad at some level.

PAKISTAN'S TWO-YEAR term as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, which commenced on January 1, 2003, coincides with crucial Assembly elections in several States and the even more crucial general elections next year in India. If Pakistan and `Mian' Musharraf are going to figure prominently in these elections, it will suit Pakistan fine. The anti-Pakistan rhetoric surrounding the elections and the consequent escalation of tensions in Indo-Pakistan relations will provide ample ammunition for Islamabad to attempt to raise subcontinental issues in the Security Council.

While Pakistan will eagerly grab this rather extended opportunity to put Indian diplomacy on the defensive, it will have its own difficult moments in the Council in dealing with issues relating to the situation in Iraq which might persist throughout its two-year term. The inclination of the Pakistani Government would be to support American moves against Iraq and to happily welcome any opening to further cement its highly profitable alliance with the U.S. in the war against terror. The assumption of power by fundamentalist parties in two provinces, especially in the NWFP, will not be an asset in this game plan. Already fairly serious differences have emerged between the two `allies' over some incidents in the border areas. There is also a major domestic issue for the Government in Islamabad regarding the inclusion of Pakistan in the list of countries whose nationals have to register themselves with the U.S. Department of Immigration. Of course, something unforeseen and helpful can always turn up, as it usually does for Pakistan's military rulers, which might bail out the Musharraf regime.

Pakistan's discomfort in the Security Council, however, on Iraq-related issues need not be a source of comfort for India. In fact, the more troublesome Iraq-related items prove for Pakistan, the more active Pakistan will become on Kashmir and other matters, including heightened tension with India. Indeed, agitating India-centric questions might help the regime in defusing the pressure from Islamic and Jehadi groups on U.S.-centric questions. Thus, while we in India might rejoice at Pakistan's possible discomfiture on Iraq, the Indian mission in New York and the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi will have an unenviable task on their hands. The present Ambassador of Pakistan at the U.N., who seems to have been reprieved by the State Department regarding his reported ill-treatment of his girlfriend, will certainly make sure of that.

What should be India's response to Pakistan's anti-India machinations in the Security Council? There are a few possible options. The most effective way, of course, is not to provide any pretext to Pakistan to raise Indo-Pakistan issues in the Council. This would imply not making `Mian' Musharraf an issue in the various elections in the country. It is a safe bet to believe that Pakistan will certainly figure prominently in most of the elections. It should surprise no one if the authorities in Pakistan were to encourage an incident or two in India, which would ensure the centrality of Pakistan as an election issue. There is indeed, it would appear, a sort of unspoken alliance between the Pakistani Jehadi groups and electioneering in India. Thus, the particular option of keeping Pakistan out of the elections and thereby denying it the excuse of raising Indo-Pakistan issues in the Security Council would appear to be unavailable.

There are two other possible approaches. India could take the attitude of "we don't care, you can do your damnedest". A nation, strong, cohesive and united, could certainly adopt such a posture. At the time of the liberation of Goa in 1961, the Security Council, led by the then American Ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, was extremely critical of our military operation, but India was not over-concerned about it. C.S Jha, our permanent representative, told the Council in no uncertain terms, that Charter or no Charter, India would do what it had to do to protect its interests. In 2003 and 2004, the challenges facing the country are of a different nature, the state of the Indian Union is not so robust. Nevertheless, if the Government were to take the Opposition into confidence, the possibility of evolving at least a vague consensus on dealing with the developments in the Security Council cannot be ruled out.

The other alternative is to ask our `friends' in the Council to curb Pakistan's mischiefs. This would involve continuous interaction between the MEA, the Indian mission at the U.N. and the members of the Council. This would have to be done in any case, even if the first approach were preferred. Relying exclusively on the second alternative would put us on the defensive and would not necessarily be effective all the time. Indeed, the Americans, increasingly beholden as they become to Gen. Musharraf with every single Taliban or Al-Qaeda member being arrested and/or handed over to them, will obliged to satisfy the General's domestic political compulsions. They would probably ask for India's understanding.

While the U.S. is the single most influential player in the Council, care will have to be taken to massage the ego of every other member. Indeed, the less important a country, the bigger is its own image of its importance. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that the five permanent members, each of whom has a particular equation with one or more non-permanent members, have a decisive voice in laying down the Council's agenda. India would once again be in the undignified position of having to ask one or more permanent member to bail us out.

The surer way of keeping Indo-Pakistan issues out of the Council's deliberations, even informal ones, is to resume the dialogue with Islamabad at some level. Resumption of dialogue would be an effective instrument with which our `friends' can counter Pakistan's anti-India efforts. Our refusal to talk to Pakistan, while necessary from the domestic angle, gives Pakistan significant diplomatic advantage, similar to what we had after the Lahore bus journey and the Agra summit. Unforeseen developments can always occur, but as of today, this position is unlikely to change for the next two years.

It is probably worth clarifying what `raising' an issue in the Security Council means. It does not necessarily involve debating or discussing it at an open, official meeting of the Council in the presence of all the members of the United Nations, the media and the public. Indeed, for the most part, it involves one member of the Council bringing to the notice of other members, during informal consultations in the small room next to the Council Chamber, any issue that, in its opinion, might disturb international peace and security in any part of the world. If other members pick up the subject, they might ask the President of the Council to say a few words about it to the representatives of the media who are hovering about just outside the Council. This is how a subject gets internationalised. If other members do not pick up the subject, it is still open to the member who raised it to brief the media about its initiative during the informal meeting. This, however, is not at all as effective as the President of the Council doing it.

India has enough clout and influence in the international community to neutralise Pakistan's mischief-making advantage in the Security Council. It is well to remember, however, that the Council is a political body and its members most often take positions based on political considerations prevailing at a given time. If domestic politics propels the political leadership in India to adopt a certain posture, it ought to take in its stride an occasional unpleasant turn in the U.N. without blaming the foreign policy apparatus for it.

Printer friendly page
Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Opinion

Stories in this Section

Undermining the rule of law

Beyond statistics

India, Pakistan and the U.N.

Against the politics of terror

Diplomacy at its worst

Volatile stand

Flimsy proof?

Not a revelation