The Hindu : Consequences of a war

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Wednesday, Feb 19, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Consequences of a war - II

By Michael Krepon

The Bush administration cannot succeed in countering proliferation by bludgeoning the U.N., multilateral diplomacy and treaties.

IF SADDAM Hussein creates mass U.S. casualties by unleashing chemical or biological weapons in a losing cause, the presumed value of gas, germs and nukes could grow considerably. Why? Because other leaders worried about U.S. gun-slinging might reasonably conclude that the best way to deter another preventive war would be to clarify the prospect of mass casualties, thereby reinforcing second thoughts by the American public and its erstwhile allies. And if friendly nations perceive a folding of the American protective umbrella, they, too, could be more interested in acquiring deadly weapons for national defence.

Chemical or biological weapons have never been used in asymmetric warfare between weak states and major powers. Taboos could be broken, with cascading effects, if Mr. Hussein uses these weapons in a losing cause.

The first Bush administration was mostly silent when Mr. Hussein used chemical weapons against domestic foes and Iranians. There will be no silence this time at home and abroad if Mr. Hussein uses deadly weapons against allied expeditionary forces.

The most significant taboo in warfare is against the use of nuclear weapons. The Bush administration has warned that this taboo could also be broken in a prospective war against Mr. Hussein. The Bush national security strategy states that, "the United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force — including through resort to all of our options" if bugs or gas are used against U.S. forces, friends and allies.

This veiled warning of the possible use of nuclear retaliation has been much repeated of late in order to deter Mr. Hussein from authorising a chemical or biological attack.

For the sake of shoring up deterrence, let us conveniently ignore that the threat of using nuclear weapons against Iraq violates a fundamental norm of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (and thus U.S. and international law) that nuclear powers are not supposed to use nukes or threaten their use against non-nuclear countries. By repeatedly invoking this threat, the Bush administration has hastened into what Stanford University's Scott Sagan calls the "commitment trap". If deterrence breaks down, and if Mr. Hussein or his henchmen actually use bugs or gas, the question will immediately arise whether Mr. Bush will carry out his implied threat. If Mr. Bush backs down, this threat and the national security strategy in which it is now embedded will be much weakened, thus inviting further WMD use.

If, alternatively, the most powerful country the world has ever known detonates a nuclear weapon against a pitifully weaker foe — even one that initiates chemical or biological warfare — there will be a hellish global reaction, particularly in the Islamic world.

Whatever gains that might accrue from "shoring up" deterrence against future foes would be dwarfed by negatives, including the crossing of a fateful threshold that has withstood 45 years of Cold War crises, as well as the Korean and Vietnam wars.

The first use of a nuclear weapon after Hiroshima and Nagasaki will have profound consequences for proliferation and catastrophic terrorism. In his recent State of the Union message, Mr. Bush declared, "if war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means, sparing, in every way we can, the innocent". If nuclear weapons now constitute "just means", a norm that Presidents have strived mightily to uphold since 1945 will be waved aside. Subsequent U.S. efforts to stop nuclear terrorism or to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by other states will become a lonely, hypocritical pursuit. Proliferation feeds on double standards.

What conclusions might be reasonable, drawn from these lousy choices? First, that the twin crises the Bush administration now faces in Iraq and North Korea constitute a likely "tipping point" for global proliferation. If either crisis ends badly, the world will become a far more brutish place. Critical thresholds will be tested.

If they are crossed, the "antidotes" to U.S. military supremacy — the acquisition of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons — will spread in troubled regions.

Second, there is now no alternative to successful disarmament in Iraq. Having rejected containment and U.N. inspections while teeing up an invasion force, the Bush administration has to separate Mr. Hussein, voluntarily or involuntarily, from the stockpiles he has previously worked so assiduously to hide. The consequences for regional proliferation if Mr. Hussein again succeeds in playing "cheat and retreat" would be severe. The chances of persuading North Korea to reverse course will plummet if Mr. Hussein succeeds in foiling the U.N. and the Bush administration.

Third, the pursuit of preventive war does not become the U.S., especially when its advocates denigrate multilateral institutions and hollow out treaties.

The Bush administration cannot succeed in countering proliferation by bludgeoning the U.N., multilateral diplomacy and treaties. The treaties administration officials denigrate set international norms against the possession of chemical and biological weapons. If these norms are worth asking American soldiers to die for, the treaties embodying these norms are worth strengthening.

Fourth, until a balance is restored in the Bush administration's approach, military successes will still generate proliferation setbacks. The administration proposes to spend three dimes on safeguarding dangerous weapons and materials that could fall into the wrong hands for every dollar spent to maintain and modernise the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Mr. Bush's new budget spends $1billion more on missile defence programmes than for the entire State Department. It is extremely hard to make the case against nuclear proliferation when the administration rejects a nuclear test ban and hints at a resumption of underground testing.

Is proliferation worth fighting against? To judge by the U.N. debate, most countries would answer "no". In some cases, however, proliferation can metastasise throughout a troubled region, reducing international bodies to mere talk shops and gutting global norms. The Bush administration is poorly positioned to argue this case, since it has revelled in double standards and has had little use for the institutions and treaties that are now placed at grave risk. And even if the Bush administration had adopted a coherent approach, a burgeoning global peace constituency is unlikely to have been persuaded. Paradoxes now rule: Mr. Hussein and his henchmen are widely viewed as victims, and vastly superior U.S. firepower will be neutralised, not on the battlefield, but in a world of spreading proliferation, weakened multilateral institutions and hollow treaties.

(Concluded)

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