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A very different war

By C. Raja Mohan

NEW DELHI MARCH 10. Power, precision and speed are likely to be the features of the extraordinary military invasion of Iraq being planned by the United States in the next few days. While the last embers of diplomacy to avert the war die down at the United Nations this week, thousands of U.S. troops in and around the Gulf are all coiled up and ready to go.

The political and military nature of this American war against Iraq will be very different from the one the world saw in the first weeks of 1991. The first Gulf war was about liberating Kuwait from the occupation of Iraq. The second Gulf war is aimed at overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein. If the earlier conflict aimed to restore the territorial status quo in the Gulf, the present war seeks to enforce a regime change in Iraq that could set the tone for a long-term political transformation of the entire West Asian region.

The very different political objective that the U.S. has set for itself has made it necessary for a radical overhaul of its military strategy against Iraq. While an enormous force will indeed be used by the Pentagon to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein, the U.S. also needs to win popular support in Iraq. It is of the highest political priority for the U.S. that this war be perceived in Iraq and the rest of the world as a "war of liberation" rather than one of occupation. The military planners in Washington are hoping, without a realistic basis, critics say, that the people of Iraq would welcome the American troops for ending the oppressive rule of Saddam Hussein.

The Pentagon, then, is keen on avoiding excessive targeting of civilian population in this war. Reports from Washington indicate that it is prepared to forego the advantage of tactical surprise on initiating the war.

The U.S. is likely to publicise the date for the launch of air operations and ask the civilian population to leave and potential defectors from the armed forces to abandon their positions. Given its plans to run the country for a few months, if not years, the Pentagon also wants to avoid destruction of the civilian infrastructure.

The air raids which will formally launch the war are expected to be many times more effective than in 1991, thanks to the induction of a wider range of "smart bombs" into the U.S. arsenal over the decade. Nine out of 10 bombs used this time will be precision-guided weapons. The ratio was the opposite in the last war.

The overwhelming use of air power to produce "shock and awe" would be the first instrument of the U.S. military. Given the political objectives, however, Washington would want to narrowly focus the application of air power by emphasising those targets that are crucial for the political and military control of the regime. Carpet-bombing of Iraq rules itself out as an instrument.

Unlike the last time, the war is not likely to unfold in a sequential manner. In 1991, the ground attack followed five weeks of aerial bombing. In the present war, the ground attack is expected to be launched simultaneously with the air campaign. American forces based in Kuwait will launch the invasion from the south and hope to race towards Baghdad. They expect little military resistance. In the north, the U.S. hopes the political problems relating to access in Turkey will be sorted out this week, and it could launch another military thrust from there. Special forces based in Jordan hope to take charge of key locations in western Iraq on the third front.

The American game plan is to surround Baghdad in less than two weeks. A stunningly effective air campaign and rapid mobility of its ground forces hold the key to U.S. success. Surviving the initial air attacks, slowing down the American ground advance, and putting up a defiant stand in Baghdad would be the critical factors for Saddam Hussein.

No war goes according to plans conceived on either side. There are far too many imponderables here, as in any war, which will shape the implementation of the competing military strategies.

The forces of Saddam Hussein are half their size in 1991 and are ill equipped. The U.S. military has become more powerful. But this imbalance alone is unlikely to shape the story of this war.

By delaying the American advance, Saddam Hussein hopes to weaken the international coalition and raise the political costs for George W. Bush. The U.S., on the other hand, needs a swift and decisive victory. The longer it takes the more difficult it might get for Mr. Bush.

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