The Hindu : Divided at the United Nations

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Friday, Mar 14, 2003

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Divided at the United Nations

By Chinmaya R. Gharekhan

Having taken the U.N. route, however reluctantly, President Bush would be well advised to stick to it... He would still achieve his objectives, albeit a little later than he might like.

IT IS ironic that the crisis over Iraq, which provided the first occasion for the five permanent members of the Security Council to work together and demonstrate their unity in the post-Cold War era in 1990, is also responsible for causing deep, open and, at present, unbridgeable split among their ranks. If the British and the Americans keep to their intention of putting their revised draft resolution to vote by March 17, we might witness the fascinating spectacle of two, perhaps three, permanent members vetoing a resolution sponsored by their fellow members in what is the most exclusive club in the world. It would be the first time ever in the new world ``disorder'' that one permanent member would exercise its veto power against another on an issue of the highest importance to the latter. During the Cold War, permanent members routinely used their veto power on issues of importance to their national interests or for their ``special'' friends or allies. Since 1990, vetoes have been used sparingly. The U.S. has invoked it the most often, primarily to bail out Israel. The Chinese have used it on a few occasions when Taiwan came into their calculations. Thus, they vetoed extension of the peacekeeping operation in Haiti because the government of Haiti extended recognition to the Taiwan regime. But the resort to veto by one permanent member against another in modern times would be unprecedented.

On February 24, 2003, the U.S., the U.K. and Spain circulated a draft resolution with practically only one operative paragraph: "Decides that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it by resolution 1441(2002)." A cleverly drafted, deceptively simple text, but extremely potent. If the Council were to adopt such a resolution, it would mean that Iraq would not be given any further ``final'' opportunity, that the work of the weapons inspectors would come to an end and the ``serious consequences'' referred to in 1441 would follow anytime, without the need for any further authorisation from the Council. The sponsors have submitted a revised draft on March 7 in which the operative paragraph, corresponding to the operative para of the original draft, would ask the Council to decide if Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it under 1441 unless the Council concluded, on or before March 17, that Iraq had demonstrated the cooperation demanded of it under 1441. This is the famous ultimatum or what the sponsors would call one more final opportunity to Iraq to avoid war. The revised draft has another strange paragraph calling upon Iraq to take the decisions ``necessary in the interests of its people and the region''.

France, Russia and Germany have made it clear that they will not let such a resolution pass. The French Foreign Minister stated in his intervention in the Council on March 7 that, as a permanent member, France would not allow the passing of a resolution which authorised the automatic use of force. These three countries signed and sent a joint letter to the Security Council on March 5, emphasising the same common position against the draft resolution. In the letter, France and Russia affirmed unambiguously that as permanent members they would assume all their responsibilities on this point.

Incidentally, permanent members never say that they will ``veto'' a resolution. The word ``veto'' does not figure in the U.N. Charter. Article 27 (3) states that decisions on non-procedural questions need an affirmative vote of nine members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. A strict interpretation of this provision would mean that all the P-5 (permanent five) should vote affirmatively for a resolution to be validly adopted. In other words, if one of the P-5 did not vote in favour, the draft would not be adopted. In actual practice, however, abstention by a permanent member is not enough to block a resolution. For a resolution to be rejected, at least one of the P-5 must vote against a draft resolution.

There is one more way in which France, Russia (and Germany) can prevent the resolution from being adopted, and that is by persuading enough number of the non-permanent or elected members not to support the resolution. They do not have to vote against; abstention would do just fine. If France, Russia and Germany can prevail upon at least four more members to abstain, the resolution will fail for want of the minimum required majority of nine. In such a scenario, there would be no need for a veto by any permanent member, an obviously preferable alternative for France and others. This is what France and its partners have been working for, this is what took the French Foreign Minister to Angola, Cameroon and Guinea immediately after the Council meeting on March 7, and this is what made the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, call the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, on the telephone. But this is also precisely what the U.S. President, George W. Bush, and his Foreign Minister would like to avoid. The Americans, it appears, would prefer to see their draft vetoed than fail to attract a minimum of 9 affirmative votes.

It is evident that France and Russia have an understanding between them on double veto; they have safety in each other's company. China may decide to join them, though it is more likely to abstain. The present line-up in the Council is somewhat as follows: in favour of the draft — the U.S., the U.K., Spain and Bulgaria; against or not in favour — France, Germany, Russia, China and Syria. This leaves six members undecided or ``floating'': Pakistan, Angola, Cameroon, Guinea, Chile and Mexico. It is difficult to imagine Mexico not supporting the U.S. The same is true, though only to a lesser extent, of Chile. Pakistan would normally be expected to go along with the Americans. But Gen. Musharraf has genuine domestic opposition to his aligning with the U.S. on this issue. Since he has done a huge favour to Mr. Bush by arresting the top al-Qaeda operative, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, he might perhaps get away with an abstention. However, if Pakistan's would be the ninth vote, it is difficult to imagine it not voting in favour, unless, of course, it were to deliver Osama bin Laden at the same time!

If the above analysis is reasonably accurate, it gives six votes on each side: the U.S., the U.K., Spain, Bulgaria, Chile and Mexico in favour and France, Germany, Russia, China, Syria and Pakistan not if favour. The position of the three African members becomes crucial; can they afford, in economic terms, not to support the Americans?

Since Saddam Hussein will not oblige by stepping down, since the chances of a successful coup against him in the next few days are extremely remote, and since the U.N. weapons inspectors have not been of any use so far from the American perspective, Mr. Bush seems to have no option but to go to war, which no one, perhaps not even himself, wants. How did the Americans manage to get themselves so isolated? They never were able to present a convincing case about the threat that Iraq is supposed to pose to its neighbours, let alone to themselves, or of its link with the al-Qaeda. Then again, they miscalculated the strength of public opinion against war and its ability to influence decision-making, the genuine apprehension felt everywhere about the destabilising effect of a war, the stimulus to fundamentalism and terror that it would certainly provide, as well as their own clout with other countries. Is this a case of a superpower over stretching itself at least in political terms? Having taken the U.N. route, however reluctantly, Mr. Bush would be well advised to stick to it.

As the U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, said in the Hague on March 10, military action outside the Council would not be in conformity with the U.N. Charter. Mr. Bush's prestige would not suffer; it would in fact increase if he were to, even at this stage, remain within the letter and spirit of the Charter. He would still achieve his objectives, albeit a little later than he might like.

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