The Hindu : India and the Iraq war

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Thursday, Mar 27, 2003

Opinion

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India and the Iraq war

By C. Raja Mohan

India's "middle path" in the war between America and Saddam Hussein has helped provide space to defend its long-term interests in Iraq and the Gulf.

INDIA'S COMMITMENT is to the people of Iraq and not to the regime of Saddam Hussein. That is at the heart of the policy of "middle path" that India had crafted to deal with the Gulf crisis that has inevitably transformed into a war. Despite considerable political pressure from the Opposition, the Government has held on to the rather cautious "middle path". This "middle path" in the war between America and Saddam Hussein has helped provide space to defend India's long-term interests in Iraq and the Gulf. It also reflects the new pragmatic strain that has taken root in India's foreign policy. Tempered by realism, India no longer believes rhetoric is a substitute for diplomacy. But as the conflict enters a decisive state, India's challenge is to find ways to end this war quickly and prepare for the post-war situation in Iraq.

As India watched the crisis in the Gulf deepen since last September and it became clear that war was inevitable, it had two clear-cut options. One was to support the Bush administration in this war, as part of building the "natural alliance" with the United States and claiming a long-term strategic role in its own extended neighbourhood. The realist case for such an approach might have had its merits. Extending political and military support to Washington at a time when it was badly isolated, it was argued by some, might have generated many positive spin-offs for India.

But it was too bold for the political leadership to stomach, for it departed so radically from the traditional impulses that guided Indian thinking about the world. If the United Nations Security Council had put its stamp of approval over American invasion of Iraq, India might have offered operational support to the U.S. With the deep divisions in the UNSC, it became impossible for New Delhi to adopt such a course. The popular sentiment against this war in India, as elsewhere in the world, made it untenable to be seen as siding with Washington in this war, despite projections by realists of a major strategic opportunity for India in the Gulf.

At the other end, there was strong pressure to join the ranks of France, Germany, Russia and China against the American war in Iraq. Such a course would have pleased the Opposition and taken the political heat off the Government. But India has resisted this temptation. The lessons from the first Gulf War during 1990-91, following the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein were instructive and nudged the Indian policy in a pragmatic direction.

Just like now, the Opposition then was demanding that India oppose the American effort to liberate Kuwait. Recall that the American war against Iraq last time had the full U.N. sanction. Those opposing the war now on the ground that it has no international legitimacy had rejected it last time when it was backed by the U.N. Desperate to get its own people out of the war zone in Kuwait, India could not bring itself to condemning Saddam Hussein's occupation of a fellow non-aligned nation. Coming under U.N. pressure, India withdrew its operational support to the American war just a couple of days before it ended. India ended up on the losing side of the war, alienated Kuwait and other Gulf Arabs, and gained nothing from supporting Saddam Hussein.

India's "middle path", prudent as it was, has run its course. The safe positions it had constructed on a number of platitudes are no longer relevant. With war having broken out, many of them serve no diplomatic purpose, except for posturing at home and fobbing off the domestic political opposition. The time has come for India to deal purposefully with the dynamic war situation and its potential aftermath in Iraq. The Government must appoint a high-level special envoy who can engage the many external actors involved in shaping the outcome of this war and craft a role for India in the post-war arrangements in the Gulf.

As Operation Iraqi Freedom enters the second week, there is some room for intra-war diplomacy. As the U.S. forces begin to mount a massive military squeeze on Baghdad, dangerous battles loom ahead for the Iraqi capital. Before the U.S. troops make a forcible entry into Baghdad, there will be some political effort to avoid such an outcome. Saudi Arabia says it has some ideas on ending the war. Although the Bush administration has rejected any compromise less than the ouster of Saddam Hussein, it has not rejected all diplomatic efforts. Given its deep concern for the Iraqi people, India must lend its weight in averting a bloody takeover of Baghdad.

This cannot be done by empty statements from the non-aligned movement and the UNSC. India has no interest in legitimising a political intervention by the UNSC on issues of war and peace. That could be a ghost that will come back to haunt India in Kashmir. India should have no objections to a U.N. role in delivering humanitarian assistance, but it would be self-defeating to support any political move that seeks active U.N. political intervention in Iraq.

Instead of paying heed to the rhetorical statements from the Arab League which are not followed by its own members, Indian diplomacy must focus on working closely with the Gulf Arab neighbours of Iraq, who have lent support to U.S. military operations but do not wish to see a brutal showdown between America and Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. India and its putative special envoy must stay in close touch with the Arab states bordering Iraq, which have the highest stake in bringing this war to a quick conclusion. He also needs to stay in touch with Turkey and Iran, the two non-Arab neighbours of Iraq who can shape the outcome of this war and are keys to future stability in Iraq.

As a humanitarian crisis begins to unfold in Iraq, the coalition forces have already mobilised considerable resources to be distributed in areas coming under their control. A large number of international and non-governmental organisations are already poised to deliver assistance. There have been no formal commitments from India on any serious plans to quickly move medical and other assistance required for the Iraqi people. Unveiling a substantive plan for providing relief and working out the organisational and logistical details must be an immediate priority for the Government.

Even more important for India is to begin to think about post-war political arrangements in Iraq. The most important objective for India is to work with other countries in preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq. India would also like to see that all the aspirations of different communities in Iraq are protected within the framework of a single state centred in Baghdad. India also has a stake in seeing that the secular character of Iraq is preserved. Pursuing these objectives requires Indian diplomatic contact with various Iraqi groups and political formations within and outside the country. These include the various Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, the Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella organisation based in London, the Iraqi Shia leaders based in Teheran, besides many Sunni leaders associated with the regime in the past and present. The mechanism of a special envoy is the key to bringing the different imperatives of Indian diplomacy together at this stage.

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