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An Indo-Pak. ceasefire?

By C. Raja Mohan

NEW DELHI MARCH 30. Last week, at one of his daily briefings, the ever-certain Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Defence Secretary, declared that there was no question of Washington accepting a ceasefire against Iraq amidst the on-going "Operation Iraqi Freedom".

Mr. Rumsfeld's assertion that the U.S. will fight the war against Saddam Hussein to the finish came amidst a feeble attempt by the United Nations to demand an early end to hostilities in Iraq.

The next day, on the margins of the summit meeting between the U.S. President, George W. Bush, and the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, their top diplomats, Colin Powell and Jack Straw, called on India and Pakistan to consider an early ceasefire on the Line of Control in Kashmir.

Putting aside the question of double standards for a moment, there is no question of underestimating the diplomatic significance of the joint statement issued by Gen. Powell and Mr. Straw on Kashmir and India-Pakistan relations.

For one, it had the full weight of Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair behind it. To reinforce its importance, American and British envoys personally handed over a copy of the statement to the two Governments in New Delhi and Islamabad last Friday.

The U.S. and U.K. know that as infiltration levels rise during summer in Kashmir, renewed terrorism and an India-Pakistan confrontation might be inevitable. They are aware of the growing pressures on New Delhi to launch attacks across the LoC following a major terrorist incident.

It is not clear if the Anglo-American initiative is aimed at merely avoiding a military crisis in the subcontinent during the Iraq war or a more serious effort to revive Indo-Pak engagement.

***

Not surprisingly, both India and Pakistan welcomed the parts of the Anglo-American statement that suited them. New Delhi liked and Islamabad protested the demands on Pakistan to "fulfil its commitments to stop infiltration" across the LoC.

New Delhi was also pleased and Pakistan miffed at that part of the statement that wanted Islamabad to "do its utmost to discourage any acts of violence by militants in Kashmir".

Pakistan was more enthusiastic and India less so about the Anglo-American call for a renewed engagement between New Delhi and Islamabad and the offer to help the two countries start a peace process.

Both India and Pakistan were more circumspect in their response to the operative element of the statement from Washington and London — an immediate ceasefire. India has neither rejected nor endorsed the call, and Pakistan's response is not clear.

***

Although this is the first time that the U.S. and the U.K. have publicly called for an India-Pakistan ceasefire in Kashmir, the idea is not new. It has been floating around for a while on the diplomatic circuit and Track Two seminars.

Washington had, in fact, brokered an unannounced ceasefire between India and Pakistan in the summer of 2000 following the visit to India by President Bill Clinton. Routine shelling across the LoC had also come down sharply after the Ramzan peace initiative in Kashmir announced by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in late 2000.

Many in the West and the subcontinent see the ceasefire as a potential first step towards a renewed engagement between New Delhi and Islamabad. But the problem for New Delhi is the sharp decline Anglo-American credibility since last summer.

It was on the basis of strong assurances from Washington and London that Pakistan had agreed to end cross-border infiltration on a permanent basis that India had agreed to stand down in the military confrontation last summer.

Although India appreciated the good faith and effort put in by Washington and London, it also came to the inescapable conclusion that Anglo-Americans are not in a position to deliver Gen. Musharraf on ending cross-border terrorism.

Unless evidence from the ground on cross-border terrorism alters that firm conclusion in New Delhi over the next few weeks, the latest Anglo-American initiative for reviving India-Pakistan dialogue will not fly. If the Anglo-American powers do deliver Gen. Musharraf on an immediate sharp decline in cross-border terrorism and free trade within the South Asian framework, it should not be difficult to visualise a peace process.

The problem lies in sequencing the process. India wants the first steps to focus on ending terrorism and launching trade cooperation. For Pakistan, they come last. The Anglo-Americans fudge it by underlining simultaneous movement on all issues.

***

As the Iraq war unfolds, the global defence industry and major military establishments are monitoring the performance of various American weapons systems. India will be keen to get an assessment of effectiveness of the Patriot missiles being used by the Pentagon to defend Kuwait and Israel from Iraqi Scud missiles.

New Delhi has a strong interest in defensive systems to neutralise Pakistan's missile quiver. India is talking to Israel about acquiring the Arrow system and associated radars which have been deployed in this war. India is also considering similar systems from Russia and is believed to have shown preliminary interest in the American Patriot.

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