The Hindu : A balancing exercise

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, Apr 14, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - News Analysis

A balancing exercise

K.K. Katyal

NEW DELHI APRIL 13. It was one of those rare occasions when foreign policy issues fed a raging domestic controversy. The Government and the Opposition differed sharply on the response to the Iraqi crisis at the various stages, beginning from the period of intense diplomatic activity to prevent recourse to military action, to the time of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The sharpness of the divergence was reflected in the acrimony in the parliamentary proceedings. Finally the two Houses adopted identical resolutions which, irrespective of the actual words used, were critical of the military operations, called for end of hostilities and return of ``coalition'' forces.

The opposition parties won a point in that they were able to get the Government to agree to a resolution, which it had earlier resisted. On the other hand, the official side claimed it had substantially stuck to its policy of caution. This was so, it was claimed, even though muted sentiments gave place to forthright expressions and the ``middle path'' was given up after it lost its relevance because of the military action.

The resolution was a balancing exercise, a way out of the conflicting compulsions, between the Government's belief that the national interest would be best served by quiet diplomacy rather than rhetorical outbursts, and the Opposition pressure for an unequivocal stand against the U.S. adventurism — between ``pragmatism'' and principled approach. Essentially a compromise, it served to diffuse the controversy, though did not put an end to it fully.

The Government defended its stand by citing parallels from the past when the Congress Governments chose not to take a public stand against the erstwhile Soviet Union's action in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan and the United Front Government equivocation on the Gulf war in 1990-91 (even though the U.S.-led attack had the blessings of the U.N.). It, no doubt, has a point but the BJP or its earlier avatar, the Jan Sangh, along with the now defunct Swatantra Party, was in the forefront of the protest against the stand of the governments of the day.

In its efforts to evolve a compromise in Parliament now, the Government took the unusual step of commending the Hindi version of the resolution. The ambiguity about the interpretation of a key phrase, ``ninda'', provided a way out of the differences between the Opposition which sought to ``condemn'' the military action and the Government which wanted merely to ``deplore'' it.

The compromise helped the Government to guard against adverse diplomatic repercussions. The opponents of the war were satisfied with the tone of the formulation on military action. The Imam of Delhi Jama Masjid, for instance, noted that the Government was more forthright than even those of some of the Muslim countries. On the other side, a senior British diplomat said, in a representative comment: ``The Government faced tremendous pressure. It was able to resist it. The end of the war does not mean the end of testing time for Indian diplomacy. True, India is a minor player but the stand it takes may set the tone for the position of a good number of developing countries and thus, help build international opinion against continued unilateralism by the U.S.''

The resolution favoured the idea of the U.N. supervising the reconstruction of Iraq. This would be the second of the three stages, through which the post-Saddam Iraq would pass, the first being the ``security phase'' and the last being the final shape and structure of a new government. In the first phase, the forces on the ground will have the prime responsibility for the administration. That is the immediate task and the world community would need to prevail on the U.S., to the extent it is possible, not to prolong it. Soon, an interim set-up will have to be put in place. The hardliners in the Bush administration want the U.S. (and the U.K.) to undertake this task to the exclusion of others, because ``we made sacrifices in money and blood''. The U.N. has no role, according to them. Others were prepared to give ``secondary'' role to the world body. That was also the stand of the U.S. President, George Bush, though at the Belfast summit, under British pressure, he was agreeable to a ``rival'' role. But the rhetorical formulation on the subject was not spelt out in concrete terms. Three major European powers — France, Germany and Russia — at the recent summit at St. Petersburg, called for a ``central'' role for the U.N. Technically, the U.N. continues to be in the picture because under the sanctions regime, oil sales are to be made and the mode of spending to be determined by it.

In the interim period, there is the danger of the U.S. taking irrevocable steps, while exercising its unilateral authority. New York Times cited an instance — ``with tens of billions of dollars at stake, there are likely to be heavy pressures from interested parties to lock up lucrative long-range contracts during the period of American occupation''. To guard against this and other problems — like the control by the occupation powers of the interim set-up, the centrality of the U.N. is important. New Delhi's task is cut out — it has to back the efforts to achieve this objective.

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