The Hindu : Settling Kashmir

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Thursday, May 01, 2003

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Settling Kashmir

By Chinmaya R.Gharekhan

Stable peace will not be possible without a settlement of the problem with Pakistan. It is equally obvious that the problem will not be solved exclusively through bilateral means.

THE PRIME Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, has spoken once again about Kashmir. Even if he has not repeated the thoughts he aired in his Kumarakom Musings more than two years ago, his remarks ought to be taken serious note of. They are in the rest of the world, including Pakistan. Even if his observations were dictated by tactical considerations, coming as they did a few days before the visit to the Subcontinent of the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, the visit of the National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra, to Washington as well as his own visit to Europe, it does not take away from their significance.

It is generally recognised that Kashmir has to be dealt with on two tracks, internal involving issues of law and order, good governance, etc., and external involving Pakistan. By now, however, it ought to be clear that the domestic situation in Jammu and Kashmir, in terms of the violence which is no longer confined to the Valley, will not be effectively resolved until and unless the external aspect involving Pakistan is tackled first. Talks at various levels with different sections of Kashmiris are perhaps essential for political and other reasons. Ceasefires of varying durations have been tried in the past, but with disappointing results. The reason is simple and obvious: Pakistan will simply not let the State live in peace, periodic conciliatory statements to the contrary notwithstanding. Stable peace will not be possible without a settlement of the problem with Pakistan.

It is equally obvious that the problem will not be solved exclusively through bilateral means. For bilateral negotiations even to be agreed upon and begun, help in the form of good offices or facilitation from a third party will be needed, unless one of the parties can impose peace on its terms — an improbable scenario. Given the emotional and almost existential importance of the issue for both sides, neither can take any initiative for meaningful talks, since the very concept of negotiations involves the principle of `give', and hence would be interpreted as a sign of weakness by the other side. After realising the hopelessness of obtaining justice in the U.N., Jawaharlal Nehru did try, repeatedly, to settle the problem directly with his Pakistani counterpart, as well as through the good (or not so good) offices of third parties.

The most intense involvement of third parties in the search for a solution of the Kashmir problem took place in 1962-63, following the Chinese aggression on India in October 1962. The Americans and the British were quite open about applying pressure on India and Pakistan. They told India that their capacity to help build its armed forces to face China would be directly related to New Delhi's willingness to settle the Kashmir problem. With Pakistan, their line was that they had to help democratic India against communist China, but that the quantum of military assistance to India could be less if Pakistan showed readiness to move on the Kashmir issue. Pakistan was further told that it was perhaps the best opportunity for it to obtain maximum concessions from India.

During the six rounds of ministerial talks that took place between December 1962 and May 1963, the U.S. and the U.K. broadly confined their role to prodding the two sides not to break off the talks and to be forthcoming into suggesting concrete proposals, such as maps, etc. Once they realised that the talks were not going anywhere, they decided to be more proactive. Early in April 1963, after considerable internal discussions, they agreed on " Elements of a settlement" as follows:

" It is proposed that the following points, which are designed to encourage the parties to concentrate on the immediate questions at issue, should be put to the parties by Ambassador and by Elmore Jackson after the latter's arrival on the subcontinent. The British, through their High Commissioners, will concert, as appropriate, in the presentation and the subsequent discussion.

1.Neither India nor Pakistan can entirely give up its claim to the Kashmir valley. Each must have a substantial position in the Vale.

2.India and Pakistan must both have assured access to and through the Vale for the defense of their positions to the north and east. These defense arrangements must be such as not to impede a disengagement of Indian and Pakistani forces.

3.Outside the Valley, the economic and strategic interests of the two countries should be recognized, e.g., India's position in Ladakh and Pakistan's interest in the development of water storage facilities on the Chenab.

4.The position of the two countries in the Valley must be such as to permit:(a) clearly defined arrangements for sovereignty and for the maintenance of law and order. (b) political freedom and some measure of local self-rule for the inhabitants. (c) free movement of the people of the Valley throughout the Vale, and their relatively free movement to other parts of Kashmir and to India and Pakistan. (d) the rapid development by India and Pakistan of tourism in the Kashmir area — with the important foreign exchange potential for both countries.(e) the effective use in Kashmir of development funds, available from external sources, for such purposes as improving water and forestry resources, the development of communications and small industries, and improving the health and welfare of the people."

As it happened, the Elements were handed over to Pakistan ten days before India. India came to the understandable conclusion that they were the product of U.S.-Pakistan collusion. Later, the idea of mediation was pursued with some vigour by the U.S. Secretary Rusk said in a telegram he sent to Washington from Delhi on May 4, 1963, that Nehru's reaction was quite positive. In fact, the idea seemed to have originated with Nehru who, however, felt that if India proposed it, Pakistan would turn it down. President Radhakrishnan mentioned the mediation idea to Rusk and even suggested the name of a possible mediator — Ellsworth Bunker. However, nothing came out of this initiative.

This sketchy narration of the 1963 negotiations — the only serious ones so far — brings out a few points: (a) Nehru was extremely keen to settle the Kashmir question and was willing to be flexible in his approach. (However, Nehru was not about to agree to just any deal. Rusk noted on his return to Washington that he was not sanguine about Kashmir settlement while Nehru was Prime Minister.) (b) Since neither country is in a position to impose a solution on the other — more so now than ever before — third party help is needed in some form. (c) Any solution will have to be built around making the LoC into a more permanent line of separation. (d) The LoC will have to be adjusted, however slightly, in Pakistan's favour.

Indian public opinion today recognises the need to solve the problem along the LoC. The main opposition party has pledged support to Mr. Vajpayee's views on Kashmir. In Pakistan, the sentiment for a practical solution seems to be growing among some sections of academia, but the army sees a threat to its monopoly on power in any solution. The U.S. today would appear to be better placed than in 1963 to try its hand at facilitation. It has the necessary leverage, political will and desire to do something.

If India is internally strong and united, which it certainly is on this crucial issue, we have nothing to fear from a friendly help. We would have to be extremely vigilant, of course. Any effort in this direction would have to be discrete and confidential and will have to work towards a package of solutions including economic and political issues, such as control over head waters, no-war pact, etc., to make it palatable to the two countries. As Nehru wrote to John F. Kennedy on April 24, 1963: " Intervention by third powers, if quiet, unobtrusive and objective, might have been helpful, but public and semi-public efforts at pressure had only worsened the situation."

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