The Hindu : Technology development, credibility and economics

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, May 05, 2003

Business

Business

Technology development, credibility and economics

WITH THE Prime Minister christening the light combat aircraft `Tejas' yesterday, it is time to ask where India's premier aeronautical initiative, the LCA programme, is headed. Both the `technology demonstrators,' TD 1 and 2, flew in formation at the gala extravaganza. Does that really signify anything?

In response, one must critically examine what has been accomplished so far. The most important target of the technology demonstration phase was to successfully trial the composite airframe, the `glass' cockpit, and the fly-by-wire (FBW) system with a rigorous flight test programme using GE 404 engines imported from the U.S.

Modern aerodynamic design with static instability (controlled by a digital flight control system), a full glass cockpit, full authority digital engine control (FADEC), and up-to-date weapons systems, including beyond visual range air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, suggest that the LCA will be comparable in performance to the latest versions of the American F-16 or the French Mirage 2000. Small size and the extensive use of composites also make this agile aircraft much stealthier than its formidable competitors, without having to resort to the aerodynamically inefficient compromises of, for example, the American F-117 `stealth' fighter.

The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) recognised right at the beginning that the LCA programme was predicated on five critical technologies: the carbon composite wing, the flight control system, a glass cockpit, a high performance multimode radar, and the propulsion system. Looking back, development of advanced carbon composites has been highly successful, with the specialised software having even been sold to Airbus Industrie, and the critical flight control system has been developed in spite of Lockheed Martin withdrawing its assistance in the wake of the Pokhran blasts of 1998.

On the other hand, development of the Kaveri engine has fallen behind, but engine development is always slow and unpredictable. Even Snecma of France, with half a century of successful jet engine development experience, took nearly 13 years to bring the Rafale fighter's engine, the M 88, to low volume production after bench testing had begun.

The decision to adopt a digital FBW system added considerably to the development process time — only partly (perhaps by about 18 months) accounted for by the curtailment of Lockheed Martin's critical assistance. To cry over spilt milk is to lament that if only we had accepted Dassault's offer of an analogue system in 1988, the flight test programme could easily have been completed by now. On the other hand, the LCA's quadruplex (four channel) digital FBW system is what the world's most advanced aircraft currently use and an analogue system may already have been a prime target for replacement. The American F-16 fighter, by way of analogy, replaced analogue with digital controls while morphing from its original A/B form to the much more capable F-16 C/D in the 1990s.

This long delay has not been wasted, however, because it has allowed the parallel development and indigenisation of hundreds of the little known systems and components that are an essential part of all aircraft. One such is the beautifully designed auxiliary gearbox developed by the combat vehicles research and development establishment (CVRDE), Avadi, which is nearly 60 per cent cheaper than an imported one.

The learning process has also allowed Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) to considerably shorten the development time of the intermediate jet trainer (IJT) and to make common use of nearly 50 per cent of the LCA's line replaceable units (systems that are replaced as a part of normal field maintenance). More importantly, India's capability in indigenous aircraft development is at last close to being vindicated a quarter century after the late Raj Mahindra's brilliant and wide ranging design initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s. His last effort, the `Saras' light transport prototype from the National Aerospace Laboratory, `rolled out' in February and will take to the air later this year.

Changes to TD 1's flight control system's software, to the `full-up' standard, and the associated modifications to some of the aircraft's control surfaces, have already allowed it to make turns at a rate of over 3G, three times the acceleration due to gravity, and it rapidly continues to expand its `flight envelope' going supersonic in about a month. TD 1 has added ten sorties this year to the dozen it flew in 2001 and now joins TD 2 in an extensive flight test programme to `prove' the aircraft and its various systems. With over 70 flights so far, the two aircraft are well on their way to establishing the credibility not only of the critical technologies that have gone into the LCA's design but of the programme itself.

If all this background seems unnecessary, it is relevant in the context of charges and counter-charges that have often been made of the whole programme. There is no doubt that the LCA's programme managers took on the ambitious task of developing an advanced aircraft without realistically estimating the resources required to accomplish their goals in the face of an often sceptical Indian Air Force and a not always fully committed HAL. They then lost a great deal of credibility by projecting completion dates that were downright unrealistic and misleading to the extent of making a presentation at the US Department of Defense in 1985 claiming that the LCA would be flying in 1990! India's financial crises of the early 1990s and the post-Pokhran embargo only added to their woes.

The end result of their struggle is, however, an aircraft that the IAF now knows (thanks to a recent increase in `transparency') will soon be a superb multirole fighter. In the same vein, ADA and HAL are now the `best of chums' and are working closely together with the latter already installing some of the production facilities needed to manufacture the eight `production standard' LCAs ordered last year.

Some of those critical of the LCA do not seem to realise that affordability is something that even the United States has learnt to accept as shown by awarding the formal contract to Lockheed Martin in 2001 to develop the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The JSF is in some ways less capable than the US Air Force F-22 or the US Navy F/A-18 E/F, but its affordability makes it essential to both services. Incidentally, Lockheed has publicly acknowledged that its design was `vetted' by Yakovlev, the Russian design bureau, before the winning prototype was finalised. That the losing finalist, Boeing, chose not to do so tells its own story and gives the lie to those in India who think that the former Soviet Union, and Russia in particular, only has obsolete technology on offer.

Estimates last year put the LCA's cost at about Rs. 100 crores per aircraft. One needs to compare this with an aircraft of similar capability like the multirole Mirage 2000-5, which Taiwan bought paying French Francs 333 million apiece in the mid 1990s. At current exchange rates, that amounts to Rs. 260 crores with inflation easily taking that up to over Rs. 300 crores today. (The latest Mirage 2000-9s that Abu Dhabi is currently receiving cost even more — over $80 million apiece, excluding weapons.) In other words, unless Indian inflation rates rise to three times those of France (they are currently about the same), the LCA would be one third the price, or at least Rs. 200 crores cheaper, when it enters service. No mean achievement that.

Even if the IAF orders only 250 aircraft, although it needs many more of the class, the nation will save at least Rs. 125,000 crores over their lifetime (when calculated by the net present value method). That represents an annual saving in interest costs alone of Rs. 10,000 crores, if the government borrows the money required at 8 per cent.

The IAF will be doing itself a big favour if it places an initial order for 50 LCAs (about two squadrons plus spares) soon — very similar to what Sweden did even after two Gripen (its LCA) prototypes crashed (the first on its fifth sortie) during their flight test programme. That would be the best way to ensure that India quickly develops the air defence capability that it has badly wanted for at least four decades.

Some systems will have to be imported, at least initially, from secure sources, but great efforts urgently need to be made to ensure that the development of all indigenous devices and systems and production facilities needed for the aircraft is put on a war footing. This will not happen unless and until realistic estimates for the various activities involved are made, and stuck to thereafter, by committing adequate physical, financial and, not least, human resources to the programme.

Past experience does not suggest, unfortunately, that that will happen unless the Union Cabinet gives immediate political direction to that effect. The nation's financial health and a sustainable air defence capability demand that nothing less is acceptable.

Last word

The Air Chief's recent decision to retire the two plus squadrons of ground attack MiG-23s that are still operational, along with the oldest versions of the MiG-21, opens up a hole in the Air Force's capability that needs to be plugged quickly if the `order of battle' is to be preserved, if not improved. The best way of doing that is to immediately purchase the dozen Mirage 2000-5s that Qatar has offered us at second-hand prices and to order twenty more directly from Dassault of France. Although expensive (at about Rs. 300 crores apiece), the IAF is very happy with the performance of the two-and-a-half squadrons it already has and extensive support and maintenance facilities have already been established in the country.

These very capable aircraft should be the latest 2000 - 5s rather than the original 2000 H / THs, 49 of which we got in the 1980s and ten more of the same type that were ordered two years ago. We ought to use the size of this large new order to ensure that these ten, due for delivery in 2003 and 2004, are at least fitted with the RDY radar, standard on the 2000-5. There is no reason why we cannot follow the Greek Air Force strategy in this regard when they placed a much smaller reorder for the type.

C. Manmohan Reddy

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