The Hindu : Reality check on J&K

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Saturday, May 17, 2003

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Reality check on J&K

By V.R. Raghavan

The U.S. will not countenance a military conflict between the two South Asian nuclear adversaries. It is unwilling to do more than counsel restraint on the Jammu and Kashmir issue.

IT IS amazing what responses are evoked by the visit of a senior U.S. official to India and Pakistan. The hand of friendship is extended, reciprocated and high-powered signalling of peaceful intentions are undertaken. Restoration of High Commissioners and recommencement of air flights between the two countries are also hastened. One must, however ask, despite the hype generated by the visit, what has Richard Armitage's trip obtained for India and Pakistan, for prospects of peace between them, or even for the U.S. fresh from its resounding military success in Iraq.

It is useful to posit the Armitage visit in the context taking shape over the last year. In India, the BJP learnt its lessons from the military confrontation for over ten months. The reality of a flawed attempt at coercion through deployment for war could not be denied. It has judged to a nicety the limits of what the U.S. can or is willing to do, to force Islamabad away from its jehadi-driven Jammu and Kashmir agenda. The BJP is facing down the barrel of the general election in 2004, to be preceded by elections to some States. It recognises the need to retain its image of being tough on Pakistan. The BJP's cadres are insisting that any concessions to Pakistan now will involve serious costs in political economy. The Government's stand of `no talks without an end to terrorism' is a product of its political compulsions.

The dramatic change in Srinagar, with the Mufti Government providing a welcome contrast to the previous regime, is not without its advantages for the BJP-led Government. The shift from the security dominant rule earlier to the current emphasis on governance has begun to make a difference, as much in Jammu and Kashmir as in foreign capitals. New Delhi's burden of having to reiterate the legitimacy of the Srinagar Government has been removed by the installation of the Mufti Ministry. As consequence, the Hurriyat's claim to being the voice of the Kashmiris has been dented. New Delhi is now in a better position than any Government in a decade and half to speak for Kashmiris. All this notwithstanding, incidents such as Nadimarg demonstrate Indian vulnerabilities and the challenges faced by the Mufti Government.

As for Pakistan, it has shown within days of the Armitage trip its inability to `give' anything on Jammu and Kashmir. The political price for Pervez Musharraf on making any concessions on the issue is even more than for the BJP. Indeed, it would not be wrong to say that he has paid the price already, for his cooperation with the U.S. in operations against the Taliban-Al Qaeda fugitives in Pakistan. The price is in the form of a deal wherein he is allowed to help the U.S. military operations, in return for his permitting a free hand to those operating the Jammu and Kashmir masterplan.

Even as he made his dramatic gestures and offers from Srinagar, Mr.Vajpayee gave nothing away on his party's strategy of no dialogue and no concessions until the next national elections. The ending of terrorism caveat — and it has many a meaning — remained the essential demand. As for appointing High Commissioners and restarting flights, the measures were overdue in any case. New Delhi may have found it easier to do so before rather than after Mr. Armitage's visit, and make it look like proactive initiatives.

It is interesting that the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, felt it necessary to state that after the Iraq campaign the U.S. would pay greater attention to India-Pakistan affairs. That combined with the Armitage trip brought about a flurry of actions and statements in New Delhi and Islamabad. Neither could afford to take substantive steps but neither was willing to be seen as being unresponsive to U.S. exhortations on engagement. Both therefore made a virtue of doing what was either long outstanding, or, packaged small and oft repeated measures as substantive offers. Islamabad was pleased to offer composite dialogue including on Jammu and Kashmir, and New Delhi lost nothing by offering to send an official to start such talks within a day of cross border terrorism ending. The need for being responsive even saw the novel phenomena of competitive confidence-building measures (CBMs). Each side was willing to join the chorus of ever more CBMs. That existing CBMs have neither enhanced confidence nor kept peace did little to reduce the theatre of CBM one-upmanship.

Why did the U.S. undertake this exercise at this time and in this manner? Did it obtain some advantage or solace from the ever ready to please adversaries of South Asia, who are also unwilling to get down to the business of peace making. The answer to these questions lie in the understanding in Washington of the conflict potential that smoulders between the two feuding capitals. The bottom line for the U.S. in South Asia is clear if it had not been earlier. The U.S. will not countenance a military conflict between the two South Asian nuclear adversaries. It is unwilling to do more than counsel restraint on the Jammu and Kashmir issue. Mr. Armitage's carefully chosen words on mediation, facilitation, peace-brokering and message-carrying indicate a change in its position on Kashmir. It no longer wishes to be part of the Kashmir conundrum about who is right and which side is to be backed. That is the import of the phrase, " it is up to India to determine if infiltration has come down". What it implies is that the U.S. has already determined that Gen. Musharraf has done as much he can about the matter. It also means that given its need for the General, the U.S. is unwilling to ask him to do more. The onus is therefore on New Delhi to find ways to engage the General, or, face the fact of the U.S. not being able to do more on the issue.

Mr. Armitage has made the U.S. position clear to both sides. He has praised Mr. Vajpayee's statesmanlike offers, but wants him to decide on infiltration instead of asking the U.S. to do more on it. He has endorsed Gen. Musharraf's offer to dismantle terrorist camps tomorrow, if they are found. This clearly means the General rather than New Delhi is to be believed on terrorist camps existing in Pakistan. In the interim, neither India nor Pakistan should treat lightly U.S. opposition to a military conflict between the two sides. There is too much at stake for the U.S. in the Middle East and in East Asia for it handle another conflict between the nuclear adversaries of South Asia. It is obvious that neither India nor Pakistan is willing or in a position to undertake a substantive set of initiatives towards resolving the Jammu and Kashmir issue. This raises the question of what the two states can do to make a start. The time is right for both sides to determine whether they prefer a package of elusive solutions, or invest in establishing a process which can work towards solutions. Such a process can only be predicated on their willingness to free it from incidents, killings, and mujahideen offensives. It would be unrealistic to expect all violence to stop before the process commences. Equally, it would be unproductive to make the process hostage to violence which will erupt from time to time.

The painstaking structuring of a process built on discussions, position papers, narrowing of options, examination of viable action plans would help both Pakistan and India. Pakistan can engage in the process even as it works to control and eliminate the terrorist outfits. It can join the process without having to pay the price in peace with India, for cooperating with the U.S. in military operations against Taliban-Al Qaeda fugitives. India can work the process even as it continues with anti-militant operations in Jammu and Kashmir. The process will also gain from the Mufti Government's new emphasis on governance instead of exclusively on security operations. Such a process will build a constituency for peace between the two countries and allow greater political flexibility to their Governments in taking bolder initiatives.

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