The Hindu : Stalemate in Afghanistan

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Saturday, May 31, 2003

Opinion

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Stalemate in Afghanistan

By T. Sreedhar

The U.S.-led war against terrorism is suddenly confronted with stumbling blocks. The expected support from the Islamic world to the war is not total and complete.

THE GLOBAL war on terrorism led by the U.S. completed 18 months on May 7. Still, the leaders of the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda, as also their family members, are eluding the U.S. dragnet. The combing operations by more than 10,000 Pakistanis and American troops have only resulted in apprehending some junior cadres of the two outfits. According to Indian intelligence assessments, the "big fish" (Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar and Ayaman Zawahiri) who escaped the U.S. bombing of southern Afghanistan in the last week of November 2001, seem to have found safe havens in and around the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Before examining the issue, three factors need to be taken into consideration. The initial U.S. strategy of tracking down the leadership of the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda was focussed on extensive aerial bombing of every suspected area. Pakistani intelligence provided the main input in identifying these hideouts. This failed to produce the desired results. At the ground level, Pakistani intelligence operatives refused to obey the orders from Islamabad. There were reports that field intelligence staff used to forewarn the villagers in the tribal areas adjacent to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border about the impending air attacks. This allowed the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda men to move out to safer places.

At another level, the indiscriminate American aerial bombings proved counter-productive. The local population turned hostile to the U.S. Realising the futility of its initial approach, which continued till April-May 2002, the U.S. brought about a qualitative change in its strategy. It divided the entire terrorist network into three components — Pakistan, Taliban and the Al-Qaeda. Washington was able to force the Pakistani rulers to give up their support to the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda through persuasion, threats and financial incentives. This did bring in the Islamabad ruling elite's support to the U.S.' war on terrorism. Here again, two things were ignored by the U.S. — that a large number of ex-Pakistani army personnel joined the ranks of the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda; and that their links with their juniors in service could not be underestimated. The best example of this is the manner in which Maj. Gen. Hamid Gul, once of the Inter-Services Intelligence, turned into a Taliban-Al-Qaeda ideologue. Then there were a whole lot of those who participated in nurturing the `jehadi' culture in and around Pakistan.

After isolating the higher echelons of the Pakistani state machinery, the U.S. tried to divide the ranks of the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda. Here, the traditional chequebook diplomacy was used along with some dose of coercion. Since the Taliban was perceived as a Pashtoon movement, the Pashtoons on both sides of the Durand Line (Pak.-Afghan border) were offered extensive financial incentives. Going by media reports, this move resulted in the decline of American clout among the Pashtoons. Their initial enthusiasm to cooperate with the U.S. came down with the passage of time largely due to the feeling that Washington was making tall promises, which were not likely to be fulfilled. They started citing how the U.S. fulfilled very few of its promises made to the Karzai Government in Kabul.

Besides, the U.S.' cozying up to the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, made many Pashtoons uneasy. Gen. Musharraf's Government is seen by the Pashtoons as one that betrayed their cause by changing sides, in spite of possessing nuclear weapons. The U.S. war-planners on terrorism also misread tribal loyalties. Mullah Omar, the Taliban chief, is a Gilzail Pashtoon, who traditionally remained second in command to the Durani Pashtoons. For the first time, after the Taliban came to power, a Gilzail Pashtoon ruled Afghanistan. The matrimonial relationship between the families of Mullah Omar and Osama makes the protection of Osama a responsibility of the entire Gilzail Pashtoon tribe, cutting across the Pashtoon belt — until and unless there is a blood feud, the Duranis and the Gilzai Pashtoons do not cross each others' paths.

Last, the U.S. did not understand the complex nature of the networking of the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda across the globe, and in Pakistan in particular. It thought that after the demolition of the infrastructure in Afghanistan, the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda would be crippled; and could be tracked down over a period of time. The Al-Qaeda cadres, as can be seen from the September 11 attacks, are well educated and committed to their leader and their cause. The way the Al-Qaeda operatives have been captured from different cities of Pakistan also shows that they are not just hiding in the Hindukush mountains. They are living in important towns and cities and they have sympathisers and supporters across the Islamic world.

In these circumstances, where can the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda leadership hide safely and direct their operations? The long American search for them along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border shows that the possibility of their being stationed in one place is highly unlikely. And that they are on the move continuously. There have been reports of the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda running mobile training camps to keep their cadres fit. There is another theory that the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda moved out of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in November 2001 and went to Yemen with the help of the underworld in Pakistan and Dubai. And that they came back in the middle of last year to relaunch their campaign. The series of bombings in Riyadh, Karachi and Casablanca from May 12 onwards shows they are back in business. The U.S. war in Iraq lent sufficient credence to the Al-Qaeda and its Islamic front for the propaganda war against the U.S. and Israel. All this means that the U.S.-led war against terrorism is suddenly confronted with stumbling blocks. The expected support from the Islamic world to the war is not total and complete.

Reports from Pakistan say that the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda have even set up a radio station, Azad-e-Afghanistan, in the North West Frontier Province-Balochistan belt. According to the Pakistani media, "they don't broadcast regularly, but whenever they go on air, they relay Quranic verses pertaining to jehad and other messages, to boost the morale of locals and to encourage them to fight against the U.S. infidels.'' People in the Pakistani tribal areas have also been receiving shabnamas or night letters.

Again, going by the media reports, Osama bin Laden has become a cult figure not only in Pakistan but also in the entire Islamic world. A shopkeeper in Karachi told the Newsline (April 2003) that "in the last two weeks, I have sold at least 20,000 Osama pictures. The pictures particularly in demand were images of bin Laden against the Twin Towers carrying the message, Down with America.'' With feelings running high in the wake of the U.S. war on Iraq, most of the Pakistanis see Osama as the only ray of hope in the Islamic world to challenge U.S. imperialism. If this is the situation, Osama and his associates can find safe havens in every city, town and village in and around Pakistan. Even the official machinery, though it has publicly made tactical shifts in its support to the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda, knows that the U.S. cannot do in Pakistan what it did in Iraq or Afghanistan.

For the time being, it appears that there is a stalemate in the hunt for Osama and Mullah Omar. As for the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda, sufficient time has been given to them by their friends in Pakistan to regroup. And, apparently, not to disturb the status quo, the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda have started attacking Western objects outside Pakistan.

(The writer is Visiting Professor, School of International Studies, JNU.)

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