The Hindu : Indo-Pak. talks and Rawalpindi

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Thursday, Jun 05, 2003

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Indo-Pak. talks and Rawalpindi

By C. Raja Mohan

India certainly does not have the luxury of simply choosing between the Pakistan Army and the civilian leadership.

AS INDIA goes through a tortuous phase of confidence-building with Pakistan and prepares for a formal dialogue, there is one important question that stands out. Who should India talk to in Pakistan?

Should it talk to General Pervez Musharraf, the President and Army Chief of Pakistan, or the Prime Minister, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali? In theory, Mr. Jamali is the top gun of the political system in Pakistan. The reality is that Gen. Musharraf calls the shots on key questions. There is no simple answer to India's diplomatic dilemma on finding the right interlocutor in Pakistan.

India must certainly think through the problem, since the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, has staked so much on the prospects for peace with Pakistan. Mr. Vajpayee has indicated that his latest gamble for peace with Islamabad is not a mere tactical manoeuvre. He has repeatedly signalled in the last few weeks the political will in New Delhi for a serious negotiation on the vexatious subject of Jammu and Kashmir. Mr. Vajpayee has hinted that if Pakistan creates the right environment for the talks, India is ready to consider a final settlement of the Kashmir question.

It is in this context that finding the appropriate interlocutor in Pakistan has become so important. Just as in India, the internal situation in Pakistan remains an important and unpredictable variable in the engagement between the two nations. In any negotiations between two states which have had a hostile relationship for so long, managing the domestic front is often more demanding than negotiating agreements with the adversary. Gaining internal support for settling territorial questions loaded with ideological baggage is even more challenging.

Mr. Vajpayee is widely seen as having the political standing to make an agreement on Kashmir stick. But it is not clear if Mr. Jamali, Mr. Vajpayee's counterpart at least in protocol terms, is in a position to negotiate and sell substantive agreements with India.

The tension between the civilian and the military establishment in Pakistan has always created complications in the dialogue between the two nations. India knows that the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army based in Rawalpindi holds a veto over all potential outcomes of a dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad.

The asymmetry in the nature of power structures in India and Pakistan and the unique role of the army next door have been realities India has had to deal with in the past.

Mr. Jamali has already emerged as a de facto interlocutor for Mr. Vajpayee. But can India afford to ignore Gen. Musharraf? The rest of the world, including the United States, understands that Gen. Musharraf is the principal force in Pakistan. The diplomatic approach of most nations towards Pakistan is premised on this political reality.

All major Governments assess that the authority for final decisions on key issues relating to foreign policy and national security vests with the Army in Pakistan. The proposition that Gen. Musharraf must be the prime interlocutor for India, then, presents itself.

But not so fast. India certainly knows that it was Gen. Musharraf who scuttled the peace process that was initiated by Mr. Vajpayee along with his counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, in 1998-99. Mr. Sharif, who was ousted by Gen. Musharraf and is now exiled in Jeddah, is not only bitter about Gen. Musharraf but also complains that India has decided to engage the Army leadership notwithstanding its recent record. Any final settlement, Mr. Sharif seemed to suggest in a recent conversation with a senior Indian journalist, that is not endorsed by the civilian leaders of Pakistan will lack legitimacy in the public eye. This is a sentiment that is echoed by the only other credible leader in Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto. This is not a view that India can easily dismiss.

That brings us back to the original question. Should India deal with the military, the dominant force in Pakistan or should it focus on the elected Government? This perpetual dilemma is further complicated by the fact that the Pakistan Army is also implacably hostile to India.

Pragmatists in India might say deal with the devil in Pakistan since it is the Army alone that can deliver a final peace settlement. Cynics will counter that the Army has no desire for peace with India. The Army in Pakistan will have a lot to lose if there is even a normalisation of relations with India, let alone a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The Army's power in Pakistan is built on sustaining hostility towards India, in the absence of which it will find it difficult to sustain its political pre-eminence. Would it be wise for India to expect that Gen. Musharraf, who is the Chief Executive of a huge enterprise called the Pakistan Army, will issue an ordinance that will undercut his own corporation?

Here then is the paradox: those who have the power in Pakistan to settle with India do not have an incentive; and those who might want peace have no power to deliver. New Delhi has no choice but to cope with this real political challenge. It must find a sophisticated response that brings together many dimensions of engagement with Pakistan to create a sustainable peace process. India certainly does not have the luxury of simply choosing between the Army and the civilian leadership.

India has a long-term interest in promoting economic modernisation and political moderation in Pakistan. Its ability to move Pakistan away from compulsive hostility against India will depend on reducing the centrality of the Army in the Pakistani society. Engagement of the civilian leadership and boosting its political profile must be an essential part of India's basic strategy towards Pakistan. But it also cannot ignore the reality in the near-term that a peace process with Pakistan cannot be sustained if the GHQ in Rawalpindi is not on board.

India, rightly, will hold official negotiations with the Jamali Government. There will be some opportunity to engage the armed forces of Pakistan in the formal discussions on border management and military and nuclear confidence-building measures. Beyond that, it is important for India to devise a variety of other mechanisms to discuss difficult political subjects with the Army leadership, including Gen. Musharraf.

Even more urgent for India is to encourage greater contact with the full spectrum of Pakistani civil society. Rather than obstructing such contacts, it is in New Delhi's interest to facilitate them. It must encourage Pakistani political leaders of all hues, including those who represent the religious parties, to come here and express their views on Indo-Pak. relations and on the nature of a final settlement to the Kashmir dispute. This process should take place in tandem with the informal engagement of the Pakistan Army. For, New Delhi cannot succeed in normalising relations with Islamabad without a broader support from the people of Pakistan as well as a wink and nod from Rawalpindi. That, in turn, calls for an Indian diplomacy pursued in many different tracks and at many levels.

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