The Hindu : Indo-Pak. peace efforts

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Tuesday, Jun 10, 2003

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Indo-Pak. peace efforts

By Ashutosh Misra

The first challenge is to create a proper political ambience for talks before talks. The eventual resolution of the pending issues will rest on the success of these pre-talks.

THE PRIME Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee's extension of olive branch from Srinagar has opened up a host of possibilities for the normalisation of India-Pakistan relations. It came as a pleasant surprise for many, within and outside the Government. Despite Mr. Vajpayee's pre-condition of "end to cross-border terrorism before talks", the Pakistani establishment and the media, which was initially not too enthusiastic about the offer, gradually adopted a more positive approach. The Pakistan Prime Minister, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, also surprised his critics in both the countries, by calling up his counterpart over the phone, welcoming the offer and expressing hope of a turnaround in bilateral relations.

With the two leaders taking the initiative to work towards an eventual normalisation of estranged bilateral ties, there is a pressing need for the two Governments, the media and public constituencies to proceed with caution. Past experience warrants that India and Pakistan tread a slow, steady and cautious path. Hopes that were built on the sheer symbolism of Lahore bus diplomacy (followed by the Kargil intrusion) and the Agra summit meeting came crashing down within a short period, leading to despair and frustration, more on the Indian side. It is, therefore, necessary that proper groundwork is done before formal negotiations begin.

The Foreign Minister, Yashwant Sinha, in his `road map' for peace, rightly called for "groundwork" before the Secretary-level talks and the eventual summit meeting materialise. A lot is being said about "ground work" before formal negotiations in the media and the political and executive circles. But what does it entail? Groundwork means ensuring that the two parties do their bit to make the situation ripe for talks. There should be a shared perception of the desirability of an eventual accord. A strong leadership, which can withstand domestic and external pressures, will also help in making the situation conducive for talks. Mr. Vajpayee's political clout and Mr. Jamali's political longevity, which is derived from the military and the U.S.' backing, has played a vital role in pushing forward the present initiative. Political will appears to be prevailing on both sides, but only for negotiating on the existing issues. Whether it will also result in the signing of an agreement and implementing it is the real question.

The `road map' which Mr. Sinha referred to is a critical component that carries in its gamut more than the path to negotiations. It proposes what the two parties need to do before the actual talks begin. In other words, there is a need for "pre-negotiations" or talks before talks. Pre-negotiations mean that India and Pakistan have to first line up the issues (set the agenda). They then need to "define the problems" and "develop a commitment to negotiate" on them.

Take cross-border terrorism or Kashmir for instance. For India, terrorism across the border is not just a concern — ending it is a "practical necessity". Pakistan says it does not abet cross-border terrorism and that it is only a domestic struggle of the Kashmiris. Again, India says that Kashmir is not the "core issue" and that the issue is more about the "problem in Kashmir" rather than the "problem of Kashmir". It does not recognise Kashmir as a dispute and therefore discussing the legality of its accession to the Indian Union does not arise at all. Whereas for Pakistan, the "disputed territory" of Kashmir is the "core issue", which should be resolved to normalise relations with India. There are two definitions of the problem, which implies that the parties are, in fact, looking at two different aspects. In the pre-negotiations stage, another essential component is "lowering of the conflict". As Mr. Vajpayee wondered, what if an India-Pakistan match is being played and news of terrorist killings come in from Kashmir. The same could derail negotiations.

Therefore, it is important that the intensity of the conflict i.e., terrorist killings in Kashmir, shelling on the International Border, and other subversive activities are reduced to the bare minimum, if not stopped completely (as Pakistan argues). This will help create a climate for the two parties to sit and discuss frankly and comfortably.

The two countries should exchange all the necessary data, facts, figures and other related information before the formal negotiations begin. New Delhi should provide all the details of cross-border terrorism in its possession, such as the number of terrorist camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, infiltration figures, linkages etc. Likewise, Islamabad should provide the necessary counter information. Then there are other factors such as building a domestic consensus to strengthen the leadership and give the nod for the eventual talks. Both India and Pakistan have built up considerable domestic consensus for talks. Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Jamali should also provide the domestic political climate for negotiations. It is heartening to see that there is a fair bit of pragmatism prevailing on both sides. Mr. Jamali has already ruled out the chances for any summit level meeting (saying "though the ice has melted, summit level talks may take time") unless proper homework is done. He has called for "spade work" before talks and creating conditions for ministerial and diplomatic-level talks. For the same reason, Mr. Vajpayee also declined Mr. Jamali's invitation to go to Pakistan.

In the present situation, unilateral gestures can also do their vital bit in making the climate conducive for talks. One instance of this is Pakistan agreeing not to raise the Kashmir issue at the United Nations Security Council special session on "the role of U.N. in the settlement of disputes". This has been taken positively in the Indian political circles. Similarly, resumption of air and rail links, liberalisation of visa formalities and resumption of full diplomatic relations would help dispel the air of antagonism and relax the environ for the negotiators. The two leaders know that the overall relations and the prospects of bilateral talks rest on a razor sharp edge, and any complacency may scuttle the entire peace momentum.

No wonder they are approaching the development with utmost caution and sensitivity. The first challenge is to create a proper political ambience for talks before talks. The eventual resolution of the pending issues will rest on the success of these pre-talks. The positive aspect is that India and Pakistan have a history of cooperation, which, if highlighted, will present a totally different picture, which is not as hostile as it seems.

(The writer is a research fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.)

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