The Hindu : The India-China engagement

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, Jun 16, 2003

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The India-China engagement

By K. K. Katyal

The approach now is to de-emphasise differences and to stress — and to build upon — common views and positions.

DURING ONE of my visits to China, the crazy idea of buying authentic silk led me to the interior of the old part of Beijing. That was during the celebrations of the golden jubilee of the revolution — in October 1999 — when, because of restrictions on main roads, the traffic was diverted to side streets. The car had to be discarded in favour of a cycle-rickshaw. Soon after, I found myself in the maze of passways, some so narrow that only one rickshaw could pass at a time. The residential buildings, old and in run-down conditions, seemed to be tilting over passers-by. This part, which foreigners are not encouraged to visit, was in sharp contrast to the new areas of Beijing, what with eight-lane roads, appropriately laced with rows of flower plants, high-rise posh buildings with massive glass frontages and concrete columns, swanky shopping malls and flyovers — modern, every inch.

My local escort explained it as a case of two Chinas, one developed, the other undeveloped. This was also evident from other known contrasting pictures — the advanced coastal region and backward interior areas or prosperous urban centres and poverty-stricken rural parts. This, high-ups in the Government and non-government think-tanks explained, led them to concentrate on the betterment of backward sectors. The development imperative, it was pointed out, also shaped foreign policy approaches, with stress on stable relations with neighbours. "We want our Indian friends to realise this", was the oft-repeated remark then. The point is stressed again now as the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, is due to visit China — the first trip at that level after 10 years.

The stability-related dimension of Chinese policy is not disputed in India. At the same time, delay by China in proceeding with normalising measures like clarifying and confirming the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and recognising Sikkim as part of India causes disquiet. There is a slight improvement in the perceptions of each side of the other, but the potential for friction needs to be rooted out in order to instil confidence and trust, both in the immediate and long-term context. Those engaged in the intensive preparatory work for the Prime Minister's visit in the two capitals are often heard mentioning two expressions — "qualitatively new relationship" and "the vision for the future" in the bilateral field.

These may well figure in some form or the other in the joint declaration, summing up the outcome of Mr. Vajpayee's talks with his Chinese interlocutors, notably the President and General Secretary of the Communist Party, Hu Jintao.

Their discussions are certain to have a strong economic and political content. The surge in trade — it was $ 5 billion last year and may be higher this time — has generated optimism that the target of $ 10 billion, set by the former Chinese Prime Minister, Zhu Rongji, during his visit to India in January last year, may be met sooner than expected. The presence of top Indian figures from business and industry in China during the Prime Minister's stay is proposed to be utilised for discussions on ways to increase mutual investments and for starting joint ventures. Then there is the question of coordinating strategies in the WTO and other major economic fora.

Of late, the two sides have been bending over backwards to dispel the perception of their posing threats to each other. Nothing demonstrated the sea change on this issue more dramatically than the Defence Minister, George Fernandes' recent visit to China and the red carpet treatment accorded to him. A far cry from April 1998, when Mr. Fernandes became the symbol of unfriendliness or from May that year when India justified, in letters to the U.S. and others, the conduct of nuclear tests because of the China factor. The approach now is to de-emphasise differences and to stress — and to build upon — common views and positions. As noted by the Chinese ambassador in India, Huo Junduo, the two countries have "put in place an array of consultation mechanisms on boundary, security, counter-terrorism and foreign policy planning and other issues". This process is intended to be continued and some specific measures may be finalised during the Prime Minister's visit — for instance, institutionalising of consultations at high levels, with one or two meetings of Foreign Ministers in a year. The direct flights between India and China, started early last year, are intended to be used to promote people-to-people exchanges and give a fillip to tourism. Memoranda of understanding will be signed on issues related to science and technology, culture, education and judicial matters. The last subject is important because of China's plans to set up a judicial system to instil confidence among the foreigners. During Mr. Zhu Rongji's visit last year, Chinese lawyers had interacted with their Indian counterparts to get a first-hand idea of the working of the judicial system here.

The downplaying of differences may not come in the way of discussion on sensitive matters such as Sikkim, the clarification of the LAC and, of course, the main boundary issue. On the eve of high-level visits in the past, hopes were invariably aroused of a finality on Sikkim. As a matter of fact, the Chinese side encouraged optimistic speculation but, in practice, there was no progress. China has made known its de facto acceptance of Sikkim as part of India — through its conduct at the border — but hesitated from according de jure recognition. Does it want a major concession as a quid pro quo?

The way the Chinese exchange mail and other postal items at the Sikkim border or conduct meetings of military commanders to sort out local problems shows that they treat it as the Indian territory. But they hesitate in taking the next step, of treating it legally as a part of India. For that, they suggest the border trade route — saying that the conduct of border transactions would lead to the finality that India wants. It seems odd but it is there. How the Sikkim case is handled during the Prime Minister's visit and what is the outcome of his talks on the subject will depend on the course of the preparatory talks, now on in Beijing. China's final acceptance, needless to say, would be a major gesture of friendliness.

The delay in the clarification process, as already mentioned, has only served to convey negative signals here. Of the three sectors, the middle one has seen encouraging progress, with the two sides exchanging maps. The western sector that was taken up next proved to be a tough nut right from the beginning, with eight areas of contention. There are six such cases in the eastern sector, which are yet to be taken up.

It is 10 years since the agreement on confirming the LAC was signed and as seen here, there is no justification for the leisurely pace of negotiations. To say this is not to play down the significance of the agreement to maintain peace and stability on the border which held its ground even during the difficult period — of strained ties in the wake of India's nuclear tests.

The coming high-level contact is also important in the context of the changing strategic equations in the world, especially in the Gulf region and West Asia, with Iraq bringing about a major transformation. China had disapproved of the unilateral U.S. attack on Iraq but did not go as far as, say, France, which threatened to veto any move to secure legality from the U.N. Security Council. India, too, opposed the unilateral action but kept its criticism (ninda) at a low key.

There has, thus, been, an identity of views, which, hopefully, may extend to post-Iraq situations. China is opposed to other countries sending their troops to Iraq to join the "stabilisation force". However, India, which has received such a request, is yet to make up its mind. Both India and China may have reasons to worry about the play of unipolarity but, at the same time, each one, in its own way, is busy building up strategic relationship with the U.S. There is a clear Lakshman rekha, which the two would not cross, both in their actions and in the matter of rhetoric.

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