The Hindu : Troops to Iraq

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Wednesday, Jun 18, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Troops to Iraq

By Chinmaya R. Gharekhan

The Americans are in Iraq for a long haul, at least a couple of years. The wise course for India might be not to rush into a decision.

THE GOVERNMENT in New Delhi seems to be facing a tough decision on the question of participating in the U.S.-led and U.S.-commanded enforcement mission in Iraq. Instinctively perhaps, it would like to respond positively to the American request to send a contingent of Indian troops to Iraq. The consideration could be that such a gesture on our part would be sufficient to act as the final seal on the vastly improved relations between the two countries. After all, a friend is one who extends his helping hand in time of real need and the Americans are in genuine, even desperate, need of help in Iraq at this stage. On the other hand, there is the public opinion, the resolution of Parliament and, most important of all, the Assembly elections to think and worry about.

There is little doubt that Iraq is proving to be a far more difficult nut to digest than was expected by the American planners, or by anyone else for that matter. Iraq is unlikely to turn out to be what Vietnam was for them in the 1960s or what Afghanistan became for the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Rather, it could become similar to what Sri Lanka was for India in the 1990s. The Indian peacekeeping contingent went to Sri Lanka as friends and saviours of the Jaffna Tamils and ended up provoking their hostility to India to such an extent that they murdered our youthful former Prime Minister. Whatever may be said about the Indian performance in Sri Lanka, there were and are no two opinions about India's intentions, which were strictly honourable. In any case, India was invited by the legitimate Government of Sri Lanka to send its troops.

The American intervention in Iraq, on the other hand, was prompted by self interest, some would say imperial considerations. One, and not the dominant one, factor was to "liberate" the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein's oppressive rule. The Americans are learning the hard way that the "liberated" are not necessarily grateful to the "liberators". Nations, like individuals, do not learn from the mistakes of others.

If the proposal were for India to send troops or police as a part of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, the Government would not have hesitated for a moment in deciding in favour. However, this is an entirely American enterprise and any country that might wish to help the Americans out in restoring order and stability in Iraq will have to operate under the command of the American General. This has been made absolutely clear in Security Council resolution 1483. If the resolution had been drafted in a diplomatically less offensive language, it would have made life easier for many. Nevertheless, there is a precedent of sorts, in case the Government was looking for one, which might help.

In 1992, the situation in Somalia had attracted the sympathetic attention of the entire international community. The complete absence of law and order had made the warlords virtual masters of their respective turfs. There was no government in the country. Humanitarian aid could not be reached to the needy since the warlords looted it and collected hefty fees for allowing at least a part of it to be distributed. The Security Council had authorised the deployment of around 500 peacekeepers to ensure the unhindered distribution of humanitarian assistance, but they could not be deployed because they did not have the authority and lacked the means to impose discipline on the unruly elements.

There was enormous pressure on the American Government of the day, the administration of Bush Sr. "to do something". The President was willing but insisted on endorsement from the United Nations. The Security Council, of which India was a member, passed a resolution in December 1992, welcoming the willingness of "a member-state" to send forces to Somalia to help in the humanitarian situation. The U.S. Marines, with CNN and other news media covering the event, mounted operation `Restore Hope' around Christmas time.

Although not a blue-helmet operation, countries around the world readily joined in it and functioned strictly under American command. The Government of the day in India decided that it would well serve India's interests if it were to participate, however symbolically, in operation `Restore Hope'. Accordingly, a small task force of the Indian Navy, comprising a guided missile corvette, an LST and a tanker, was deployed off Somalia as soon as the operation was launched. The Indian Navy spent a total of 347 ship days maintaining vigil along the Somali coast and ports during 1992-93.

Subsequently, when the U.N. deployed a full-fledged peace enforcement force in Somalia in which an Indian Army brigade performed with great distinction, a naval task force, consisting of two guided missile frigates and a tanker with their organic air elements, successfully de-inducted the last of the Indian forces from Kismayu in southern Somalia in December 1994 and later supported the de-induction of the Indian brigade from the capital, Mogadishu.

Though the two situations are vastly different, the Somalia precedent could be relevant in the sense that India participated in a U.S.-led and commanded military operation. The question of who will finance our participation is also important since taking part in a peacekeeping operation does not come cheap. The most crucial aspect to consider, of course, is the reaction of the Iraqi people to India's participation as an American ally and the fear of our troops or police getting bogged down and even losing lives in an unfriendly and hostile environment. Domestic Muslim reaction could be negative, as could the reaction of other Muslim nations.

\If possible, the Government should consult with the leaders of the Iraqi opposition within the country such as the Shia leadership, people like Ahmed Chalabi as well as with the leaders of Iraq's neighbours and countries such as Egypt. Ideally, India should have company of some Muslim or Arab country in such an exercise.

If at all India opts for sending a security contingent to Iraq under the U.S. command, we should be clear in our minds about the motivation. Doing this simply to earn American goodwill would be wrong because we are not likely to get much from the U.S. except a "thank you" and a public acknowledgement of our help from the American President. We should not expect any quid pro quo in our problems with Pakistan. We have interests in West Asia; will sending troops to Iraq enhance India's image in the region? Will it help protect our investments in Iraq's oilfields? Will it lead to increased chances of our participation in Iraq's reconstruction as and when it happens? On the other hand, if our contingent gets stuck in Iraq's quagmires, how much damage can it cause to our prestige and interests?

According to present indications, the Americans are in Iraq for a long haul, at least a couple of years. The wise course for India might be not to rush into a decision. In addition to carrying out consultations as suggested above, we should convey to the Americans that it would be a great help if they could persuade one or more `like-minded' countries to join us in helping them.

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