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News Analysis
By K. K. Katyal
The two appointments will undo the disruption of the communication channels between the two capitals and, as such, are to be hailed. Also, the plan to restart the Delhi-Lahore bus service has been finalised, with all political and administrative problems sorted out. However, the momentum of the peace initiative that began with the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, "extending the hand of friendship'' to Pakistan on April 18 has slowed down. There is enough evidence to that effect. In the absence of other steps, envisaged or expected earlier, the positioning of the High Commissioners in New Delhi and Islamabad, by itself, will be in the nature of an "action taken'' case. A positive development, no doubt, but its potential will remain unutilised unless the measures already announced by the two sides are pursued seriously and steps taken to expand the area of cooperative efforts. Sadly, the requisite political will is missing. At the same time, mutual recriminations are on the increase. The appointment of the High Commissioners will be useful only when the strength of the two missions is restored to the original levels. It was cut down from 110 to 45 in each case, and even at this reduced level there are three vacancies in New Delhi and one in Islamabad. Because of this, it may be difficult to perform normal functions, notably the issuance of visas, an essential prerequisite to promote people-to-people contacts. For regenerating the momentum of the peace move, action in at least four areas is essential. One, a joint resolve to stop bickerings; two, restoration of the position that existed at the time of the attack on Parliament; three, devising and implementing confidence-building measures; and, four, to strive for establishment of contacts, beginning with, say, at middle official level, as part of an incremental process, leading to a summit at an appropriate stage. The euphoria over Mr. Vajpayee's initiative was short-lived, partly because of internal pressures in the two countries. The leadership of the two countries succumbed to the temptation of appeasing the lobbies, inimical to the peace process, the latest example being the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf's talk of repeating Kargil and Mr. Vajpayee's retort that this was an invitation by Pakistan to a "fourth defeat''. Simultaneously, the focus shifted from bilateral moves to competitive wooing of the U.S. on the eve of the American visits by the Deputy Prime Minister, L. K. Advani, and Gen. Musharraf. Pakistan, in particular, called for American intervention (what else was Gen. Musharraf's plea to Washington to come out with a West Asia-type road map for Kashmir, and, earlier, his demand for an "arms embargo'' on India by the West?). There are several examples of the hostile rhetoric, especially by Pakistan, that served to spoil the atmosphere. To get back to the situation before the attack, the two sides will need to restore air, road and rail links (apart from appointing the High Commissioners). These items had figured in the public statements of Mr. Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart, Zafarullah Khan Jamali. Mr. Vajpayee in his Parliament statement on May 2 spoke of the decision by the two sides to appoint the High Commissioners and restore civil aviation links on a reciprocal basis. Also, he re-emphasised the importance of substantive progress on the decision for regional trade and economic cooperation taken at the SAARC Kathmandu summit in January last year. In reply, Mr. Jamali, on May 6, made two categories of suggestions. One for return to the pre-December 13, 2001, situation restoration of rail, road and air links and full strength of the two diplomatic missions and, two, some confidence-building measures, notably the MoU (on nuclear and other matters) signed at the time of Mr. Vajpayee's bus journey to Lahore in February 1999. This was a welcome change from the earlier position taken by the military regime after the coup. Why have the moves for restoration of air and rail links not taken off? Pakistan, while agreeing to restoration of air links, went slow when it same to negotiations. It was keen on restoration of flights but dragged its feet on removing the embargo on overflights in the belief that the ban hurt India more. It thus let a petty issue jeopardise the entire peace process. On economic cooperation, Pakistan took shelter behind technicalities instead of acting on the Kathmandu SAARC summit's agreement. For a meaningful advance of the peace process there is a case for change of mind-set by the two sides, for bold action on measures to which they had committed themselves and for moderating the rhetoric.
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