The Hindu : Behind and beyond the `Tejas' success

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Saturday, Aug 02, 2003

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Behind and beyond the `Tejas' success

By C. Manmohan Reddy

A video grab of the Tejas in flight during a screening for the media in Bangalore on Friday.

BANGALORE AUG. 1. India's light combat aircraft (LCA), `Tejas', which went supersonic today, first flew on January 4, 2001 and its maiden supersonic sortie was the type's 94th. These 94 flights have been split between the two `technology demonstrators', TD 1 and 2. TD 1 was the first to fly, at the hands of Wing Commander Rajiv Kothiyal, and it has now also gone supersonic first.

Project definition of a programme to design and develop an advanced LCA contemporary with the best of its kind worldwide began in 1987. This LCA was not only meant to replace the hundreds of MiG-21 interceptors in the Indian Air Force's (IAF) inventory, but also to be a true multi-role aircraft. Dassault, of France, helped the fledgling Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) in this early phase, but the government gave the formal financial sanction to go ahead with the programme only in June 1993. The initial funding of Rs. 2,188 crores met the design, construction and flight-testing of the first two technology demonstrators with no overruns whatsoever. Remarkably, enough was saved in this phase to construct the first two, of five further, prototypes on the same budget.

Without getting carried away by the supersonic symbolism, especially since the last indigenously developed combat aircraft, the HF-24, first flew in 1961, a critical examination of what has been accomplished so far, shows that the programme has already accomplished a lot. The most important target of the technology demonstration phase was to put to trial successfully the composite airframe, the `glass cockpit' and the fly-by-wire (FBW) system with a rigorous flight-testing programme, initially using General Electric F 404 engines.

The modern aerodynamic design, a `full glass cockpit', advanced combat avionics and optronics, full authority digital electronic control (FADEC) of the engine and up-to-date weapons systems, including beyond visual range air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, suggest that the LCA will be comparable to the latest versions of the American F-16 or the French Mirage 2000. Its small size and the extensive use of composites also make this agile aircraft considerably stealthier than its formidable competitors, without the aerodynamically inefficient compromises of, for example, the American F-117 `stealth' fighter.

Looking back, the development of advanced carbon composites for the airframe was very successful, with specialised software having been sold even to Airbus Industrie. And the critical flight control system was developed in spite of Lockheed Martin withdrawing its assistance in the wake of the Pokhran nuclear blasts of 1998. On the other hand, the development of the Kaveri engine has fallen behind and the Tejas is not expected to fly with it until 2008.

Less than a hundred sorties have been undertaken so far of the thousand plus that are needed before the aircraft can meet initial operational capability, and weapons and combat avionics integration has not even begun. Hence, flight-testing is now critical. If all five prototypes, in addition to TD 1 and 2, take to the air by 2005, this initial capability is expected in 2006-2007 and the IAF should receive its first eight limited series aircraft soon thereafter.

The decision to adopt a digital FBW system added considerably to the development process. This was only partly accounted for (perhaps by about 18 months) by the curtailment of Lockheed Martin's critical assistance. To lament that if Dassault's offer of an analogue system in 1988 had been accepted the flight test programme could easily have been completed by now will be to cry over spilt milk. On the other hand, the LCA's quadruplex digital FBW system is what the world's most advanced aircraft currently use and an analogue system may already have been a prime target for replacement. By way of analogy, the F-16 replaced analogue with digital controls while morphing from its original A/B form to the much more capable F-16 C/D in the 1990s.

This long delay has not been in vain, however, because it has allowed the parallel development and indigenisation of hundreds of the little known systems and components that are an essential part of all aircraft. One such is the beautifully designed auxiliary gearbox developed by the Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE), Avadi, that is nearly 60 per cent cheaper than an imported one.

The learning process has also allowed Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to shorten considerably the development time of its intermediate jet trainer (IJT) and to make common use of nearly 50 per cent of the LCA's line replaceable units. More important, India's capability in indigenous aircraft development is at last close to being vindicated a quarter century after Raj Mahindra's brilliant and wide-ranging design initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s. His last effort, the `Saras' light transport prototype from the National Aerospace Laboratory, rolled out in February 2003 and will take to the air later this year.

All this background is relevant in the context of charges and counter-charges that have been made with regard to the programme. There is no doubt that the LCA's programme managers took on the ambitious task of developing an advanced aircraft without realistically estimating the resources required to accomplish their goals in the face of an often sceptical IAF and a not always fully committed HAL. They then lost a great deal of credibility by projecting completion dates that were downright unrealistic and misleading. They even made a presentation to the U.S. Department of Defence in 1985 claiming that the LCA would fly in 1990. India's financial crises of the early 1990s and post-Pokhran 1998 embargoes only added to their woes.

The end result of their struggle is, however, an aircraft that the IAF now knows will soon be a superb multi-role fighter. In the same vein, the ADA and HAL are now the best of friends and are working closely together. The latter has already installed some of the production facilities needed to manufacture the eight production standard LCAs ordered last year.

Some critics of the LCA do not seem to realise that affordability is a factor that even the U.S. has learnt to accept, as was shown by the awarding to Lockheed Martin in 2001 of the formal contract to develop the joint strike fighter (JSF). The JSF is in some ways less capable than the U.S. Air Force's F-22 or the U.S. Navy's F/A-18 E/F, but its affordability makes it essential to both the Services. Incidentally, Lockheed has acknowledged that its design was `vetted' by Yakovlev, the Russian design bureau, before the winning prototype was finalised.

That the losing finalist, Boeing, chose not to do so tells its own story and gives the lie to those in India who think that the countries that were once a part of the Soviet Union, and Russia in particular, only has obsolete technology to offer.

Estimates made last year put the cost of a production standard Tejas at about Rs.100 crores (nearly $22 million) per aircraft even with American F 404 engines. One needs to compare this with aircraft of similar capability, such as the multi-role Mirage 2000-5, which Taiwan bought paying French francs 333 million apiece in the mid-1990s. At current exchange rates, that amounts to approximately $57 million. Today, inflation has taken that up to nearly $70 million. Unless Indian inflation rates rise to three times those of France (they are currently about the same), the cost of Tejas would be one third, or at least $45 million cheaper, when it enters service. This is no mean achievement.

Even if the IAF orders only 250 aircraft, although it needs many more of the class, India will save at least $11,250 million in initial acquisition costs alone compared to a fresh Mirage 2000 purchase, with international rules of thumb typically placing through-life costs at least three times as much.

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